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Theory 
 
This study aims to clarify the underlying conceptual structure of Adorno‟s theoretical 
position with regard to both philosophy and art and to examine the expectation of 
philosophical aesthetics. I introduce Aesthetic Theory from a morphological point of view 
and claim that the form and structure of this unfinished text reveals a great deal about the 
book, as it exemplifies Adorno‟s theory of meaning.  I claim that for Adorno dialectic is 
better thought of not in its Hegelian form but as a Kantian antinomy. This is because the 
dialectical oppositions he identifies cannot be resolved under the capitalist conditions of 
the administered world. I claim that philosophy understood as the construction of a form 
of totality, the constellation, provides the key to understanding Adorno‟s theory of 
meaning. This theory consists of three linked concepts: midpoint, constellation and 
parataxis. I further claim that for Adorno art and philosophy are structured in the same 
way. Adorno has in effect developed a conception of art that depends for its ultimate 
justification on the concept of rank as explicated by the completion of the work of art by 
philosophy. Art and theory are thus entwined in a mimetic relationship.  I claim there is a 
temporal dichotomy at the centre of Adorno‟s conception of the work of art, that it is both 
transient and absolute. This antinomy is what makes the work of art a paradoxically 
absolute commodity precisely because Adorno‟s concept of the work of art is modelled 
on the commodity form. I claim that Adorno‟s conception of the artwork as an instant is 
clearly closely related, in a structural and conceptual sense, to his conception of how 
philosophy works. Truth for Adorno is always located in the present instant. My textual 
analysis leads me to claim that for Adorno a utopian element is involved in writing a 
negative dialectical text. Finally, I claim that a theory of the art form in all its different 
typologies is best suited to carry out detailed critique and theoretical reflection on 
contemporary art. Philosophical aesthetics can only supply an historical perspective.   
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P R E F A C E  
„In order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, he [the philosopher] must first bind it in 
fetters of rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and preserve its 
living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words‟.1 
 
 „…the philosopher is always implicated in the problems he poses,‟ 2 
 
The second quotation above has a double significance for this study. First, Adorno always 
thought of himself as a musician. He was a skilled pianist but was also a composer. Early on in 
his life he was unsure whether he would become a composer or a philosopher. Second, for my 
own part as both a visual artist and student of philosophy I was attracted to Aesthetic Theory for 
two reasons. As a student of philosophy I have always been fascinated by texts that do not reveal 
their meaning on a first reading. As an artist I have always been engaged, as a reader, with 
aesthetics and art theory. I know from my own practice that there is an aspect to making art that is 
theoretical. This is because making is a form of thinking, just as writing is a form of thinking. The 
old saying that you only find out what you think by writing it down holds for painting too. 
In his essay Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel Adorno gives advice on reading Hegel. My 
methodology in what follows is to take Adorno‟s advice on how to understand Hegel and apply it 
to reading Adorno‟s Aesthetic Theory. The advice in question concerns the suggestion that 
reading for understanding, if done properly, if done immanently, will lead to a critique of what is 
to be understood. „Philosophy itself takes place within the permanent disjunction between the true 
and the false. Understanding takes place along with it and accordingly always becomes in effect, 
critique of what is to be understood when the process of understanding compels a different 
judgement than the one that is to be understood.‟3 Adorno has a second piece of advice about 
reading both Kant and Hegel that also applies to his own texts. It is generally accepted that almost 
any philosophical text if scrutinised minutely enough can be, in Heidegger‟s usage subjected to 
de-structuration. There is a danger, especially with Adorno, of taking quotations out of context 
and so giving them a false reading. Aesthetic Theory is eminently quotable and easily 
misconstrued. In his fourth lecture on Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason Adorno stresses how 
important it is to keep in view the wider intentions of the writer of the text.  
 
It is necessary for thinking about Kant - and to a far greater degree about Hegel - that the 
process of thought should carry a double movement. On the one hand, it should immerse 
itself in the text, and keep as closely to it as possible; on the other hand, it should retain a 
degree of self-control, remove itself from immediate contact and look at the ideas from a 
certain distance. This is because very many of the difficulties in Kant and Hegel, but also 
                                                                                                                                         
in Fichte and Schelling, arise when you scrutinize the texts too closely and so fail to 
recognise their intentions, whereas these can be perceived much more clearly at a 
distance.
4
 
 
The procedure for this investigation of Aesthetic Theory will be a close reading continually 
informed by a stepping back for a wider view.  
Aesthetic Theory is a book of and about philosophical aesthetics, and of and about art. 
The book has twin openings. The „Draft Introduction‟ asks whether aesthetics is still possible, 
whilst the opening section of the main text asks whether art is still possible. The two questions are 
connected because if there is no contemporary art then there will be no contemporary 
philosophical investigation of art, no aesthetics. It looks like a question about the end of art. 
However from Adorno‟s point of view it is equally a question about the end of philosophy. If 
philosophy is no longer possible then aesthetics is at an end. If art is understood as being 
inextricably bound up with philosophy, as it is for Adorno, then by implication art is at an end if 
the discipline that uncovers the truth of art is at an end. If modern art changes into anti-art then 
there might be nothing modern philosophy can do to explicate it other than turn into an anti-
philosophy. It is the relationship of art and philosophy for Adorno that is the main subject of this 
examination of Aesthetic Theory. 
Studying the history of philosophy is an essential part of contemporary philosophy, 
studying what Heideggerians call „the memory of thought‟5. Similarly, in order to study 
contemporary aesthetics it is essential to study the memory of aesthetic thought. This is the 
intended use of memory in the title of this thesis. Within the memory of aesthetics can be detected 
a conception that the philosophical discourse on aesthetics involves an element of expectation. 
This can be seen early on in the discourse, in Kant‟s theory of genius; „the genius gives the rule to 
art‟. It can also be found, far later, in the „Draft Introduction‟ to Aesthetic Theory. „The concrete 
historical situation of art registers concrete demands. Aesthetics begins with reflection on them; 
only through them does a perspective open on what art is. For art and artworks are exclusively 
what they are able to become.‟6 For Adorno, authentic contemporary artworks are the promise of 
future happiness as they point towards the possibility of a radically different, fully transformed, 
society in the future where art is no longer forced to be alienated in its opposition to the 
administered world of monopoly capitalism. Jean Marie Schaeffer also describes an aspect of 
expectation in modernist art, in his book, Art of the Modern Age, „… in “modernist” historicism 
the prospective dimension is essential: the past is not a completed model, it only represents the 
first steps of a future evolution.‟7 In his Futures Past Kosselleck argues that a significant change 
took place in the concept of history and the late eighteenth century so that it included a horizon of 
                                                                                                                                         
expectation.
8
 It is precisely these prospective elements in philosophical aesthetics that lie behind 
the use of „expectation‟ in the title of this thesis.  
The question „what is aesthetics?‟ is as difficult as any other „what is…?‟ question.  For 
over two hundred years in philosophical circles the word aesthetics has generally been shorthand 
for philosophical aesthetics, a branch or sub-division of Western philosophy. To complicate 
conceptual matters Western philosophy itself divided into three whilst the nature of aesthetics 
was still evolving, continental, pragmatic and analytic. Nowadays these philosophical boundaries 
are increasingly fluid. As a collective singular in ordinary English usage the word aesthetics has 
two main historical meanings. The first is „The science of the conditions of sensuous perception –
1803.‟ The second main historical meaning is itself divided in two: „The philosophy of taste or of 
the perception of the beautiful – 1833.‟9  Dr Johnson might well have kicked another stone and 
remarked grumpily that aesthetics „was something to do with art… whatever that is!‟ These three 
meanings are a clear pointer to conceptual confusion in the future. All classifications have fuzzy 
edges. At one time early investigators of the life sciences decided to classify living creatures into 
plants and animals, which was an „either… or…‟ classification.  Eventually viruses were 
identified that fit neither classification fully, but both partially, thus showing up an incipient 
problem in the original division into plants and animals. But, in historical terms, the original 
division was eminently rational given the state of knowledge at the time. It was only at a later 
time that it became problematic and at that later time zoology and botany seemed to theoreticians 
of the subjects to make more sense combined into biological science. An analogous change has I 
believe occurred with aesthetics. At the time when modern philosophical aesthetics developed, in 
the late eighteenth century and into the early nineteenth century, it existed as a branch of 
philosophy. Philosophy as a discipline, had, at that time magnificent grandiloquent pretensions to 
systematise thought. Nothing would escape philosophy, but everything did, except the study of 
itself. This in a nutshell is what I claim in this study has happened to aesthetics, it has become the 
study of the history of itself. Art has escaped aesthetics just as the virus foxed botany and 
zoology. Indeed one could agree with Adorno‟s tart observation in the „Draft Introduction‟ to 
Aesthetic Theory that Kant and Hegel were the last philosophers who were able „to write major 
aesthetics without understanding anything about art.‟10 Adorno, on the other hand, insisted on the 
importance of critique being targeted at a particular artwork as opposed to a genre. For Adorno 
each artwork exemplified Goethe‟s claim that „True works of art contain their own theory and 
give us the measurement according to which we should judge them.‟11 Whilst Goethe‟s claim can 
be understood as  a claim that works of art cannot be criticized, Adorno on the other hand 
believed, in line with the Jena Romantics, that works of art had to be completed in critique. 
                                                                                                                                         
Adorno understood music so well that his writings on music are better described as musicology 
than as aesthetics. However, Aesthetic Theory is probably best described as an extended 
meditation on the possibility and simultaneous impossibility of philosophical aesthetics.  
 Art is an open concept that evades definition. However, conceptual expertise and 
theoretical reflection exist for all forms of art. This theory of art forms cannot in all conscience 
any longer be called aesthetics. To begin with most of the experts in the theory of art forms are 
not philosophers. A few are, and as with some of Adorno‟s texts where philosophy ends and 
musicology begins, depends entirely on whether the reader is a philosopher or a musicologist. 
Judgement on such a text can be made meaningfully in either court, philosophy or musicology, 
and it is a nonsense to call either or both aesthetics. Neither does this mean that all forms of art 
form theory can be brought under the rubric of aesthetics for that would be to fall back into the 
old hegemonic philosophical ways of thinking of the time of Kant and Hegel. Philosophy can no 
longer take over the various discourses on the arts, all it can do is intervene for the sake of clarity 
by tracing the philosophical heritage of a conceptual formulation. In short to use the brief history 
of philosophical aesthetics as a tool to help analyse the origins of conceptual confusions, if this is 
philosophical aesthetics then it is a form of historical study. 
 In the first, introductory, chapter of this research project I open the first section by 
exploring the brief history of modern aesthetics in order to be in a position to introduce the text 
that forms the centrepiece of this investigation Aesthetic Theory. The reception of Aesthetic 
Theory has been short and partial in Anglophone studies. I introduce the text from a 
morphological point of view as the form and structure of this unfinished text reveals a great deal 
about the book as it exemplifies what in chapter two I identify as Adorno‟s theory of meaning, 
revolving as it does around his concept of the constellation. Aesthetic Theory is also an 
interdisciplinary text and in the second section of chapter one I examine the question of 
interdisciplinarity. It is Adorno‟s Marxist approach that helps define the interdisciplinary nature 
of Aesthetic Theory in that he does not recognise disciplinary boundaries as anything more than 
illusory divisions. However, it is also the case that within the tradition of continental philosophy, 
the historical hermeneutical sciences, such as anthropology, sociology and psychology have close 
and in some respect shared conceptualities with philosophy. In the final part of the first chapter I 
explore Adorno‟s conception of culture that stands in sharp contrast to the more recent cultural 
studies movement. 
 The second chapter is divided into three sections and in it I explore Adorno‟s 
philosophical and artistic position by employing the concept of totality in three related senses. I 
take three objects that for Adorno are all linked, capitalism, philosophy and artworks. I argue that 
                                                                                                                                         
each of these three objects can be best understood through three different methodological forms 
of totality: capitalism as negative totality, philosophy as constellation and artwork as monad. In 
the first section I argue that Adorno‟s conception of capitalism as a form of negative totality is 
fundamental to his world view. Whilst his concept of society is somewhat ambiguous and his 
ideas of the relationship between the individual and society seem to rule out meaningful 
collective action his philosophical position and his theory of the artwork are clearly fully 
informed and shaped by his Marxist position. I claim that for Adorno a dialectic is better thought 
of not as Hegelian in form, but as a Kantian antinomy. This is because the dialectical oppositions 
he identifies cannot be resolved under the capitalist conditions of the administered world. In the 
second section I claim that philosophy understood as a form of totality, the constellation, provides 
the key to understanding Adorno‟s theory of meaning. 
This theory consists of three linked concepts: midpoint, constellation and parataxis. 
Allied to these three concepts are the three ideas of formation, presentation and interpretative 
understanding. Reading a philosophical constellation of concepts involves for Adorno reading 
more than appears to be there at first sight. This is a paratactical reading that implies that for 
Adorno art and philosophy are structured in the same way. In the third section of this chapter I 
explore the artwork as totality. Adorno uses Liebniz as a model and takes the monad as an 
exemplar of the artwork because the monad is both a universal and a particular, both a thing and a 
being. Monads reflect the external world and are dynamic in time. Artworks for Adorno reflect 
the administered world of capitalism and are dynamic in time in that their interpretations change 
over time. I claim that for Adorno artworks and philosophy share the same abstract structure both 
take the only forms they can against the negative totality of capitalism. 
 The third chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I examine Adorno‟s 
conceptions of autonomous art and commodification and of success and coherence.  For Adorno 
both artworks and commodities share the same abstract structure. The success and coherence of 
works of art are explored next. It becomes clear that for Adorno art has to reach a level of 
coherence if it is to be classified as art and the judgement that an artwork is successful does not 
come from outside the work but is internal, the artwork is itself the source of its own norms. In 
the second section, construction, I explore two important ideas for Adorno‟s theory of the modern 
artwork, montage and mimesis. Montage is a form of construction where elements are brought 
together so they can be read, sometimes in an instant. Construction underlies twentieth century art 
for Adorno. Mimesis and construction are dialectically opposed for Adorno. I explore the 
complex inter-linked conceptions of mimesis in Aesthetic Theory. These range from mimesis in 
language, in art and in the interpretations of artworks. There is also an Aristotelian aspect to 
                                                                                                                                         
mimesis that is fundamental to artworks in that they mimic the other, the administered world. The 
last section of this chapter is concerned with judgement. Interpretation, commentary and critique 
are essential to the completion of an artwork by philosophy.  It is the spirit and truth content of an 
artwork that is recognised by philosophy. This is a position that effectively excludes non-
philosophers from the highest form of critical engagement with art. Adorno has in effect 
developed a form of definition of art that depends for its ultimate justification on the concept of 
rank as explicated by the completion of the work of art by philosophy. Art and theory and thus 
entwined in a mimetic relationship.   
 The fourth chapter is concerned with the temporalities in Aesthetic Theory.  I argue that 
four forms of time inform Aesthetic Theory: chronological time, historical time, the time of the 
artwork and phenomenological time. Adorno‟s Marxist philosophy of history seeks to understand 
the past in the present in the hope of effecting change in the future. This is an interpretation of 
„concrete history,‟ which he understands as a constellation. So for Adorno, history, like 
philosophy is modelled on structured forms. For Adorno there is a dialectical relationship 
between the new and the „ever the same‟ that is based on Marx‟s commodity form. Indeed I claim 
that Adorno‟s abstract concept of the artwork is modelled on the commodity form. The 
autonomous work of art is, like the commodity form, an illusion, a semblance, both subject and 
object, both being and thing, both a commodity and work of free spirit, both within time as 
transient  and an absolute, this is the relativity of artworks. This is the temporal dialectic at the 
centre of Adorno‟s conception of the work of art, that it is both transient and absolute. This 
antinomy is what makes the work of art an absolute commodity precisely because Adorno‟s 
concept of the work of art is modelled on the commodity form. The work of art is transient 
because the critique of it is always in a process of becoming and at any one historical moment this 
critique can in that historical moment reveal the truth, the absolute, about that work of art, a 
revelation of the truth in the metaphysical medium of philosophy: a truth that is always 
historically mediated. In the second section, musical time and phenomenological time are 
examined by means of a constructed historical narrative that seeks to trace Adorno‟s idea as to 
how musical time changed from the time of Bach to John Cage. Over this period of time Adorno 
argued that musical time became progressively spatialised. In addition Adorno believed that the 
works of the past were best interpreted by means of the works of the present. He thought Bach, 
for example, was best understood from the point of view of the music of Webern and Schoenberg. 
The less the music of the mid twentieth century seemed like earlier music, ceasing almost to be 
describable as music, the more it illuminated the past but the more it proved difficult to interpret. 
The constructed nature of Aesthetic Theory mirrors the constructed nature of contemporary music 
                                                                                                                                         
of the 1960s and equally evades easy interpretation. Underlying his conception of history is 
Adorno‟s fundamental belief that truth is historical, that the truth, the absolute aspect, of any 
work of art is only identified by philosophical critique. The truth of a work of art, its participation 
in the absolute, is always now in the present time of interpretation, commentary and critique. The 
final section examines Adorno‟s conception of the instant. Like many of Adorno‟s concepts his 
theory of the instant is derived from ideas of Walter Benjamin. The instant is the moment of truth 
in a work of art. The experiential time of an artwork culminates for Adorno in this strange 
encapsulation of the totality of what a work means in a short space of time, the blink of an eye. 
This is not a temporal experience in terms of either musical time or phenomenological time. It is a 
form of understanding described as if it were a temporal moment. Adorno‟s conception of the 
artwork as an instant is clearly closely related, in a structural and conceptual sense, to his 
conception of how philosophy works: in metaphorical terms, as a form of instant pattern-
recognition. This recognition of a moment also operates within his conception of history and in 
his theory that works of the past are best illuminated by the forms and structures of works in the 
present. The new reveals the old. The present moment then becomes the essential element in his 
conception of history, of art and of philosophy. Truth for Adorno is always located in the present 
instant. 
 In the final chapter, I analyse the topos of expectation in Aesthetic Theory from three 
viewpoints: his view on utopian expectation, his philosophical relationship with Heidegger and 
finally the relations between philosophical aesthetics and art theory. The main way Adorno thinks 
of utopia in Aesthetic Theory is as the negation of the administered world encapsulated within the 
freedom inherent in the making of an autonomous artwork. Further, the rationality of 
construction, derived from the administered world, may well, Adorno argues, point forward to 
perfected art forms in a future changed world. I claim that there is an epistemological utopia 
inherent in Adorno‟s style of writing. This can be identified in a paragraph at the end of the 
introduction to  Negative Dialectics where the utopian nature of conceptual thought when 
expressed by rhetoric in an antinomical text is visible. My analysis of this passage leads me to 
claim that this utopian element involved in writing a negative dialectical text is clearly closely 
related to the utopian aspect involved in the construction of an artwork and is another Adornian 
parallel between art and philosophy. The one-sided relationship between Heidegger and Adorno 
is well known. The parallels between Adorno and Heidegger are striking despite their obvious 
artistic, political and philosophical differences. Fundamentally they differ over their respective 
views on truth. For both Adorno and Heidegger truth is non-propositional. For Heidegger truth is 
a foundational revealing as exemplified in a great work of art that serves to found an historical 
                                                                                                                                         
epoch. Thus both the truth, the work and the epoch are only identifiable after the event. Whilst the 
work looks forward, it is only identified retrospectively. For Adorno by contrast the truth content 
of a work of art is a historically changing constellation of aesthetic elements as interpreted by 
philosophy. The truth content of a work of art is revealed, illusory as it is, by the external forms 
of interpretation, commentary and critique, but in an uncanny parallel to Heidegger this is always 
best done from the point of view of the present as retrospective understanding.  
In the final section I explore the antinomical and mimetic relationship between 
philosophical aesthetics and art-form theory with regard to the expectation of philosophical 
aesthetics. In Aesthetic Theory Adorno is clearly concerned about the obsolescence of aesthetics. 
This he argues is because aesthetics continually fails to confront its object the work of art. If one 
examines what texts do confront the artwork then today they are all to be found within the wide 
variety of art form theory. The interdisciplinary nature of the crossover between philosophical 
aesthetics and art form theory does not make art form theory philosophical aesthetics. Essentially 
art form theory discourses are related to philosophical aesthetics historically and yet have to 
operate as separate discourses in their own right. This leads to the overall question of the 
meaningful survival of philosophical aesthetics as a discipline theorising about any art forms in 
the present day. I claim that the expectation of philosophical aesthetics is now limited to its 
memory, limited to looking back. A great deal of philosophical aesthetics as practised today in 
academic circles is precisely an examination of aspects of the memory of philosophical aesthetics, 
it is a looking back, an industry of re-evaluations of theories from the short history of 
philosophical aesthetics. This is an archaeology of philosophical aesthetics. As long as there is a 
memory of philosophical aesthetics that is found interesting enough to re-examine then the 
expectation of philosophical aesthetics is of a growing field of historical studies. 
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C H A P T E R  O N E  
I D E N T I F Y I N G  A E S T H E T I C S  
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is an introduction to philosophical 
aesthetics and to Aesthetic Theory.   The second section is concerned with interdisciplinarity and 
cultural studies.  
 
Section One: Aesthetics and Aesthetic Theory 
Brief historical background to Aesthetics. 
Modern aesthetics is a philosophical subject area that started in the mid to late eighteenth century 
with no less than five separate definitions as to what aesthetics was within fifty years. For 
Baumgarten aesthetics was a form of sense perception concerned with beauty. „Aesthetics (as the 
theory of the liberal arts, as inferior cognition, as the art of beautiful thinking and as the art of 
thinking analogous to reason) is the science of sensual cognition.‟1 For Kant aesthetics was 
initially a mode of conceptual understanding concerned with sensory perception. Kant 
distinguished his use of aesthetic in his Critique of Pure Reason from that of Baumgarten. It is 
worth quoting Kant‟s footnote in the Critique of Pure Reason because it is an excellent indicator 
of the state of the use of the word and change of concept in 1787 and is a pointer to some of the 
problems that lie ahead. 
 
The Germans are the only people who currently make use of the word „aesthetic‟ in order 
to signify what others call the critique of taste. This usage originated in the abortive 
attempt made by Baumgarten, that admirable analytic thinker, to bring the treatment of 
the beautiful under rational principles, and so to raise its rules to the rank of a science. 
But such endeavours are fruitless. The said rules or criteria are, as regards their chief 
source, merely empirical, and consequently can never serve as determinate a priori laws 
by which our judgement of taste must be directed. On the contrary, our judgement is the 
proper test of the correctness of the rules. For this reason it is advisable either to give up 
using the name in this sense of critique of taste, and to reserve it for that doctrine of 
sensibility which is true science - thus approximating to the language and sense of the 
ancients, in their far-famed division of knowledge into sensation and thought  - or else to 
share the name with speculative philosophy, employing it partly in the transcendental and 
partly in the psychological sense.
2
 
 
Even in this first re-definition, Kant still leaves open the older sense so establishing a 
fundamental ambiguity of use. Kant‟s second re-definition of the word aesthetic comes in the 
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Critique of Judgement where he restricts the word to its transcendental usage but changes that 
usage from the „doctrine of sensibility‟ to „the aesthetic power of judgement‟ on the grounds that 
the third critique is concerned with an „inquiry into our power of taste‟.3 This third change of use 
of the word aesthetics returns it closer to its use in Baumgarten as pertaining to the senses 
concerning the beautiful but further restricts it to its new transcendental use in the concept of 
aesthetic reflective judgement. Kant has in effect altered his definition of aesthetics to become a 
philosophical account of the nature of judging the beautiful in nature and art.  
There is a fragment by Schlegel, „Critical Fragment no. 40‟ which questions the use of 
the word aesthetic. „In the sense in which it has been defined and used in Germany, aesthetic is a 
word which notoriously reveals an equally perfect ignorance of the thing and the language. Why 
is it still used?‟4 This is very probably a reference to Kant‟s redefinition of aesthetic, not once but 
twice. Hence in the space of less than 40 years we have three distinct uses for the same word. The 
next few years saw two further changes to the concept of aesthetics. For the Jena Romantics and 
Schelling, aesthetics, or the philosophy of art, was the highest form of philosophy. As Schelling 
stated: „The objective world is only the primitive, as yet unconscious, poetry of the spirit; the 
general organon of philosophy - and the keystone of the whole arch - is the philosophy of art.‟5 
Art is therefore fully within the sphere of cognition and hence of truth. Indeed Schelling 
suggested, in line with the other Romantics, that philosophy can only be understood through art. 
„The appropriate sense by which this kind of philosophy must be comprehended is thus the 
aesthetic sense, and for this very reason the philosophy of art is the true organon of philosophy.‟6 
The idea that the work of art is a process of becoming whereby successive interpretations can 
only be expected is at the heart of the theory. For the Romantics this endless interpretation was 
the absolute, a kind of infinite process. As Schelling also remarked in his System of 
Transcendental Idealism: 
 
The artist seems to have presented in his work, as if instinctively, apart from 
what he has put into it with obvious intent, an infinity which no finite 
understanding can fully unfold. …So it is with every true work of art: each is 
susceptible of infinite interpretation, as though there were an infinity within it, 
and yet we cannot at all tell whether this infinity lay in the artist himself or 
whether it resides solely in the art-work.
7
 
 
The logical development of this idea of art as a form of absolute is the supposition that, for 
Schelling, there is in fact only one work of art, an absolute beauty, one of the highest rank in 
which and of which what we normally regard as separate works of art are merely participating.  
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…for as aesthetic production proceeds from freedom, and if the opposition of 
conscious and unconscious activity is absolutely precisely for freedom, then there 
exists really only a single absolute work of art, which can to be sure exist in 
entirely different exemplars but which yet is only one, even though it should not 
yet exist in its most original form. To this view it cannot be objected that it would 
be  inconsistent with the great freedom with which the predicate “work of art” is 
used. That which does not present an infinite immediately or at least in reflection 
is not a work of art.
8
 
 
This absolute work is held to be „not yet existing‟, a phrase that occurs many times in Aesthetic 
Theory, demonstrates a prospective element to the philosophy of art. It is a form of expectation.  
Schelling went on to state that „Absolute objectivity is given to art alone. If art is deprived of 
objectivity, one may say, it ceases to be what it is and becomes philosophy; give objectivity to be 
philosophy, it ceases to be philosophy and becomes art.‟9 On Schelling‟s later, Philosophy of Art, 
when art has ceased to be the pinnacle of the system, Kai Hammermeister states: „Art is a vital 
contribution to thought because it still fulfils functions that cannot be executed by conceptual 
thought, yet ultimately it depends on the philosopher to interpret its exploits.‟10  
Finally, after Schelling‟s total identification of art with philosophy, the fifth re-definition 
of aesthetics was given by Hegel. At the start of the Lectures on Fine Art we find: „These lectures 
are devoted to Aesthetics. Their topic is the spacious realm of the beautiful; more precisely, their 
province is art, or, rather fine art.‟11 Hegel goes on to state that „the word “Aesthetics”, taken 
literally, is not wholly satisfactory‟ as it has its origins in Baumgarten‟s Aesthetica  „when works 
of art were treated with regard to the feelings they were supposed to produce‟. Hegel explains 
that: „attempts were made …to frame others, e.g. “Callistics”. But this too appears inadequate 
…We will therefore let the word „Aesthetics‟ stand; as a mere name it is a matter of indifference 
to us, and besides it has meanwhile passed over into common speech.‟12 For Hegel, aesthetics was 
largely an account of the history of the development of art, which understood in spiritual terms 
must culminate in philosophy. In his historical account Hegel claimed that art had once been 
highest form of absolute knowledge in ancient Greece. Art was then later replaced in this role by 
the Christian religion, which in turn had now been replaced by philosophy. Only in philosophy 
could knowledge of the absolute be attained, in the present, by Hegel.  
To this muddled heritage were subsequently added sub-disciplines of other disciplines 
each dealing with art from a different perspective, art history, the sociology of art, the psychology 
of art and a more recent phenomenon of the twentieth century known as art theory that borrows 
from all the above. A fine beginning one might observe for a long history of misunderstandings 
and redefinitions as recently analysed by Peter Osborne who correctly points out the historical 
ambiguity still in use as regards the „conflation of art and aesthetic‟ within contemporary  
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„philosophical discourses about art.‟13 The basis of this confusion according to Osborne is  „a 
longstanding confusion …between the terms of the two main philosophical discourses about art 
that were established at the end of the eighteenth century: art as “aesthetic” and “art as 
ontology”.‟14  Part of the confusion in recent years, according to Osborne, has been the fact that 
after Duchamp much visual art simply was not presented as „aesthetic‟ in the traditional sense of 
being a sensuously appealing object of contemplation. The same can be claimed for the advanced 
music and literature of the time. The confusion between art and aesthetic, according to Osborne, 
encouraged traditionally minded philosophical commentators on art to claim that art is at an end 
and to largely restrict their commentary on art to works that are unambiguously in the older 
defunct tradition, such as Francis Bacon, and to fail to engage with conceptual and post-
conceptual art. If the memory of aesthetics is so muddled then Schegel‟s question which has been 
hanging unanswered since the late eighteenth century as to why the word is still used is still a 
critical question concerning the expectation of aesthetics. 
 
The reception of Aesthetic Theory 
There is a real sense in which the reception of Aesthetic Theory is still in progress. Clearly the 
reception of Adorno‟s work started in Germany as Aesthetic Theory was not published in English 
until 1984. There is then a further lag as it took quite some time for a few of the seminal texts on 
Aesthetic Theory written in German to be translated into English. Richard Wolin wrote that 
„Aesthetische Theorie constitutes a monumental effort to vindicate modernism, to authenticate its 
„right to exist‟ from a historico-philosophical point of view, however precarious that right might 
appear to be in contrast with the grandeur of classical works of art.‟15  In 1984 Abrecht Wellmer 
considered that the „critical response‟ to Adorno‟s aesthetics has led to a situation where „only 
fragments and remnants of his work in this area live on in philosophical, literary and musical 
scholarship. It is not the esoteric nature of the Aesthetic Theory that has hampered its reception. 
The problem lies rather in its systematic aspects;‟16 Wellmer considers that different aspects of 
Adorno‟s theory have been re-used by others but that even the detailed critiques of Adorno‟s 
aesthetics that have been produced, which he in large measure agrees with, leave a sense that „the 
actual substance of Adorno‟s aesthetics eluded them.‟17 At the end of his discussion of truth, 
semblance and reconciliation Wellmer admits that „Adorno‟s writings on aesthetics themselves 
possess something of the qualities of a work of art. and thus may not be captured or surpassed by 
any process of interpretation.‟18 Rüdiger Bubner considers that Adorno‟s Aesthetic Theory „has 
proven to be his true philosophical testament.‟ His main criticism of Adorno‟s theory of the 
artwork is that  philosophy „adds what can never be contained in them: the interpretation of their 
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meaning as the negation of existing reality.‟19 He further argues that „Adorno‟s aesthetic theory 
tends toward dogmatic self-validation.‟20 
 Simon Jarvis on the other hand thinks that the title Aesthetic Theory is „intended to 
distinguish Adorno‟s work from formal aesthetics and from art history.‟21 Peter Osborne in his 
essay of 1989 presents „Aesthetic Theory as a materialist metaphysic of modernism.‟22 Writing in 
1991, Lambert Zuidervaart describes Adorno as „one whose last major book and its central 
philosophical claims are, for the most part, ignored in the English-speaking world.‟23  He goes on 
to describe Aesthetic Theory „as a modernist reconceptualizing of philosophical aesthetics, 
especially the writings of Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel.‟24 Zuidervaart also claims 
Aesthetic Theory to be a book of meta-aesthetics, for „it presents philosophical reflections on 
philosophical aesthetics and it elaborates the categories and procedures employed in Adorno‟s 
previous writings on the arts.‟25 Zuidervaart‟s book is still, after eighteen years, the only entire 
book in English devoted to Aesthetic Theory. It came out at a time when arguments concerning 
the nature of the post-modern were fore-grounded in many texts published at the time in the 
tradition of continental philosophy. Consequently a great deal of the discussion centres around the 
topic of post-modernism.  For Jay Bernstein the project of Aesthetic Theory is to reflect on the 
„terms of analysis‟ of „aesthetic modernism.‟ „Using the achievements of modernist art as its 
guiding thread, it seeks to trace the critical transformation that aesthetic discourse performs upon 
the language of reason (truth only cognition and categorical morality). Only through such a 
reflection can we comprehend how art‟s apparent unreason reveals the irrationality of formal, 
enlightened reason.‟26 Hauke Brunkhorst on the other hand considers Aesthetic Theory to be „a 
critique of culture by art.‟27 Brunkhorst quotes Adorno: „In the Introduction to the Sociology of 
Music, he writes, “The common ether of aesthetics and sociology is critique.” And the Aesthetic 
Theory postulates a “critique of culture through art”.‟28 Kai Hammermeister writes of Aesthetic 
Theory that – „Adorno‟s magnum opus on the theory of art is a collection of meditations on 
central concepts of classical aesthetics. These are intimately woven reflections, yet they are not 
clearly structured. Adorno‟s basic manoeuvre is to take up the notion of paradigmatic aesthetics 
and unfold their negativity.‟29 In his excellent literature review John Roberts considers that 
following the publication in English of Aesthetic Theory in 1984 „Adorno‟s writing has had an 
extensive influence on the rethinking of the question of autonomy in Anglophone art theory and 
philosophical aesthetics. …generating by the late 1990s a minor academic industry in Europe and 
North America.‟30 Roberts identifies five different strands of critique of among Adorno‟s 
commentators which in effect are five different political understanding of Adorno‟s concept of 
autonomous art. In addition there is an enormous philosophical literature on Adorno that largely 
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ignores Aesthetic Theory except to make passing reference to the text. There are useful 
introductions to Adorno‟s thought, such as Max Paddison‟s work on Adorno‟s aesthetics of music 
where the references to Aesthetic Theory are sparse. There is no doubt Aesthetic Theory  is a 
forbidding text, one that I believe holds the key to Adorno‟s philosophical position. It does not 
stand alone, Aesthetic Theory must be interpreted as the final stage of a massive corpus of texts 
that lead up to it. 
 
Introduction to Aesthetic Theory. 
If Schiller‟s „fleeting phenomenon‟ is the work of art, and the „sorry skeleton of words‟ 
philosophical aesthetics, then Adorno‟s late magnum opus, Aesthetic Theory, published 
posthumously in an unfinished form in 1970 may be „sorry‟ but it is no „skeleton‟.  It is a massive 
text that few commentators have come to terms with as a whole. For any reader in any language 
to open the book at any page is to see part of the problem. The reader is presented with a 
continuous text with no chapter divisions, no sub-headings, nothing but paragraph divisions. In 
addition there are single blank line divisions between the twelve sections of the main text. For a 
reader of Aesthetic Theory in English there are two separate translations. The first translation by 
Christian Lenhardt was published in 1984.  This translation did not follow the layout of the 
original German text but was divided into twelve chapters with numbered sub-headings and 
paragraphs that do not follow the layout of the original. To add to the misleading layout   
„transitional phrases were interpolated such as: “as we saw‟ or “as we said” or “let us 
remember‟.‟31 This all gives the impression that the text is discursive. In addition, many words 
that were in a foreign language in the original were translated into English so their effect was 
rendered invisible. However, this first translation does have two merits. The first, is a 
comprehensive index of both names and concepts. The later translation in English only has a 
name index. The second merit is that, unreliable as aspects of the translation are thought to be, it 
is far easier to read than the second translation and is therefore still a useful introduction to the 
book.  
The consequence of having two translations in English is that early articles on Aesthetic 
Theory, and some books, published in English refer to, and quote, the first translation. After the 
second translation by Robert Hullot-Kentor was published in 1997 references in the literature on 
Adorno in English were increasingly referenced to the Athlone Edition. Unfortunately, in 2004, 
the publishers Continuum took over the Athlone edition  and republished it with a different 
pagination. The secondary literature on Aesthetic Theory in English from 2004 on can now be 
referenced to either of two editions of the second superior translation, each with a different 
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pagination. This of course makes looking up such references an unnecessarily complex task. The 
decision to „re-package‟ the book in a re-designed uniform series must have been a marketing as 
opposed to a scholarly decision. The result is to make a difficult book even less accessible. 
Commodification of the product Aesthetic Theory thus continues, Adorno would have been 
appalled, if unsurprised.   
There is no simple key to Aesthetic Theory. No summary can be made without distortion. 
This is true of most important philosophical texts, their innate complexity evades paraphrase and 
frequently understanding. In his Philosophy of Existence Karl Jaspers raises precisely this 
possibility of misunderstanding a text. „…one experienced  the truth of  Schelling‟s remark that 
philosophy is an “open secret”. One may know texts, and be able to trace their thought 
constructions with precision – and yet not understand them.‟32 One approach to Aesthetic Theory 
is through its structure. Clearly it is impossible to look solely at the structure without paying 
attention to the content. In a sense only familiarity with the content allows one to look at the 
structure. But such a morphological approach to Aesthetic Theory reveals something fundamental. 
The book as it stands presents a forbidding wall of text. It is also unfinished. The unfinished 
nature of the book is seen clearly in the „Paralipomena‟ where sets of paragraphs are grouped 
together awaiting either rejection or incorporation into the unnamed sections that roughly form 
the whole. These sections would have been revised. Whilst this unfinished state matters a great 
deal to any approach to the content of the book, it does not matter to the morphological approach. 
The structure of Aesthetic Theory is as clear in the unfinished text as it would have been in the 
final version. How can this structure be described?  The text is a totality consisting of a set of 
fragments. The basic unit is the sentence, a fragment in itself for it is only a part of a larger 
whole, the paragraph. In English many of these paragraphs are less than a page long, most are one 
to two pages in length. Some paragraphs are 3 pages long and only three run to four pages with 
one at over just over 5 pages. The paragraphs are in themselves mini-totalities and they in turn are 
grouped together in sections. The twelve sections in turn form the group that is the whole. In 
addition to these twelve main sections there are 154 paragraphs in the Paralipomena, some no 
more than fragments, and a short section on  „Theories on the Orgins of Art‟. Finally come the 
„Draft Introduction‟ and „Editor‟s Afterword.‟ The „theory‟, the content, is presented, or more 
accurately painstakingly discovered by the reader, within this structure, within this form, which 
could itself be called „aesthetic‟ but it could equally well be called „philosophic‟. It is quite 
possible Adorno hoped that Aesthetic Theory, in its final state, would be an elegant constellatory 
set of statement about theories of art and aesthetics and hence aesthetic in a double sense. So the 
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morphology of the text reveals it to be an aesthetic/philosophic structure about theory concerned 
with aesthetics. The aesthetic structure mirrors the philosophical structure.  
In „The Essay as Form‟ Adorno contrasts the „positivist tendency‟ with its „rigid 
separation of form and content‟ and his essayistic approach. In this essay, Adorno claims –„…it is 
scarcely possible to speak of the aesthetic unaesthetically, stripped of any similarity with its 
object, without becoming narrow-minded and a priori losing touch with the aesthetic object.‟33   
Adorno clearly thinks that the very act of writing about art cannot but be aesthetic, that writing 
about art cannot be undertaken in flat un-expressive matter of fact prose. He is not claiming that 
writing about art should itself be a form of art. His claim is closer to the Jena Romantic‟s notion 
that criticism of a work of art it itself an integral part of that work in the sense that criticism 
completes the work. I will return to this aspect of Adorno‟s Romantic understanding of artworks   
in the next chapter concerned with his ideas about art works as monads. As Fredric Jameson 
wrote about Aesthetic Theory - „…the method might be Marx‟s, but the philosophical form 
something closer to Finnegans Wake.‟34 It is worth quoting what Walter Benjamin had to say 
about the style of Friedrich Schlegel‟s fragmentary style of writing for it parallels Adorno‟s style. 
 
…the epistemological presuppositions are bound up in the most intimate way with the 
extralogical, aesthetic determinations and can be divorced from these and presented 
separately only with great difficulty. At least at this particular period, Schlegel cannot 
take up any idea without setting his entire thinking and all his ideas into unruly motion. 
This compression and close connection of the epistemological insights within the whole 
mass of Schlegel‟s thinking appear to have heightened their bold paradoxical character, 
and vice versa.
35
 
 
 
Adorno‟s writings have been called „atonal philosophy‟ by Susan Buck-Morrs 36 this points to the 
suggestion that Aesthetic Theory was consciously conceived of as if it were a modernist 
composition. However, the motive for the style is not artistic but philosophical, although as will 
be seen the two are linked. Adorno often cites „Rimbaud‟s dictum‟ concerning the necessity to be 
absolutely modern in Aesthetic Theory with reference to art. In his article „Why Philosophy?‟ he 
applies it to philosophical texts. „Rimbaud‟s phrase: “it faut être absolument moderne” is not a 
programme of an aesthetic nature, nor one likely to appeal to lovers of neat and tidy schemes. It is 
a categorical imperative of philosophy.‟37 Aesthetic Theory is not structured in a traditional sense. 
Consequently reading this text becomes a different form of activity from traditional reading of a 
linear text. It becomes necessary to first read the text before you can read it again for 
understanding. This is nothing new in philosophy, the same demand was made by Schopenhauer 
in the Preface to The World as Will and Representation on the grounds that „the beginning 
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presupposes the end almost as much as the end the beginning, and that every earlier part 
presupposes the later almost as much as the later the earlier.‟38 Anyone who reads Aesthetic 
Theory expecting a linear narrative to unfold will quickly find themselves disorientated. Not until 
several subsequent readings are the constellations of concepts revealed to the reader. In Negative 
Dialectics Adorno compares writing philosophy to composing music, „Its course must be a 
ceaseless self renewal,‟ and that „philosophy is not expoundable.‟39 This last ominous phrase 
should give any interpreter of Adorno‟s philosophical texts a clear warning. Adorno‟s 
philosophical texts, and in particular Aesthetic Theory are written, or composed, in order to resist 
easy interpretation just as Samuel Beckett‟s plays resist interpretation.  
Aesthetic Theory was to have been dedicated to Samuel Beckett and the motto for the 
book was intended to be Friedrich Schlegel‟s Critical Fragment 12 – „What is called the 
philosophy of art usually lacks one of two things: either the philosophy or the art.‟40 At the time 
Schlegel published this fragment (1798-1800) there were very few texts it could have applied to. 
The two main ones would have been Kant‟s Third Critique, The Critique of Judgement (1790) 
and Schiller‟s On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795). Kant was justifiably accused by 
Adorno (along with Hegel) of being among the last „able to write major aesthetics without 
understanding anything about art.‟ 41 In contrast Schiller can be accused of writing so elegantly 
and poetically that the philosophical content is rendered opaque. This motto by Schlegel would 
have announced at the very start of Aesthetic Theory what might be called the Romantic heritage 
of Aesthetic Theory. The extent to which Adorno was influenced by the Jena Romantics directly 
is hard to judge, he was however thoroughly familiar with Walter Benjamin‟s text The Concept of 
Criticism in German Romanticism. The further ramifications of this Romantic heritage will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
One aspect of the verbal style of Aesthetic Theory is Adorno‟s use of foreign words. As 
Robert Hullot-Kentor, the second translator of Aesthetic Theory, puts it in one of his essays on 
Adorno, „foreign, classical, and archaic terms recur regularly; …all these techniques break the 
normal rhythm of the sentence and not only demand persistently reconstructive labour on the 
reader‟s part, but bring concepts into otherwise unavailable association.‟42 As Adorno commented 
in Minima Moralia „German words of foreign derivation are the Jews of language.‟43 Berthold 
Hoeckner suggests that Adorno‟s use of foreign words, particularly in Aesthetic Theory, was 
aesthetic. „The appearance of these words in his own writings, I suggest, does precisely and 
paradoxically what he claimed only the German language could offer to philosophy namely, an 
authentic form of expression and presentation. The Fremdwort becomes Adorno‟s performance of 
the aesthetic.‟44  The example Hoeckner gives for Aesthetic Theory is the use of the English word 
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apparition, which keeps on appearing throughout the text. As Hoeckner comments: „The foreign 
word is like a fleeting poetic moment in philosophical prose. It is an enigma in need of exegesis, 
even though its meaning is impossible to grasp. Adorno fulfils that interpretative need by 
suggesting that an apparition, like fireworks is ephemeral, sudden, explosive.‟45 This use of a 
foreign word is precisely the effect of montage. The addition is exactly calculated to contrast with 
its context. In his essay „On the Use of Foreign Words‟ Adorno claims he wants „to release their 
explosive force: not to deny what is foreign in them but to use it.‟46  In this essay Adorno argues 
that a purist organic view of language would try to exclude the use of foreign words as 
inappropriate. He sees in them „the incursion of freedom.‟47 He quotes Walter Benjamin in One-
Way Street who compared a writer with a surgeon who inserts „the silver rib of a foreign word‟ 
into a text in order to cure it and describes this as „the dialectic of the foreign word‟48. In his essay 
„Words from Abroad‟ Adorno claims that an author „can, however, take advantage of the tension 
between the foreign word and the language by incorporating that tension into his own reflections 
and his own technique.‟49 The foreign word provides an „interruption of the conformist moment 
of language‟ and can serve „the expression of truth.‟50 Further on in a passage where he is 
criticising Heidegger‟s „jargon of authenticity‟ for largely excluding foreign words Adorno 
claims that – „Every foreign word contains the explosive material of enlightenment, contains in 
its controlled use the knowledge that what is immediate cannot be said in unmediated form but 
only expressed in and through reflection and mediation.‟51 Later he states - „Only the foreign 
word that renders the meaning better, more faithfully, more uncompromisingly than the available 
German synonyms will allow a spark to flow in the constellation into which it is introduced.‟ 52 
Adorno writes of „the social process undergone by foreign words, and in fact by language itself, a 
process in which the writer can intervene to make changes only by recognising it as an objective 
one.‟53  
Aesthetic Theory is undoubtedly difficult to read. The stylistic characteristics of the text     
described by the second translator in a striking way. „No one from the land of edutainment would 
compose these starkly unbeckoning sheer sides of type, uninterrupted by chapter titles or 
typographic markers, that have severed and jettisoned every approach and patched over most 
every apparent handhold.‟54 The unapproachability of the text is not just in the form but in the 
structure as well. This aspect of reading Adorno‟s prose is well described by Terry Eagleton in 
the following way.  
 
Every sentence of his texts is thus forced to work overtime; each phrase must become a 
little masterpiece or miracle of dialectics, fixing a thought in the second before it 
disappears into its own contradictions. Like Benjamin‟s, this style is a constellatory one, 
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each sentence a kind of crystallized conundrum from which the next is strictly non-
deducible, a tight-meshed economy of epigrammatic aperçus in which every part is 
somehow autonomous yet intricately related to its fellows.
55
   
 
Aesthetic Theory is in twelve sections. It is entirely possible that the number of sections would 
have altered during the final revision that Adorno planned to make and so it is fanciful to read 
anything into the number twelve. But if one allows fancy to take its course then the musical 
parallel with twelve tones inevitably comes to mind. The twelve tones determine the structure, 
they are the material, the stoff. In what sense are they the most up to date materials? It is the 
technique with which they are manipulated, the construction that is up to date, the spatial 
arrangement, the enigmaticalness of the text, the difficultly of reading. The twelve tones stand 
together, they do not lead on one from another. To list them is easy, to summarise them is very 
difficult except in such general terms as are encapsulated in the titles. (These section titles refer to 
the second translation into English, they do not appear in the original.) 
1: Art, Society, Aesthetics 
2:  Situation 
3: On the categories of the Ugly, the Beautiful, and Technique. 
4: Natural Beauty 
5: Art Beauty: Apparition, Spiritualization, Intuitability 
6: Semblance and Expression 
7: Enigmaticalness, Truth Content, Metaphysics 
8: Coherence and Meaning 
9: Subject-Object 
10: Toward a Theory of the Artwork 
11: Universal and Particular 
12: Society 
Twelve sections whose titles yield 25 topics. In addition are the Paralipomena, consisting of 
twelve groups of paragraphs ordered by the editors into twelve groups in the same order as the 
twelve sections and a short section on theories concerning the origin of art. Finally, there is the 
„Draft Introduction‟, the topic of which is aesthetics. This is in effect a constellation of 
constellations as each of the sections is itself a constellation. Adorno‟s conception of the 
constellation will be examined in the next chapter. 
 So who is it for? What audience of readers is it written for? Not for the general reader but 
for a set of audiences. For an academic philosophical audience, and for audiences of artists, critics 
and art theorists.  As John Roberts reported, „In conversation with two artist friends recently, both 
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declared Adorno was a far more serious and productive guide to their practices than any other 
philosopher or aesthetician.‟56 It would be entirely in keeping with Adorno‟s position as a public 
intellectual that he would hope for a wide audience but without for a moment relaxing his 
rigorous dialectical style of writing. Any audience needs to be familiar with Bach, Baudelaire, 
Beckett, Benjamin, Beethoven, Berg, Brecht, Croce, Freud, George, Goethe, Hegel, Hölderlin, 
Kant, Klee, Lukács, Marx, Mozart, Nietzsche, Plato, Proust, Rimbaud, Schelling, Schiller, 
Schoenberg, Schopenhaeur, Schubert, Shakespeare, Valéry, Wagner, and Webern as well as a 
wide range of other theorists and artists, including the rarely cited Heidegger. This list gives an 
indication of the scope of the text and the breadth of intellectual, cultural and artistic experience 
any reader is assumed to have.  But by far the highest number of references are to the sextet of 
Beckett, Benjamin, Beethoven, Hegel, Kant and Schoenberg. This sextet defines the book. One 
artist and two theorists from the age of the bourgeois revolution, „without understanding anything 
about art‟57 and one theorist and two artists from „the short twentieth century.‟58 Then there is 
Adorno himself. His earlier texts are essential reading for an understanding of many key ideas 
that cannot be fully appreciated by studying Aesthetic Theory in isolation. 
  Adorno normally dictated his texts and once he received the typed manuscript he became 
a critic. „This process of revision which may end up with every sentence having been changed, 
was a process Adorno called “carrion-eating” (lämmergeiern).‟59 Lämmergeiers are a type of 
vulture that drop bones „from a height onto rocks to break them: the marrow can then be 
devoured.‟60 Adorno enjoyed watching them in Frankfurt zoo and adopted the name for his own 
critical editorial process of text revision. This process of revision of Aesthetic Theory was still in 
progress at the time of his death. Many changes still remained to be made. A characteristic of the 
writing style of Aesthetic Theory is that within a section on a particular topic many of the 
paragraphs, each of which deals with a different aspect of the subject of the section, have both 
conceptual and verbal echoes. These echoes are found in the first sentence of the paragraph. I use 
the word echo to describe this aspect of his writing style because the echoes are reminiscent of 
the structure of some music. Many of the paragraphs of Aesthetic Theory start with a sentence 
that makes a transition from the subject matter of the previous paragraph by referring to it in the 
process of introducing the next topic, an echo. An example of the echo would be the sentence at 
the start of a paragraph on „The Progress of Art‟ in the section „Universal and Particular”. This 
paragraph follows one on the topic of „Style‟. „Naïve faith in style goes hand in hand with rancour 
against the concept of progress in art.‟61 Such echoes give the misleading impression that the 
whole text is to be read as if it were a discursive text, as if one topic leads on from another. 
However, as Adorno did not believe that a traditional discursive text was still possible, this echo 
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has to be regarded as demonstrating his belief that everything is related and that categorisation 
into particular topics is an illusory quality of academic texts. In this sense echoes can be seen as 
ironic. As related precisely to the irony of a Jena Romantic fragment. It could well be that the 
echoes can be taken as evidence that paragraphs starting with them are virtually complete and in 
the correct order. The final sentence of some paragraphs also act like Jena Romantic fragments, 
as they both sum up the paragraph and stand alone as quotable statements. 
In Aesthetic Theory there is a dialectic between totality and fragments, between totalities 
and singularities, between the book and the sentence. This makes sense of claims that this is a 
paratactical text where any sentence can stand in for the whole. The editors of Aesthetic Theory, 
attribute this fragmentariness to the factor that left the text in an unfinished state, namely 
Adorno‟s death. 
 
Adorno employs the concept of the fragment in a double sense. He means on the one 
hand, something productive: that theories that bear a systematic intention must collapse 
into fragments in order to release their truth content. Nothing of the sort holds for 
Aesthetic Theory. Its fragmentariness is the intrusion of death into a work before it had 
entirely realized its law of form.
62
 
 
The law of form the editors refer to is the constellation, the arrangement of a set of 
concepts in such a way that they produce an insight, a meaning. This constellation of course 
operates in the realm of content, of meaning. The same „Editors‟ Afterword‟ contains quotations 
from Adorno‟s correspondence about Aesthetic Theory that shows the editor misunderstood the 
nature of the book by claiming its  „fragmentariness‟ to be „the intrusion of death‟. In contrast it is 
clear that Adorno did think of the book as a totality composed of fragments, but as seen from the 
point of view of meaning. „…one must assemble the whole out of a series of partial complexes, 
that are so to speak of equal weight and concentrically arranged all on the same level; their 
constellation, not their succession must yield the idea.‟63 It is clear that the philosophical content 
of Aesthetic Theory is going to take the form of a constellation of philosophical and aesthetic 
ideas ideas concerning works of art set against the totality that is capitalist society.  
It is worth considering the title Aesthetic Theory. This title has an ambiguity about it 
created by the juxtaposition of aesthetic and theory. Rüdiger Bubner argued that the title „is 
equivocal. “Aesthetic theory” does not only mean that theoretical aesthetics is one subdivision of 
an extensive theoretical edifice. More important, it means that the text‟s main concern is the 
process by which theory itself becomes aesthetic the convergence of knowledge and art.‟64 Hans-
Martin Lohmann also sees the title Aesthetic Theory as deeply ambiguous. Is it concerned with 
the „theory of the aesthetic‟ or with „a theory that is aesthetic‟? „The one remains as unclear as the 
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other and we probably have to resign ourselves to the thought that Aesthetic Theory in its entirety 
has something of a rebus riddle about it that nobody has yet been able to decipher.‟65 He 
recommends Freud as a key to understanding Aesthetic Theory. Andrew Bowie comments that 
“the suggestion has rightly been made that Aesthetic Theory‟s title, which has no article, plays 
with the idea that the theory itself is in one sense aesthetic.‟66 Adorno‟s constant use of 
antinomies is a clue to this ambiguity. If Ästhetische Theorie is read as an antinomical paratactical 
title, a mini constellation in its own right, then the two concepts oscillate between unresolvable 
opposites of aesthetic(s) and theory.  Theory is reflective philosophy, it is reflection upon theory 
past and present.  In terms of expectation theory operates in a realm of concepts that do not fully 
capture the aesthetic experience of a singular artwork. On the other hand, the realm of the 
aesthetic is the non-conceptual experience of a singular artwork. The whole of Aesthetic Theory 
revolves around this antinomy. For Adorno the aesthetic concepts of the history of philosophical 
aesthetics always fail to capture the „non-identical‟ particularity of any artwork, and yet they 
inevitably have to be used. One of the clearest expositions of this position is in paragraph 137 of 
the „Paralipomena‟.  
 
None of the categories of theoretical aesthetics can be employed rigidly, as unshakeable 
criteria. Whereas aesthetic objectivity can only be grasped in the immanent critique of 
individual works, the necessary abstractness of categories becomes a source of error. It is 
up to aesthetic theory, [ästhetischer Theorie] which is unable to progress to immanent 
critique, at least to delineate models of its self-correction through the second reflection of 
its categories.
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Aesthetic Theory is thus an exercise in „second reflection‟ where the experience of an artwork is 
mediated  by „interpretation, commentary  and critique‟ which must of necessity operate in the 
realm of theory. So the title of the book stages the philosophical antinomy that exists between the 
aesthetic and reflective theory, between the experience of art and philosophy. Between two 
separate but, for Adorno, inescapably connected realms. 
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Section Two: Interdisciplinarity  
Interdisciplinarity: art, aesthetics, philosophy  
When Kant wrote The Conflict of the Faculties he argued that the state should have control over 
the three higher faculties concerned with the well being of mankind. First: the protection of 
private property. – the law. Second: the well being of the body – medicine. Third: spiritual well 
being – religion. Kant further insisted that the lower faculty, philosophy, should have the freedom 
to examine the theoretical positions of the other three, independent of state control.  
  
…a university must have a faculty of philosophy. Its function in relation to the three 
higher faculties is to control them, and in this way, to be useful to them, since truth (the 
essential and first condition of learning in general) is the main thing, whereas the utility 
of the higher faculties promise the government is of secondary importance. …The 
philosophy faculty can, therefore, lay claim to any teaching, in order to test its truth.
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The idea that other disciplines have developed within philosophy and subsequently split off is 
related and also puts philosophy as prime. In this sense philosophy is understood to have 
intellectual progentiture, to be an origin for the evolution of all other disciplines. This is an 
historical evolutionary position, it is Hegelian, although Hegel was scathing about 
„conglomerates‟ of knowledge, disciplines that he considered to have been cobbled together. 
„What is true in any science is so through and by virtue of philosophy, whose encyclopedia 
comprises all true sciences. …The encyclopedia of philosophy thus excludes …mere assemblages 
of information.‟69 Nietzsche took a similar view to Kant and Hegel concerning the  primary 
position of  philosophy. In „We Scholars‟, the sixth part of Beyond Good and Evil, he inveighs 
against „a harmful and improper displacement of the order of rank between science and 
philosophy which is today …threatening to become established.‟70 A later variant of this position 
by Heidegger ends up wondering whether after the progressive splitting away of other disciplines 
there is any thing left for philosophy understood as metaphysics to do.
71
    
By contrast philosophy has a long history of incorporating ideas, theories, beliefs and sets 
of values that have originated outside philosophy. Other disciplines have similarly absorbed ideas 
and theories that developed within philosophy. This widening approach recognises the main 
thrust of interdisciplinary studies requires a wider frame of reference.  Roland Barthes identifies 
an „unease in classification‟ as an important factor: 
 
Interdisciplinarity is not the calm of an easy security; it begins effectively (as opposed to 
the mere expression of a pious wish) when the solidarity of the old disciplines breaks 
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down …in the interests of a new object and a new language neither of which has a place 
in the field of the sciences that were to be brought peacefully together, this unease in 
classification being precisely the point from which it is possible to diagnose a certain 
mutation.
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One of the widest frames of reference, developed by Foucault, is the idea of discourse. The idea 
that disciplines as traditionally conceived can be discovered to be part of deeper structures, such 
as discourses and domains, comes from a structuralist analysis of knowledge. However, widening 
the frame of reference from discipline to discourse merely widens the whole within which the 
various compartments are understood to be contained. It is a form of super-interdisciplinarity. 
Aesthetic Theory can be regarded as both a genealogy of art and philosophical aesthetics 
on the one hand, and as a „world scale narrative‟ on the other – a genealogical narrative. It is a 
form of critical history of art and philosophy of art written from the standpoint of the 1960s. As a 
„world scale narrative‟ its precedent in aesthetics is Lukács‟ Theory of the Novel, which Adorno 
claimed „set a standard for philosophical aesthetics which has been retained ever since.‟73 
Aesthetic Theory also has another relationship to Lukács‟ Theory of the Novel  – the mood in 
which it was written. Lukács writing during the First World War found himself writing „in a 
mood of permanent despair over the state of the world.‟74 Adorno  in the 1960s had a similar 
mood of despair over the state of the world and the state of art but he was also concerned about 
the survival of autonomous works of art and by implication the survival of the philosophy of art.    
When one comes to consider the relationship of philosophy to the wider contemporary 
theoretical discourse about art one finds several approaches that relate to philosophy in a number 
of different ways. In The Return of the Real Hal Foster, who writes from the perspective of an art 
critic, identifies three areas of investigation that „advanced art‟ has shared with critical theory, 
„the structure of the sign, the constitution of the subject, and the siting of the institution‟. His 
claim is that the relationship between critical theory and advanced art is so close „that critical 
theory is immanent in innovative art.‟75  Foster goes even further by suggesting that critical 
theory is „not only a conceptual tool but a symbolic, even symptomatic form.‟ He has an 
interesting, if not wholly, convincing theory why this is so.  „Since the middle 1970s critical 
theory has served as a secret continuation of modernism by other means: … after the climax of 
the 1968 revolts, it also occupied the position of cultural politics, …This double secret service - 
as a high art surrogate and an avant-garde substitute - has attracted many different followers.‟76 
Foster draws on the work of philosophers and theorists such as Benjamin, Deleuze, Derrida, 
Foucault, Kristeva, and Lacan. His suggestion, that there is a symbiotic relationship between 
philosophical and non-philosophical thought and the production of art, that theory and art feed off 
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each other would suggest that a philosophical dimension is not only ineliminable to the discourse 
on art but to the production of art as well. 
In Farewell to An Idea, a work of art history, T.J. Clark draws on ideas from Hegel, 
Bahktin, Adorno and Freud in order to illuminate his thesis that both modernism and socialism as 
projects, have come to a melancholic end.  Clark borrows the structure of his book from Hegel. 
Each chapter consists of a detailed investigation of a „moment‟ in the history of modernism. Each 
selected „moment‟ illuminates its period very effectively, but, this borrowed Hegelian structure 
amounts to no more than a striking literary device as opposed to  a philosophically informed 
conceptual investigation.  
Kant after Duchamp by Thierry de Duve is an interdisciplinary book of art theory that 
uses philosophy instrumentally with little understanding of the original context. The book is 
centrally concerned with the reception of Duchamp‟s Readymades in the 1960s and is particularly 
concerned to establish Duchamp‟s „Fountain‟ as a paradigmatic example of twentieth century art. 
One of de Duve's borrowed philosophical theses is derived from Saul Kripke. De Duve claims 
that by naming the urinal by the proper name „art‟ Duchamp has in fact nominated it as art and 
that therefore it is art. In chapter 5 de Duve attempts a re-reading of Kant‟s „aesthetic judgement‟ 
that illegitimately conflates the „sensis communis‟ with the „supersensible‟  and is more a homage 
to Greenberg‟s (acknowledged) misreading of Kant than a useful contribution to Kantian studies. 
As well as relying on Kripke and Kant he attempts to use the „archaeological‟ methodology of 
Foucault. These particular „borrowings‟ from philosophy are a form of misappropriation of 
sources that exemplify the dangers of such interdisciplinarity for De Duve‟s use of these 
philosophical theories is not undertaken at a level that is fully responsible to the philosophical 
traditions he attempts to borrow from.  
By contrast Peter Osborne‟s definitive study Conceptual Art is a work of theoretical 
scholarship that sets the works within the wider philosophically derived theoretical setting in 
which they were created. It can be described as art history, or art theory, or visual culture, but it is 
simply self-described as a „typology‟ of six forms of conceptual art, accompanied by edited texts 
that give the intellectual background to the forms in question.
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 This all raises the question as to 
what extent a philosophical dimension to discourse on contemporary art is ineliminable? 
All interdisciplinary studies have one thing in common, they implicity recognise the 
existence of disciplines, for even to ignore them is to recognise them as something to ignore. In 
the one position, philosophy is prime and other disciplines are under it‟s ultimate jurisdiction, 
whether they can be traced as having split off from philosophy as either analytic sciences or as 
historical hermeneutic sciences. In this view any theorisations undertaken within these disciplines 
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can be claimed as „a philosophy of‟. In another position, philosophy proceeds by borrowing and 
lending, as the different strands of philosophy have certainly done, and in widening the frame of 
reference. Finally there is the totalising frame of reference as provided by a Western Marxist 
analysis whose perspective demands an approach that effectively ignores disciplinary boundaries 
to thought. 
Interdisciplinarity has been critically described as a form of intellectual desire that seeks 
a lost world called „einheitswissenschaft‟ the „supra-disciplinary science of culture‟.78  Although, 
as one might expect, most practitioners of interdisciplinarity would deny this analysis, they would 
deny they have a repressed desire for a totalising perspective. Most practitioners would claim to 
be operating at a lower level, that their investigations fall between disciplines, or across 
disciplines, or involve more than one discipline. There are various prefixes to the word discipline 
that carry these senses, „inter‟, „trans, „multi, „cross‟.  
Disciplines have their habitus in the institution of the university where the „empirical-
analytic sciences‟ are in constant disciplinary flux. What were once interdisciplinary projects 
harden into disciplines in their own right, Biochemistry being the prime historical example. More 
recently, largely through the desire to investigate ecological systems, the older disciplines of 
Botany, Zoology and Biochemistry have joined up into Biological Science. The continued 
investigation of ecological systems has drawn in more specialists from Geology, Soil science, 
Geography, Paleobotany, Oceanography, and even Land use historians. In short as many 
specialists as the investigation seems to require. Ecology itself has subsequently been mined for 
ideas, concepts and models by other disciplines. Similar re-groupings have taken place within the 
„historical-hermeneutical sciences‟. For example, in some universities in the United Kingdom, art 
history has been transformed into a wider discipline called visual culture. One description of 
visual culture draws on 34 different specialisms.
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 Most of these are „borrowings‟ from other 
disciplines surrounding the core components of traditional art history. The rationale behind this 
re-grouping reflects not merely changes of intellectual fashion within academia, but a reaction to 
perceived related changes that have occurred within the visual arts and the wider culture since the 
breakdown of traditional visual art genres in the mid twentieth century.  
The concept of borrowing is well established in the new discipline of interdisciplinary 
studies, which is itself partly a sociology of interdisciplinarity and partly a „philosophy of‟ a 
meta-discourse on interdisciplinarity. There are two main problems with borrowing ideas, 
concepts and models from other disciplines. The first is that their precise use and value within the 
original discipline may not have been fully understood by the borrower and so doubt may be cast 
on the validity of their re-use. The second problem is related, the borrowing becomes 
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commodified in an intellectual sense, becomes an intellectual fashion icon that is then applied 
across a whole range of disciplines simply because it is fashionable. An example would be the 
recently fashionable tag „postmodern‟. An analysis of its actual usage reveals that it meant 
diametrically opposed things in different disciplines and in different art forms.
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 Other intellectual 
fashion icons in current use can be identified, „discourse,‟ „text‟ and „theory‟ are possible 
candidates.  
Disciplines and university departments are not necessarily coterminous. Some university 
departments may only cover part of a discipline. For every discipline, sub-discipline, and 
emerging discipline, for every inter, trans, and multi discipline there will be a meta-theoretical 
„philosophy of‟. It is partly for this reason that some theorists have claimed that philosophy is not 
a discipline, but an activity common to all disciplines. „Philosophy of‟ can be identified in each 
discipline (in the loosest sense) as that activity undertaken when the disciplinarians reflect 
critically upon their own theoretical structures.  How they reflect on their own theories will vary, 
but sometimes some of it is borrowed theory in the sense that the theories originally belonged to 
philosophy, linguistics, psychology, sociology, or anthropology, or to any one of what Habermas, 
in Knowledge and Human Interests,
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 has called the „historical-hermeneutical sciences‟. These 
disciplines, just like the „empirical-analytic sciences‟, are much closer theoretically in both their 
shared intellectual heritage and in their borrowings from each other, than might seem apparent at 
first sight. This is surely one reason why inter/multi/trans/disciplinarity is both possible and 
common. Philosophy is itself a divided discipline, historically divided post-Kant into three 
traditions in Western universites, continental philosophy, pragmatism and  analytic philosophy. 
Of the three, it is the continental tradition that has been most borrowed from and has itself 
borrowed from, the closely related disciplines of psychology, anthropology, linguistics, and 
sociology. Philosophy does not exist outside the university, there are no financially independent 
commercially driven institutes of philosophy. 
Another reason sometimes advanced for considering that philosophy is not a discipline is 
largely historical. As Bourdieu has pointed out, philosophy was the first of the disciplines to 
institute itself in a sociological sense as a body of scholars within, and yet separate from, the 
community in fifth century Greece.
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 So from the founding position of origin an historical 
account can be attempted of how all the other disciplines periodically split off from the mother 
discipline, and then themselves continued to split in a form of creative evolution of knowledge. 
So any proposal that philosophy is not a discipline partly relies on this historical perspective and 
partly on the assumption that philosophy and all the variations on the theme of „philosophy as …‟ 
should be regarded as one body of knowledge, a kind of un-masterable, unknowable totality, an 
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einheitswissenschaft, a chimera. There clearly cannot be a meaningful sense to the idea of such a 
broad and incoherent category as „philosophy in general‟. Although it is no doubt possible to 
trace the origins within philosophy of critical concepts used with the various „philosophies of ‟. 
  There is a further reason why inter/multi/trans/disciplinarity is common. The continental 
„historical-hermeneutical sciences‟ have also, in various forms and in various areas, taken 
Marxism seriously as a form of totalising perspective. There is a sense in which any Marxist 
account of almost anything is bound to cross disciplines. Similarly other „wide-studies‟ were 
developed in the mid twentieth century that also inevitably cross disciplines. Gender Studies and 
Ethnic Studies are examples. These in turn, have in parts, also been conducted from a Marxist 
perspective. What all these „wide studies‟ have in common is that they are fundamentally driven 
by value, by a moral position.  
Adorno is firmly located in the tradition of the movement commonly known as critical 
theory. The ideas of the group, the Frankfurt Circle, developed when he was a member. Critical 
theory has been well described by Helmut Dubiel as „the name for the Circle‟s theoretical-
political orientation, a mark of belonging to the tradition of Marxist theory, and – significantly – 
the expression of the claim of representing the real substance of the authentic tradition.‟83 There is 
no doubt that Aesthetic Theory must be classified as a late example of critical theory at work 
precisely because it is a work that makes use of the multi-disciplinary approach pioneered by the 
Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This can be seen in a 
short selection of the many formulations of societal totality in Aesthetic Theory. This totality is 
variously described as „the subordinating authority of the whole,‟84  „the system of total functional 
rationality‟85, „the irrational administration of the world‟86, and „the guilt of the monstrous 
monadological character of society.‟87 There are four intertwined disciplines at work here, 
Western Marxist theory, sociology, Freudian psychology and philosophical theory.  
One theme that runs throughout Adorno‟s thought is the dialectical relationship between 
universal and particular. One of Adorno‟s intellectual objections to any systematic philosophy 
lies in his distrust of the rationality that subsumes particulars under universals, and yet this is the 
dominant rationality of the Enlightenment. For Adorno, any general universal concept like 
„totality‟, „capitalism‟ or „society‟ under which sets of particulars can be subsumed must be 
treated with suspicion. As Max Weber wrote in a letter: „If I am now a sociologist …I am so 
essentially in order to put an end to the use of collective concepts, a use which still haunts us. In 
other words: even sociology can only start from the action of one or a few, or many individuals, 
i.e. pursue a strictly “individualistic” method.‟88 Weber‟s thought was of considerable importance 
for Adorno in another respect concerning the rationalization of society. Adorno agreed with 
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Weber that any account of wide concepts such as „totality‟, „capitalism‟ or „society‟ was bound to 
be problematic. Each of these three comes originally from a separate discipline, totality from 
philosophy, capitalism from political economy, society from sociology. Each of these separate 
disciplines is, for Adorno, another example of a form of false rationality in that the real nature of 
the administered world has created such false divisions within knowledge. Adorno believed, for 
example, that the „separation of sociology and psychology‟ had to be understood in his 
characteristic dialectical fashion as „both correct and false:‟ – „False because it encourages the 
specialists to relinquish the attempt to know the totality which even the separation of the two 
demands; and correct insofar as it registers more intransigently the split that has actually taken 
place in reality than does the premature unification at the level of theory.‟89 Adorno thought that 
such intellectual divisions between disciplines were largely a matter of institutional convenience 
within an institution, the university, that claimed to be the repository of the whole truth even if its 
structure made that goal impossible. „In all their necessity these divisions simply attest 
institutionally to the renunciation of the whole truth.‟90   
This belief, that the real nature of the world is effectively masked by knowledge being divided 
into disciplines raises the question of the perspective from which this can be asserted. Any 
disciplinary division is a perspectival division, each discipline provides a different perspective. 
This leads to the kind of relativism put forward by Adorno‟s one-time colleague at the Institute of 
Social Research in Frankfurt, Karl Mannheim. The sociology of knowledge that Mannheim 
advocated employed a „concept of the social totality‟ that Adorno found: „…serves not so much 
to emphasise the intricate dependence of men within the totality as to glorify the social process 
itself as an evening-out of the contradictions in the whole.‟91 Only at the level of an individual, 
Adorno believed, along with Weber, can these sets of false disciplinary divisions be revealed as 
such. Consequently any use of such universals is bound to involve distortion and ambiguity. One 
could therefore expect that Adorno‟s use of totality, capitalism and society to involve some 
ambiguities and contradictions. Despite this it is necessary for Adorno to rely upon such false 
universals precisely because there can be no grasp of the real nature of reality underlying false 
rationality without such reliance being in place. It is impossible to declare something to be unreal 
without relying on a notion of the real, without covertly employing a perspective that underlies all 
others. This does not imply that such a perspective is an external viewpoint it is just that an 
immanent analysis of the contradictions involved in any set of perspectives can reveal a 
fundamental insight. Such a fundamental insight into the reality of the social and economic power 
of capital was made by Marx.   
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In the „Paralipomena‟ of Aesthetic Theory Adorno addresses the problems of attempts to 
separate aesthetics from the rest of philosophy and turn it into a form of science.  
 
Aesthetics presents philosophy with the bill for the fact that the academic system 
degraded it to a mere specialisation. It demands of philosophy precisely what philosophy 
has neglected to do: that it extract phenomena from their existence and bring them to self-
reflection; this would be the reflection of what is petrified in the sciences, not a 
specialised science located beyond them. Aesthetics thereby yields to what its object, like 
any object, immediately seeks. Every artwork, if it is to be fully experienced, requires 
thought and therefore stands in need of philosophy, which is nothing but the thought that 
refuses all restrictions.
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It is clear that for Adorno philosophy must resist being restricted to being a narrow specialist 
discipline. He seems to take very much the same view as Kant that philosophy must be free to 
criticise texts of other disciplines. In the „Draft Introduction‟ to Aesthetic Theory Adorno 
addresses the very possibility of the continuation of philosophical aesthetics. „The concept of a 
philosophical aesthetics has an antiquated quality‟ and „what needs to be carried through is what 
in the theories of Kant and Hegel awaits redemption through second reflection. Terminating the 
tradition of philosophical aesthetics must amount to giving it its due.‟93 Adorno is above all 
concerned with a particular conception of truth as embedded in particular artworks and available 
only through philosophical analysis. Whilst his analysis is in the main based on theoretical 
positions derived from the European philosophical history of aesthetics, he draws on other 
disciplines. These include Freudian theory, theories from sociology and politics, hermeneutics, 
semiotics, and from writings on artworks by both critics and artists. This approach exemplifies his 
fundamental belief that philosophy is „nothing but the thought that refuses all restrictions.‟ As 
Peter Osborne argues philosophers work in abstractions. „Capitalist modernity is a social world 
constituted through abstraction to a hitherto unthinkable extent. It is in this conjunction that the 
“absolute modernity” of an ant-disciplinary, and hence speculative and cross-disciplinary, 
philosophical practice resides.‟94 
 
Art and culture 
In Aesthetic Theory it is clear that Adorno is concerned with art in a narrow sense as „great art‟. 
This is anomalous for his time. By the 1960s when Aesthetic Theory was written most left-wing 
writers on art would have been wary of drawing any clear demarcation between high art and the 
rest of culture. This was partly because employing the (at times) vague concept of culture 
obviated the need to refer to art as separate from culture in the first place. Most commentators of 
the time would have been closer to Raymond Williams in his development of a form of cultural 
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studies concerned with a broad spectrum that included both high art and industrial entertainments 
of many forms, particularly those derived from a working class folk culture.  
In addition to this broad movement of cultural studies, most overtly Marxist cultural 
critics of the 1960s and 1970s would still have asked the traditional Marxist question of a work of 
art, „who is it for?‟ in order to lay bare the class nature of art. In his talks at the Yenan Forum on 
Literature and Art in 1942 Mao Tse-Tung had asked the same question, „The first Problem is: 
literature and art for whom?‟95 The answer for Mao was the broad mass of the people, any art that 
was not for the people was class dominated bourgeois art. Adorno did not think about society in 
class terms and so stands apart from many Marxists of the mid-twentieth century for this reason. 
However, he was not in favour of creating art for overtly politically driven reasons. The 
breakdown of the categories of high and low art had, as Adorno knew, been championed by the 
Dadaists and Surrealists. So, in very general terms, Adorno was out of step with his 
contemporaries in two main ways: by rejecting a class-based approach and by rejecting the 
category breakdown within the arts promoted by a wide range of creators. He was further out of 
step with the nascent cultural studies movement. This movement had grown out of the studies of 
works by writers such as Mathew Arnold with his Culture and Anarchy in the nineteenth century 
as well as by works such as Notes Towards the Definition of Culture by T.S. Eliot in the 1940s 
and the later work of, Leavis, Hoggart, and Raymond Williams.
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 Adorno, by contrast, had a 
particular usage for the word „culture‟ which he had developed with Horkheimer during their 
exile in America. This was the concept of the culture industry. The discussion of „culture‟ within 
the Frankfurt School had opened in the 1930s when Horkheimer coined the phrase „affirmative 
culture.‟ This was explored by Marcuse in an important early essay.  
 
By affirmative culture is meant that culture of the bourgeois epoch which led in the 
course of its own development to the segregation from civilisation of the mental and 
spiritual world as an independent realm of value that is also considered superior to 
civilization. Its decisive characteristic is the assertion of a universally obligatory, 
eternally better and more valuable world that must be continually affirmed: a world 
essentially different from the factual world of daily struggle for existence, yet realizable 
by every individual for himself “from within,” without any transformation of the state of 
fact. It is only in this culture that cultural activities and objects gain value which elevates 
them above the everyday sphere. Their reception becomes an act of celebration and 
exaltation.
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Here Marcuse identifies a spiritual split, a form of alienation between everyday life and the world 
of art. Furthermore in this essay he implies that the enjoyment of, and participation in, all aspects 
of the high culture of the bourgeois era is in itself to affirm the non-artistic repressive values of 
that culture. He identifies affirmative culture as idealist and goes on to claim that it is only 
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through some form of revolution, through materialist philosophy that the end of affirmative 
culture will come about, and a „new life‟ emerge.  As one culture ends, another begins - this 
theme runs on through a whole succession of later essays and books by Marcuse, as does the 
paradox that now becomes apparent in the next quotation. 
 
There is an image of earthly delight in the works of great bourgeois art, even when they 
portray heaven. The individual enjoys beauty, goodness, splendour, peace, and victorious 
joy. He even enjoys pain and suffering, cruelty and crime. He experiences liberation... In 
art one does not have to be “realistic”, for man is at stake, not his occupation or status. 
Suffering is suffering and joy is joy.  The world appears as what it is behind the 
commodity form: a landscape is really a landscape, a man really a man, a thing really a 
thing.
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The paradoxical contradiction here is that we have already understood that the affirmative 
character of bourgeois culture gives merely the illusion of freedom, yet in this passage Marcuse 
states clearly that some aspects of bourgeois culture are valuable and do transcend the affirmation 
of the repressive controls of bourgeois society and indeed can be truly liberating in a progressive 
sense. One might term this the aesthetic dialectic of Marcuse. This strand to his thought runs right 
through his subsequent texts. “The Affirmative Character of Culture‟ is an important essay in 
regard to Adorno because he did endorse many of the points Marcuse made in it: the commodity 
status of art, the idea of the end of art in a time of revolution, the liberating possibility of art  and 
the extent to which art affirms the values of a total society.  At the same time Adorno rejected the 
use of such a general concept as affirmative culture in any discussion that does not involve 
detailed analysis of individual works of art.  „As legitimate as Herbert Marcuse‟s critique of the 
affirmative character of culture was, its thesis requires the investigation of the individual artwork: 
Otherwise it would become an anticulture league, itself no better than any cultural asset.‟99 Here 
Adorno is putting forward one of his central beliefs about art that any generalised discussion of 
culture needs to be informed by detailed discussion of individual artworks. For Adorno it is only 
by making a detailed study of an individual work of art that any insights into art can be made. 
Marcuse, in his books and essays up to the time of the publication of Aesthetic Theory does not 
do this. In later books, Marcuse does look at individual works so he clearly took in Adorno‟s 
criticisms. Adorno continues:  
 
Rabid criticism of culture is not radical. If affirmation is indeed an aspect of art, this 
affirmation is no more totally false than culture - because it failed - is totally false. 
Culture checks barbarism, which is worse; it not only represses nature but conserves it 
through its repression; this resonates in the concept of culture, which orginates in 
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agriculture. Life has been permeated through culture, along with the idea of a decent life; 
its echo resounds in authentic artworks.
100
 
 
There are far worse things Adorno points out than a failed culture, barbarism for example, and 
that even in a failed culture authentic artworks carry a message of hope and truth. „Affirmation 
does not bestow a halo on the status quo; in sympathy with what exists, it defends itself against 
death, the telos of all domination. Doubting this comes only at the price of believing that death 
itself is hope.‟101 This is Adorno‟s sharpest critical comment on affirmation. He is arguing that if 
you believe affirmation bestows a halo on the status quo, then your only hope is death, the death 
of humanity, art and culture. As early as the 1940s Adorno and Horkheimer had been critical of 
the use of the word „culture.‟ 
 
To speak of culture was always contrary to culture. Culture as a common dominator 
already contains in embryo that schematization and process of cataloguing and 
classification which brings culture within the sphere of administration. And it is precisely 
the industrialized, the consequent, subsumption which entirely accords with this notion of 
culture.
102
   
 
In the Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer developed the critical concept of „the 
culture industry‟ in order to propose that most culture, both high and low, was fully integrated 
into late capitalism as a form of social control as forms of entertainment. This concept of „the 
culture industry‟ is also a fundamental part of the theoretical structure of Aesthetic Theory. In the 
section known as „Situation‟ Adorno clarifies his antinomic conception of art, that it is both art 
and a commodity, both autonomous and liable to submersion in the culture industry. „Compared 
with authentic art, degraded, dishonoured, and administered art is by no means without aura: The 
opposition between these antagonistic spheres must always be conceived as the mediation of one 
through the other.‟103 The antinomy lies in the fact that Adorno wishes to maintain a dichotomy 
between authentic (or autonomous art) and the wares of the culture industry. These two concepts 
are both in dialectical tension as opposites and yet in antinomic complicity as each has to be 
understood through the other within a society created and dominated by late capitalism. As 
Adorno writes in Aesthetic Theory, there is a sense in which the culture industry includes art 
because both art and entertainment are products of the same society. Autonomous art is opposed 
to that society whilst entertainment accepts and affirms the values of that society. „Art develops 
by way of the social whole; that is to say, it is mediated by society‟s ruling structure.‟104 What 
were formerly free „lower arts‟ have, during the course of the growth of capitalist society, become 
integrated by being submerged in the culture industry. „…the lower arts and entertainment, which 
are today, administered, integrated, and qualitatively reshaped by the culture industry.‟105 
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Autonomous art, on the other hand, has a long history, dating from the end of the eighteenth 
century, of growing independence from traditional patronage. Art established itself during the 
nineteenth century as an independent sphere having its own economic power within the larger 
capitalist economy and its own internally generated artistic values. Adorno called this historical 
phase of art, autonomous art and it is very difficult to understand Aesthetic Theory without a clear 
grasp of what he meant by the autonomy of art. Precisely what Adorno meant by autonomous art 
will be examined in the third chapter. In the next chapter the structure of Adorno‟s conception of 
the administered world, critique and the artwork three inter-linked aspects will be examined in 
more detail as three forms of totality, capitalism, philosophy as constellation and the artwork as 
monad. 
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C H A P T E R  T W O  
T O T A L I T I E S  
 
If there is a central topic to Aesthetic Theory then it is encapsulated in phrases such as „…the 
irrational administration of the world…‟ and „…the untruth of the whole…‟1 These two phrases 
are both references by Adorno to the reality of the situation of the historical time of autonomous 
art. This reality is the negative form of totality that represents, for Adorno, capitalism at work. 
Capitalism denies freedom and happiness, this position of Adorno is probably best described in 
traditional philosophical language as ethical. This ethical position underlies everything for 
Adorno, it underlies his three main areas of interest, society, philosophy and art.  It is a major 
presupposition to Aesthetic Theory. Against the background of an increasingly powerful late 
capitalism Adorno identifies a crisis for both philosophy and art. Given this background he is 
concerned whether philosophy and art are still possible in the twentieth century. How can 
philosophy and art continue to exist in such a world? In his analysis of this crisis Adorno makes 
use of two further forms of totality.  
One of these further totalities is concerned with philosophy, the other with art. In 
Adorno‟s philosophical methodology he makes use of categories and concepts from the history 
of philosophy combined with insights from other disciplines to create constellations of ideas 
which are intended to be interpreted by the reader. These constellations can be understood to be 
totalities, to be wholes. However, they are not to be understood as permanent wholes, as 
achieved totalities that will continue through time but as temporary arrangements of concepts 
that yield an insight at the historical moment in which they are formed. Such constellations are 
the polar opposite of  
traditional philosophical theories that form part of a system such as those of Kant or Hegel. 
These thought-constellations, if developed rigorously, so Adorno claims in „The Actuality of 
Philosophy,‟ form part of an emancipatory praxis for an interpretative materialist philosophy. 
This modern version of philosophy stands in contrast to traditional philosophical systems which 
are understood by Adorno to be not only internally incoherent but to have intellectually 
impossible goals.  
The third form of totality in Aesthetic Theory is the work of art itself. Just as a 
philosopher can no longer write a system, so no contemporary composer can write music in the 
same style and form as Beethoven, without it being any more than a dull essay in academicism. 
When we think back to the time of Hegel and Beethoven, to the time of the bourgeois 
revolution, according to Adorno, we find both philosophy and art expressed in totalities. An 
early autonomous artwork of modernity, such as a Beethoven symphony, can best be understood 
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as a form of dynamic totality paralleling Hegel‟s systematic philosophy. As autonomous art has 
progressed in the twentieth century this integral totality of the artwork has altered, has 
fragmented. This can be seen in works by Schoenberg, Kafka and Beckett for example, and this 
fragmentation of art runs parallel to Adorno‟s fragmentation of philosophical methodology 
which reconstitutes it as an interpretation of a constellation of concepts. The artwork can still be 
thought of as a totality, albeit fragmented. The metaphor Adorno uses is the monad. So there are 
three objects, capitalism, philosophy and art, each of which can be understood through three 
different methodological forms of totality: negative totality, constellation, and monad. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. Each section will consist of an examination of one of 
these three forms. 
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Section One: Capitalism as negative totality 
 
There is a historical relationship between the concepts of „totality,‟ „negation‟ and „capitalism.‟ 
The first two are philosophical terms, the third derives from political economy yet its 
conceptualisation depends on the other two terms. Aesthetic Theory demands to be understood 
as a Marxist text as this first section will make clear, but, before proceeding to an examination 
of Adorno‟s understanding of „the administered world‟ I will briefly sketch the historical 
development of the concepts of „totality‟ and „negative‟ from Kant and the Jena Romantics 
through Hegel to Marx and the arrival of the third term „capitalism.‟ 
 
Background to negative totality 
For Kant, both totality and negation are two of the twelve a priori concepts that go to make up 
his table of categories. The conception that there could be „an idea of the totality of the a priori 
knowledge‟ can be found in Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason. This totality of „a priori  
knowledge‟ would be conceived as „an exact classification of the concepts which compose that 
totality, exhibiting their interconnection in a system.‟2 This system is a positive totality. 
However the system is not knowable as a systematic totality of ideas but only in parts, as 
described in the three Critiques, but only, knowable as fragments. Not that Kant understood this 
as fragmentation. For Kant „Totality‟ and „system‟ are intimately related, at times synonyms. 
However, the Jena Romantics employed the concept of fragment as a further synonym for 
totality and system.  
Can a negative totality be found in Kant? A possible candidate would be everything 
assumed to be lying beyond the bounds of sense, the „things in themselves.‟ These are strictly 
unknowable in their reality except as produced by the operation of sense perception in the only 
form it can take as filtered through our a priori concepts of understanding. However, the „things 
in themselves‟ are not actually a form of negative totality. They merely form a background of 
unknowable reality and as such are vacuous, they do not negate anything. They are just 
unknowable in contrast to the world of appearance and not in opposition to it. 
However, there are other forms of negation in Kant. One form is that of non-being in 
time which is conceived of as the opposite of being in time or reality. „There therefore exists a 
relation and connection between reality and negation, or rather a transition from one to 
another…‟3 Negation is a sub-set of the „Table of Categories‟ under the second division, Of 
Quality, negation here being understood as that which does not exist, nothing. The distinction is 
between something and nothing, i.e. „none „ which opposes „all, many and one.‟4 „All 
negations…are merely limitations of a greater, and ultimately of the highest, reality; and they 
therefore presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived from it.‟5 Negation is 
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also understood by Kant in terms of „conflict,‟ as in the opposition of forces in nature, where 
one aspect of reality is in conflict with another, „realitates phenomena.‟6 Thirdly, Kant also 
makes use of antinomies, or contradictory positions. It is these last two forms of negation, 
conflict and the antinomical, that Hegel will develop. 
As Herbert Marcuse states in the opening sentence of his Reason and Revolution, 
„German idealism has been called the theory of the French Revolution.‟7 It is well known that 
both Kant and Hegel were excited and to some extent inspired by the events of 1789. As one of 
Kant‟s acquaintances reported, „He lived and moved in it; and in spite of the terror, he held onto 
his hopes so much that when he heard of the declaration of the republic he called out in 
excitement; “Now let your servant go in peace to his grave, for I have seen the glory of the 
world”.‟8 Hegel, along with his student friends at Tübingen, Hölderlin and Schelling „welcomed 
the French Revolution by planting a liberty tree on the outskirts of town.‟9 Adorno also saw the 
French Revolution as a pivotal moment in history: „…the French Revolution, for all the abrupt 
concurrence of some of its acts, fitted into the overall course of bourgeois emancipation.‟
10
  In 
the Preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel makes clear he is aware of living in a time of 
great change, „…ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era.‟11 Hegel‟s 
philosophy was a progressive dynamic seeking for a unified theory of reality (Reason) that 
proceeded by negation. Full comprehension of the whole, is the whole comprehended. So, for 
Hegel, totality is both the totality of knowledge and the knowledge of totality. For Hegel what is 
given is in essence negative, there is a real sense in which his was a negative philosophy, which 
is how it was referred to by his contemporaries and successors.
12
 What is given is negative 
because its truth will be achieved by „overcoming this negativity, so that the birth of the truth 
requires the death of the given state of being.‟13 Hegel‟s progression to the absolute notion of 
his system took place through negation, through dialectical moments. Out of each negative 
moment came a further positive stage of becoming, creating in the end, a system of total 
knowledge and comprehension. This project enabled Hegel to claim that „Philosophy is its own 
time apprehended in thoughts.‟14  As Adorno remarked, the very thought „…of world history 
being perfected in the Prussian state…‟ was of itself enough to render the entire project an 
„absurdity.‟15  
Hegel‟s systematic philosophy was employed by Marx as part of his science of  
capital. The science of capital was conceived by Marx as a whole systematic totality 
dynamically unfolding through historical time. This is as much an idea of the Enlightenment as 
the encycopledia, or systematic philosophy or science. Marx‟s analytical science of capital 
described an economic mode of organising society, which later came to be popularly known as 
capitalism. As Marcuse states:  
 
There is no more adequate example of the formation of the dialectical notion than 
Marx‟s concept of capitalism. …The concept of capitalism is no less than the totality of 
the capitalist process, comprehended in the „principle‟ by which it progresses. The 
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notion of capitalism starts with the separation of the actual producers from the means of 
production, resulting in the establishment of free labour and the appropriation of surplus 
value, which, with the development of technology, brings about the accumulation and 
centralization of capital, the progressive decline of the rate of profit, and the breakdown 
of the entire system. The notion of capitalism is no less than the three volumes of 
Capital, just as Hegel‟s notion of the notion comprises all three books of his Science of 
Logic.
16
 
   
Hegel‟s „notion constitutes a „negative totality‟, which evolves only by virtue of contradictory 
forces.‟17 As Marcuse points out in Reason and Revolution the substantive difference between 
the dialectics of Hegel and Marx was between Hegel‟s ontology of the system and Marx‟s 
grounding of dialectics in „a historical condition…a social condition associated with a particular 
form of historical society…The totality that the Marxian dialectic gets to is the totality of class 
society, and the negativity that underlies its contradictions and shapes its every content is the 
negativity of class relations.‟18 So capitalism as modelled on Hegel‟s „notion‟ can be understood 
to be a negative totality, moreover a negative totality that is still in the process of becoming, not 
yet finished. It is in this sense in which Adorno seems to understand it, however, he does not 
always seem to distinguish clearly between capitalism and society. As Marx wrote in the first 
volume of Capital, „capitalist production‟ would lead to „the negation of negation‟ in other 
words to its own disintegration.  
 
The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, 
produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private 
property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, 
with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of 
negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him 
individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-operation 
and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.
19
 
 
The logic of disintegration, „the negation of the negation,‟ when projected into the future 
depends on a smooth concept of temporal progression, a projected history, what might be called 
a Marxist imaginary of inevitability. As Marx remarked in a speech, progress and decay seem to 
go hand in hand in some ghastly dialectic of his contemporary civilization: 
 
On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces, which no 
epoch of the former human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist 
symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors of the Roman Empire. In our days 
everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful 
power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking 
it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into 
sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. …This 
antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, modern misery and 
dissolution on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers, and the 
social relations of our epoch, is a fact, palpable, overwhelming.
20
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Disintegration was also a central concept for Adorno. Disintegration not only in capitalist 
society, but in philosophy and art as well. Adorno‟s conception of dialectics takes up Hegel‟s 
idea that „the very being of finite things‟ contains  „the seeds of their perishing as their own 
Being-in-Self.‟21 The logic of dialectics‟ remarks Adorno in Negative Dialectics  „is one of 
disintegration: of a disintegration of the prepared and objectified form of the concepts which the 
cognitive subject faces, primarily and directly.‟22 
 
Adorno’s conception of capitalism and society 
When Adorno remarked in Minima Moralia „The whole is the false‟23 he was reversing a 
famous phrase of Hegel‟s „The True is the whole‟24  [das Ganze]. By this Adorno meant that the 
actual whole, capitalism, the „administered world‟ was false, was untrue. It was a totality that 
negated truth. In this sense „the administered world‟ is a negative totality. It not only negates 
truth in all fields, it negates freedom and happiness as well. It is also a negative totality in the 
Hegelian sense of being not yet completed. The negative totality that is late capitalism at work 
provides a background to all of Adorno‟s thought. It provides the moral authority for the 
variations on the declaration that nothing is right about the world and that the world should be 
other than it is. The implicit claims are not only that should the world be other than it is, but 
philosophy should also be other than it is and art should be other than it is. Most of Aesthetic 
Theory is taken up with a set of accounts as to why philosophy and art have developed but little 
space is given to theorising „the total exchange society‟25 against which philosophy and art are 
understood. Even less space is allotted to theorising about how, if society were other than it is, 
what, in such changed circumstances, art might be like. All we are offered is the expectation 
that best practice in autonomous art, of whatever historical moment within modernism, 
somehow points to a utopian future, to a spark of freedom the truth of which can only be 
revealed by philosophy. It is therefore necessary to step outside the late text Aesthetic Theory 
and to examine earlier texts in order to gain an insight into Adorno‟s concept of „the 
administered world.‟ There is an important sense in which Aesthetic Theory does not stand 
alone, even when it comes to art, for many of Adorno‟s extended comments on artworks are 
contained in earlier texts. The same is true of philosophy. Aesthetic Theory is a text centred on 
the possibility of there being such a study as aesthetics, in that it stands alone in Adorno‟s 
oeuvre and yet its interpretation does require reference to earlier texts.  
A clear reference to the negativity of „the whole‟ can be found in Adorno‟s Negative 
Dialectics: „If the whole is the spell, if it is the negative, a negation of particularities – 
epitomized in that whole – remains negative.‟26 The phrase of Adorno‟s, „the administered 
world‟, can be seen as ambiguous, in that it seems to refer to both society and capitalism. The 
phrase becomes shorthand for a capitalist society, a society in which capitalism is the economic 
system for that society. Capitalism as an economic system may historically have started within 
one particular society, within one particular nation but by its very nature it is trans-national and 
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ultimately a global economic system because of capital‟s inherent tendency to universalise 
itself. The territory of capitalism is defined not by any state or nation, nor by boundaries of 
economic unions or any other spatially defined entities but by the mode of production. A society 
on the other hand is spatially defined. Within sociology the concept of society originated in 
attempts at definitions for the relations and operations of the populations of nation states.   
  It was George Lukács who in History and Class Consciousness re-introduced, or  
revealed, the centrality of the concept of totality for Marxist thought, as he stated: 
  
It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the 
decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of 
totality. The category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the 
parts is the essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly 
transformed into the foundations of a new science. …Proletarian science is 
revolutionary not just by virtue of revolutionary ideas which it opposes to bourgeois 
society, but above all because of its method. The primacy of the category of totality is 
the bearer of the principle of revolution in science.
27
   
 
Adorno did not share Lukács‟ faith in the revolutionary potential, let alone the reality, of the 
proletariat. The moment that Marx had hoped for in 1848 was long gone along with the 
potentially revolutionary class on which the faith was based. However, Adorno did still use the 
language of class in his discussions of the nature of society. „Society remains class society, 
today just as in the period when the concept originated; the repression current in the eastern 
countries shows that things are no different there either.‟28 The phrase „class society‟ in the 
above sentence, from Adorno‟s article „Society,‟ was originally translated by Fredric Jameson 
as „class struggle‟. Martin Jay corrected this translation of Klassengellschaft in his Marxism and 
Totality.
29
 It is clear that Adorno did still believe in the class structure of society: „…the 
difference between the classes grows objectively with the increasing concentration of capital.‟30   
              As Martin Jay has pointed out there have been almost as many versions of what is 
meant by totality as there have been prominent Western Marxists.
31
 Adorno‟s totality is almost 
the negation of Lukács‟. As Adorno explained in his lectures on sociology, where he directly 
addresses the question as to whether society can be considered to be a totality in any sense: „The 
emphasis I place on the concept of society, and my insistent use of it, may, of course, be readily 
misunderstood in the „organicist‟ or – to use the language of the German cultural reaction – the 
„holistic‟ sense, to mean that society is a sum or an agglomeration of elements which is simply 
more than its parts.‟32 What Adorno has in mind by contrast is a concept of society that is more 
abstract, and dialectical: on the one hand, individuals and on the other the various relationships 
individuals have to each other. On this view society has to be understood „…as a relational 
category which is not exhausted by the individuals composing it.‟33 The real relations between 
individuals are masked by the ideology of capitalism: 
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… the totality within which we live, and which we can feel in each of our social actions, 
is conditioned not by a direct „togetherness‟ encompassing us all, but by the fact that we 
are essentially divided from each other through the abstract relationship of exchange… 
If one wanted to characterize the concept of society itself, then the notion of the system, 
of an order imposed in a somewhat abstract way, would be far more adequate than the 
notion of organic wholeness.
34
   
 
 
This analysis of society in terms of „exchange relations‟ makes use of a basic concept of Marx‟s 
theory of capitalism, the relationship of exchange. Adorno makes clear in „Society‟ that 
exchange is a form of control over the individual. „The form of the total system requires 
everyone to respect the law of exchange if he does not want to be destroyed, irrespective of 
whether profit is his subjective motivation or not.‟35 It is clear that Adorno believes individuals 
to be trapped by capitalism, that individuals are at the mercy of an „economic process‟ that 
„…reduces individual interests to the common denominator of a totality which remains negative 
because its constitutive abstraction removes it from those interests, for all its being composed of 
them at the same time.‟36 This is another clear reference that Adorno does consider the totality 
of capitalism to be negative. Capitalism appears as the fundamental conceptual structure for 
Adorno. It must underlie any attempt to make sense of society: „Without making use of 
capitalism as a key concept, they [the facts] could only be interpreted at the cost of violent and 
arbitrary distortions.‟37 As Adorno stated in „Some Ideas on the Sociology of Music‟ the 
concept of society operates in two ways, it is a dual aspect concept: „…society is both an 
umbrella concept that subsumes every more specialized subsystem within itself and something 
that manifests itself as a totality in each of its branches…it is a process; it produces both itself 
and its subordinate parts, welding them together into a totality, in Hegel‟s sense of the term.‟38 
As is already clear, for Adorno society cannot be understood without reference to capitalism. In 
his essay, „Late Capitalism and Industrial Society‟ Adorno draws upon Marx‟s important 
distinction between the forces of production and relations of production. These two concepts are 
the key to making clear that for Adorno late capitalism has given rise to industrial society:     
 
… contemporary society undoubtedly is an industrial society according to the state of 
its forces of production. Industrial labor has everywhere become the model of society as 
such, regardless of the frontiers separating differing political systems. It has developed 
into a totality because methods modelled on those of industry are necessarily extended 
by the laws of economics to other realms of material production, administration, the 
sphere of distribution, and those that call themselves culture. In contrast, however, 
society is capitalist in its relations of production.
39
  
 
This essay contrasts late capitalism with industrial society in a way that makes clear these two 
concepts are related by the one being folded into, contained within the other. However, for 
Adorno,  this hiding within by late capitalism is not at all obvious: 
 
However, simply to regard the forces of production and the relations of production as 
polar opposites would be unworthy of dialectical theory. They are interlocking 
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phenomena: the one contains the other within it. It is this that seduces us into focussing 
simply on the forces of production, even though it is the relations of production that 
have the upper hand. The forces of production are mediated more than ever by the 
relations of production, so completely, perhaps, that the latter appear to be the essence; 
they have become second nature.
40
  
 
These statements make it clear that Adorno did think that capitalism was a more fundamental 
category than society. There is a sense in which capitalism and society are, for a Marxist, dual 
concepts. Capitalism and society are related, both are necessary for any description of how life 
is organised, but the first is prior in that it explains why the organisation is as it is. So for 
Adorno, the individual is the antithesis of society, the antithesis of totality. This is why Adorno 
claims that totality is a dialectical concept that belongs to a critical theory as opposed to an 
empirical positivist theory: 
 
The crucial difference between the dialectical and the positivistic view of totality is that 
the dialectical concept of totality is intended „objectively‟, namely, for the 
understanding of every social individual observation, whilst positivistic systems 
theories wish, in an uncontradictory manner, to incorporate observations in a logical 
continuum, simply through the selection of categories as general as possible. In so 
doing they do not recognize the highest structural concepts as the precondition for the 
states of affairs subsumed under them. 
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This statement again makes it clear that capitalism has to be assumed as a „highest structural 
concept‟, a precondition for any attempt to understand totality. The individual is the antithesis 
of society as opposed to any collectivity of individuals. Society for Adorno, is a system in 
which each individual has a place. It is in this sense that society can be thought of as a 
structured system. The very idea of society is itself not value free for „… in its very structure 
this idea follows the model of middle-class society.‟42  
 
 
Adorno’s rational – irrational dialectic of society 
A further aspect of Adorno‟s views about society is encapsulated in his antinomical dialectic 
between rational and irrational. This dialectic brings together ideas from Freud and Weber and 
sets them in dialectical tension. Any idea of society, according to Adorno, involves notions of 
„hierarchical ordering‟ and so society itself is a „classificatory concept‟ of sociology which is 
incoherent because „The object meant by the concept society is not in itself rationally 
continuous.‟43 For Adorno, society is both rational and irrational. Society believes itself to be 
rational but in truth is irrational. Society can include remnants of „pre-capitalistic‟ societies 
within them, an irrationality within a rationality that is itself irrational. „Within the exchange 
society, the pre-capitalistic remnants and enclaves are by no means something alien, mere relics 
of the past: they are vital necessities for the market system. Irrational institutions are useful to 
the stubborn irrationality of a society which is rational in its means but not in its ends.‟44  The 
progressive rationalisation and bureaucratisation of society were key concepts in the sociology 
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of Weber. In Adorno‟s view the progressive rationalisation as described by Weber is irrational. 
This means that the various meanings of rational and irrational used by Adorno with regard to 
society are complex and characteristically set up as contradictions and have to be disentangled. 
To begin with, how can Adorno‟s claim be understood? The claim is that to describe society as 
rational is itself irrational. This idea was developed in The Dialectic of Enlightenment where 
Adorno and Horkheimer set out to show how Enlightenment reason developed out of myth 
(irrationality) and in the twentieth century can be seen regressing into mythic irrationality in 
totalitarian states such as Nazi Germany and the USSR, as well as in Western liberal 
democracies dominated by capitalism. In his essay, „Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?‟ 
Adorno states that a rational theoretical description of an irrational society is impossible: „The 
irrational nature of contemporary society inhibits a rational account of it in the realm of 
theory.‟45 The second strand that is bound up in this rational/irrational idea is derived from 
Freud. No more can society be regarded as a curable whole than can a person be thought of as a 
psychically sound subjectivity, this is the myth of the whole personality. „The stress on totality 
as against the unique, fragmentary impulses, always implies the harmonistic belief in what 
might be called the unity of the personality, [a unity that] is never realised in our society. It is 
one of the great merits of Freud that he has debunked the myth of this unity.‟46  So it is a critical 
sociological/psychological conceit for Adorno to refer to society as irrational. It brings together 
Max Weber and Freud as opposite poles. For Adorno rational and irrational are in a dialectical 
relationship. To think of society as a whole would be to think of it by means of a false 
rationality. This false totality of society „binds people together only by virtue of their alienation 
from each other.‟47 Each individual may have an identifiable place, and identifiable role but 
their binding together is not rational in the Weberian sense, but irrational in the Freudian sense 
as a society based on the mutual antagonisms of individuals is irrational because: „the whole or 
the totality of society maintains itself …only though the antagonistic interests of human beings, 
this society of rational exchange is infected in its constitution and at its very root by a moment 
of irrationality which threatens to disintegrate it at any moment.‟48  Furthermore this 
antagonistic relationship is also at the same time a form of „rational‟ domination which is 
theorised by „Freud‟s theory‟: „namely, that the overwhelming majority of human beings 
tolerate relations of domination, identify themselves with them and are motivated towards 
irrational attitudes by them…‟49 There is a sense in which this rational/irrational conceit is a 
typical Adornian antinomical dialectic in that it at first sight looks ultimately self-defeating. It 
looks to be as much a stylistic, defiant, and rhetorical trope as a useful analytical description. 
However, it is probably best understood as an example of Adorno‟s „shock‟ tactics in presenting 
text that is designed to take readers by surprise so they are forced to stand back and think about 
the meaning.  
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Antinomies and/or dialectics 
I have called this rational-irrational dialectic an antinomical dialectic simply because it is not a 
pure example of a Hegelian dialectic. There is indeed an opposition involved but it is not 
resolved, Hegel‟s dialectics are resolved through the negation of the opposition whereas 
Adorno‟s are negative in that they are unresolvable. Adorno‟s negative dialectics are far more 
like Kant‟s antinomies, upon which Hegel‟s dialectics are based, than Hegel‟s dialectics in 
themselves. Many  commentators who write about Adorno refer to him as a Hegelian. This 
judgement should in my opinion be revised. Adorno is far more of a Kantian in his negative 
dialectics than a Hegelian for his negative dialectics are identical to Kantian antinomies in being 
unresolvable in the terms in which they are conceived. Lukács uses the concept of unresolvable 
antimonies in the essay „The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought‟ in History and Class 
Consciousness. For Lukács these antinomies can only be resolved by the proletarian revolution. 
Similarly for Adorno the antinomies revealed by his negative dialectic cannot be solved under 
the negative totality of late capitalism, but the horizon of revolution has receded. 
One commentator who takes the standard view that Adorno is more of a Hegelian than a 
Kantian is Mauro Bozzetti. „Kant is often employed by Adorno for the purposes of criticizing 
Hegel, but Adorno‟s perspective remains fundamentally dialectical, and this crucially distances 
him from Kant‟s method.‟50 Bozzetti admits that Adorno resists Hegelian „reconciliation, 
synthesis, the positive and totality‟ which is precisely the difference I am alluding to but still 
claims that resistance „ is always carried out in such a way that his procedure remains in 
dialectical contradiction.‟51 Remaining in „dialectical contradiction‟ without any form of 
synthesis means that the contradictions remain open, remain in short antinomic. Later in his 
essay Bozzetti lists three points on which Adorno and Hegel „find no agreement‟ in their 
respective interpretations of history, in their respective evaluations of unreason and irrationality 
and in their ideas about religious categories. Despite this Bozzetti still sees „the elements of 
kinship between Hegel and Adorno are greater, indeed thematically and methodologically 
inseparable from one another.‟52  Bernstein whilst he claims Adorno is a Hegelian remarks that 
„he cannot be an orthodox Hegelian‟. „Adorno‟s philosophy is the articulation of what it is to be 
a Hegelian after Hegel, after Marx, after Nietzsche, and above all after two centuries of brutal 
history in which the moment to realize philosophy, the hope of left Hegelians like Marx, was 
missed.‟53 As Bernstein points out it is Adorno‟s central belief in the domination of  capitalist 
society that lies at the heart of his negative dialectics. „Since contradiction is the moving force 
of negative dialectics, negative dialectics will continue only so long as domination continues.‟54 
This position is made clear by Adorno in the Introduction to Negative Dialectics. „Regarding the 
concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The right 
state of things would be free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction.‟55 Towards the end of 
the book Adorno returns to the idea of utopian hope. „It lies in the definition of negative 
dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. This is its form of hope.‟ 
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For Bubner, by contrast, one of the main questions Adorno and Horkheimer faced in 
conceiving their Dialectic of Enlightenment was, „How is it possible to make use of Hegel‟s 
dialectic and, at the same time, be dead set against its logical and historical consequences?‟56  
Giving a privileged status to „irrational beliefs‟ is he thinks the key, so that their conception of 
myth is at basis rational is the heart of the dialectic which is hidden by ‟illusion‟. Bubner sees 
the use of „illusion‟ in the Dialectic of Enlightenment as a „means to obscure the line of division 
that separates art from philosophy.‟57 
  A commentator who does think Adorno‟s use of dialectic is more Kantian than 
Hegelian is Hauke Brunkhorst who identifies the time Adorno spent reading Kant with Kracauer 
as a teenager as a key his use of antinomies. „The idea of a negative dialectics, which is 
Adorno‟s most unique philosophical contribution, owes much to it. This influence is particularly 
evident in Kant‟s antinomies, since they do not nullify contradiction, but maintain it and allow 
thought to move back and forth between its opposing extremes.‟58 This resemblance to Kant is 
the most striking thing about Adorno‟s use of dialectics as negative dialectics, Adorno does not 
move to as Hegel does to an ultimate totality of absolute knowledge, but moves away from the 
negative totality of the administered world. „Adorno takes only the negative side of Hegel‟s 
dialectics as a method of processing through contradictions …Adorno‟s step away from Hegel‟s 
speculative understanding of dialectics is a step back to Kant, just a step, not a return to some 
sort of Neo-Kantianism.‟59 As Duttmann remarks: this is a „transformed conception of what 
dialectic is. Adorno calls the dialectical approach that has renounced the claim to totality a 
negative dialectics.‟60 As Brunkhorst points out „Contradictions and antinomies for Adorno are 
not only something to avoid. On the contrary, they have a productive function of finding new 
solutions to problems and innovative conceptions in theory as well as in practical life, as in 
Kant‟s transcendental dialectics. They can also be applied to modern art, and to the process of 
socialization and in therapeutic communication.‟61In his lectures on Kant‟s Critique of Pure 
Reason Adorno describes what he understands as the essence of Kantian philosophy that at its 
heart is a fundamental antinomy. 
 
The dialectical or antonimic structure of Kantian philosophy means that it aspires to 
create a system, to provide a central point, which is that of the idea that can construct 
reality - but at the same time, it refuses to regard the world as identical with that idea. 
This implies a vast effort to square the circle and it is very easy to criticize him for the 
errors that spring from it. I believe that this is the deepest thing to be found in Kant. On 
the one hand, he holds fast to the intention of philosophy to understand reality as a 
whole, to decode the totality. At the same time, he declares that philosophy is incapable 
of this, and that the only form in which the totality can be grasped is the expression of 
the fact that it cannot be comprehended.
62
 
 
This antinomy lies at the centre of Kant‟s whole philosophical approach for Adorno. In 
Negative Dialectics Adorno points to a fundamental difference with Hegel. „What is negated is 
negative until it has passed. This is the decisive break with Hegel.‟63  In other words under the 
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conditions of late capitalism a negative dialectic must remain unresolved, remain in short an 
antinomy. In this, paradoxically, Adorno sees a form of utopian hope. „It lies in the definition of 
negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. This is its form of 
hope.‟64 
 
The individual and society 
Adorno and Raymond Williams had significantly different conceptions of the relationship 
between an individual and society. In the final section of The Long Revolution, „Britain in the 
1960s‟ Raymond Williams analyses a series of „confusions‟ in general thinking about modern 
society. These confusions concern the uncertainties about how to organise and plan the various 
services and developments within a society that appears to be complacently expanding under the 
sort of banner encapsulated in the phrase, derived from a 1957 speech by the Conservative 
Prime Minister Macmillan, „You‟ve never had it so good.‟ This misquotation of Macmillan is 
how the essence of the speech is remembered. Macmillan was referring to the optimism and 
prosperity that opened the decade of the 1960s. Raymond Williams is in no doubt as to the 
source of the confusions in thinking about society. „For my own part I am certain, as I review 
the evidence, that it is capitalism  – a particular and temporary system of organizing the 
industrial process – which is in fact confusing us.‟65 Williams sees the older socialist values of 
the labour movement being compromised and rendered powerless by the increasing power of 
capitalism to infiltrate deeper into society so „that hardly any principled opposition remains.‟66  
He is concerned with the absence of democracy from many aspects of life at both a national and 
a local level. „The pressure now, in a wide area of our social life, should be towards a 
participating democracy, in which the ways and means of involving people much more closely 
in the process of self-government can be learned and extended.‟67 Class is another issue that 
Williams thinks is confused, between the social origins of classes and the economic aspects that 
were subsequently overlaid on the original social classification and he believes society would be 
better off without such a classification. When he turns his attention to culture Williams is 
concerned that whilst there has been an increase in the enjoyment of „real art and argument‟ the 
„distribution of bad art and bad argument is increasing even more rapidly.‟68 Williams sees the 
way forward as, on the one hand, the encouragment of artists to experiment in all forms and on 
the other by encouraging „real criticism.‟ He admits that increasingly so much of culture is „left 
to the market‟. „We should be much clearer about these cultural questions if we saw them as a 
consequence of a basically capitalist organization, and I at least know no better reason for 
capitalism to be ended‟69 Williams goes on to suggest structural changes to various cultural 
institutions to make them publicly owned and financed with democratic accountability to 
counter the rise of powerful financial interests and a consequent restricted marketplace in 
culture in general.  What were once „seemingly impossible expectations‟70 of the long 
revolution such as the right to vote, the eradication of poverty and education for all children, 
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had by the 1960s been achieved. William‟s main worry is that „massification‟ of society and its 
culture is already well underway. He sees the „central problem is that of expectations.‟71  It is 
the task of the present generation to „frame new expectations, in terms of a continuing version 
of what life could be.‟72 These Williams believes must revolve around the eradication of „social 
poverty‟, „cultural poverty‟  and „inadequate democracy.‟ „These ways of thinking require not 
only new kinds of analysis of the society, but also a new version of the relationship and new 
feelings in human expectation.‟73  
 As is clear from the above explication of Williams‟ position there is a great contrast 
between Adorno and Williams. In this contrast lie deep similarities. Both are orientated to the 
expectation that the world would be a better place without capitalism. For Williams there are 
difficult adjustments to make so the „long revolution‟ can continue on a path that may well end 
with the control and eventual elimination of capitalism. William‟s „long revolution‟ started in 
the 1780s with the industrial revolution. This is the same historical epoch which for Adorno 
sees the emergence of autonomous art. Adorno by contrast, whilst he has a utopian expectation 
that capitalism might one day come to an end never lays out what he might well have called a 
well meaning liberal minded set of recipes for change. Adorno identifies utopian expectations 
encapsulated within the work of art. He would never have attempted to do what Williams does 
in his laying out of a set of proposals for how ordinary life and cultural life might be changed 
and made more equitable and democratic. The „dialectic of enlightenment‟ is the direct opposite 
of the „long revolution‟. The first is utterly pessimistic the other infused with some degree of 
hope.   
By contrast to Williams, Adorno always stresses the significance of the singular 
individual whether understood as philosopher, artist or receiver of artworks or all three. This has 
led some theorists to question his apparent lack of interest in collectivity:  
 
Adorno …falls into a social-theoretic reductionism that simply passes over the level of 
the cultural accomplishments of social groups, the sphere of social action in general, 
and thus is confined to the two poles of “individual and organisation”. …This analysis 
has selected and designed concepts in such a way that the fundamental category of 
social action, the dimension of the social, can no longer be discerned…74 
 
This is a serious criticism of Adorno, by Axel Honneth, and partly explains why some of 
Adorno‟s students in the 1960s were disappointed to find his Marxist theory apparently lacked 
any element of praxis. This was unfair of such critics in that Adorno had, since the publication 
of „The Actuality of Philosophy‟, maintained that the act of engaging in critical theory was itself 
a political praxis. In his mind his activity as a philosopher and critic was itself a revolutionary 
praxis. What Adorno thought could be done in terms of practical action to combat such a 
powerful and pervasive negative totality as capitalism was less clear. He seems to believe that 
no amount of well-meaning political action within a liberal democracy can make any real 
improvement. Adorno claimed: „Politics aimed at the formation of a reasonable and mature 
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mankind remain under an evil spell, as long as they lack a theory that takes account of the 
totality that is false…‟75 A liberal politics, in other words, that failed to correctly analyse the 
total situation would be bound to fail. In his late essay „Resignation‟ he spells out the danger 
that praxis in the form of 1960s radical action was always in danger of being just another 
example of a „pseudo activity:‟76  
 
In contrast, the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither superscribes his 
conscience nor permits himself to be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does 
not give up. …Open thinking points beyond itself. For its part, such thinking takes a 
position as a figuration of praxis which is more closely related to a praxis truly involved 
in change than in a position of mere obedience for the sake of praxis.
77
 
 
Although Adorno does acknowledge the existence of collectivity he still lays most stress on the 
singular experience, whether social, metaphysical or artistic, of individuals: 
  
Collective modes of production by small groups are already conceivable, and in some 
media even requisite; monads are the locus of experience in all existing societies. 
Because individuation, along with the suffering that it involves, is a social law, society 
can only be experienced individually. The subduction of an immediately collective 
subject would be duplicitous and would condemn the artwork to untruth because it 
would withdraw the single possibility of experience that is open to it today.
78
 
 
Presumably the „collective mode of production‟ Adorno has in mind is the film, or a  
theatre ensemble, although at another point in Aesthetic Theory he refers to „collective forms of 
production such as the composers‟ workshop that Schoenberg envisaged.‟79  
If the value of collectivity is in doubt, so also is the value of a scientific approach to 
analysing the ills and structure of society: „In a determinably false society that contradicts the 
interests both of its members and of the whole, all knowledge which readily subordinates itself 
to the rules of this society that are congealed in science, participates in falsehood.‟80 In other 
words, a positivist empirical sociology which operates on a scientific basis inevitably 
„participates in falsehood‟. The results of empirical research, as he showed in his own practice 
in texts such as The Authoritarian Personality, need to be assessed critically using the deeper 
interpretation that only comes from a critical theory point of view. Adorno clearly believed that 
the industrialisation of all forms of leisure activities had taken over from, or become another 
version of, ideology:  
 
Men have come to be – triumph of integration! – identified in their innermost behaviour 
patterns with their fate in modern society. …The affective re-arrangement of industry, 
the mass appeal of sports, the fetishization of consumer‟s goods, are all symptoms of 
this trend. The cement which once ideologies supplied is now furnished by these 
phenomena, which hold the massive social institutions together on the one hand, the 
psychological constitution of human beings on the other.
81
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However by contrast, in the essay „Free Time‟ Adorno contrasts hobbies, boredom and DIY 
with genuine free time. Hobbies, boredom and DIY can be understood as an extention of the 
„unfreedom‟ of work as such.82 He admits that, much to his surprise, an empirical sociological 
investigation into attitudes towards a royal wedding had revealed that, whilst TV watchers were 
entranced by the spectacle, they nevertheless retained a sense of objectivity and disbelief in the 
importance of the hyped event they had witnessed. „It is obvious that the integration of 
consciousness and free time has not yet completely succeeded. The real interests of individuals 
are still strong enough to resist, within certain limits, total inclusion.‟83 More typical of 
Adorno‟s attitude to the consciousness of individuals in general is his view expressed in the 
essay „Lyric Poetry and Society‟ where a privileged individual is in a position to gain a wider 
perspective: 
 
The lyric subject (the more adequately it presents itself, the more compellingly) does 
not merely embody the whole. Rather it is set apart from the whole in that it owes its 
existence to special privilege: not only the fewest individuals, given the pressures of the 
necessities of life, are ever allowed to grasp the general truth or shape of things in self-
immersion – few, indeed, have been allowed simply to develop themselves as 
independent individuals, in control of the free expression of their own subjectivities.
84
   
 
This could be interpreted as mandarin cultural conservatism, and in a sense it is, for it is an 
astute acknowledgement that the forms of art, and philosophy Adorno believed in most 
passionately were the preserve of a privileged few in an irrational and unequal society. 
    
Summary 
This close reading of portions of Adorno‟s writings on capitalism as totality has revealed a 
number of aspects of his understanding that require critique. It is clear that Adorno does think of 
capitalism as a form of totality, a negative one, against which and in opposition to which critical 
theory must work. Society, whether understood in general sociological terms or as industrial 
society, is itself permeated by capitalist forces of production. Capitalism is the most 
fundamental concept. Despite this there are comments by Adorno where three different aspects 
of his critique are muddled together. It is not always clear whether Adorno is distinguishing 
between society and the power of capital. Often the sociological understanding of a society, is 
run together with an economic understanding and political understanding of capitalism as if they 
are identical. To this confusion is added the mixed metaphors of Weberian rationality and 
Freudian irrationality as forms of total ideological control from which there is no escape except 
for the few lone individuals who can identify this. Adorno and Horkheimer‟s analysis in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment that the rationality of the Enlightenment has subverted itself and 
turned into its opposite, myth is a source of this view. Whilst this has the advantage of making 
clear that philosophy is only possible as a critique of the current situation in economics, politics, 
philosophy and art, however, does seem to be used as a signifier for a deeply pessimistic 
negative outlook. That rational/irrational conceit is a good example of Adorno‟s methodological 
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approach as negative dialectics. I argue that his negative dialectics should be understood as 
Kantian antinomies which are un-resolvable as opposed to Hegelian dialectics. 
In addition there are a fundamental set of problems involved in setting up the power of 
capital, whether understood as such or in the form of a modern society, in opposition to the lone 
individual. First, the power of capital as manifested in the „irrational administration of the 
world‟ does seem to be so overwhelming in Adorno‟s view that few can escape it. There are 
places where his analysis implies that individuals are totally controlled and submerged in the 
ideology of the power of capital. This leaves Adorno no space to construct, or identify, 
oppositional social groups through whose shared understanding and shared collaborative action 
the critique of the power of capital can be undertaken. Second, emphasis on the lone individual 
whether as creator, audience member or analyst underplays a more realistic sociology of art 
such as that proposed by Pierre Bourdieu.
85
  In The Rules of Art Bourdieu develops his 
sociological conception of a „field‟ to make clear how complex and social is the creation and 
reception of art. This is an entire realm of sociological understanding that is missing in 
Adorno‟s account.  
Disintegration was meant to be the telos of capitalism according to Marx. That 
capitalism has transformed itself through several phases from monopoly capitalism through to 
global capitalism without disintegrating is undeniable. What have disintegrated, according to 
Adorno, are philosophy and art. The impossibility of grasping the world via traditional 
systematic philosophy in a world so structured by capitalism means that for Adorno the only 
way philosophy can survive is in micrological conceptual forms, in constellations, and it is 
philosophy understood as constellation, that forms the next section of this chapter. 
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Section Two: Constellation 
In the previous chapter I introduced Aesthetic Theory from a structural point of view and 
suggested that the text could partly be understood as a structure of sections or parts. Adorno 
clearly thought about the book in this way because in a letter, quoted in the „Editors‟ Afterword‟ 
to Aesthetic Theory he states: „The book must, so to speak, be written in equally weighted, 
paratactical parts that are arranged around a midpoint that they express through their 
constellation.‟86 This idea of a constellation runs through Aesthetic Theory, indeed it structures 
the book, and it is to be found in many other texts by Adorno. The basic conceptual idea is of a 
set of ideas being both equal and equidistant from a midpoint [Mittelpunkt] or centre [Zentrum] 
and presented [darstellen] in the form of a constellation. I will discuss each of these concepts in 
turn starting with „midpoint.‟ 
 
Midpoint 
Midpoint (or centre) and constellation are two intimately related concepts for Adorno and they 
are related to a third, which is a textual conception, parataxis. These three concepts, themselves 
form an implied constellation. They form the core of what, to put it in analytic philosophical 
terms, can be described as Adorno‟s theory of meaning. The relationship between the three 
concepts is complex. I will first examine midpoint which is an idea that can be found in a 
variety of texts by Adorno where interestingly it is used in reference to three different objects. 
Midpoint is used in reference to (i) the text itself (in two forms, as the essay and as philosophy) 
(ii) to art and artworks (especially to music), and (iii) to society. The fact that the idea of 
midpoint links these three different areas demonstrates its  important conceptual role for 
Adorno. It is a fundamental aspect of his concept of meaning. I will introduce each in turn 
starting with texts.   
In „The Essay as Form‟ Adorno explains why the essay is the textual mode of 
communication that he thinks is best suited to his understanding of the reality of communicating 
in a society that at every turn expresses the totality that is late capitalism at work. He does this 
by examining the form of the essay. According to Adorno, one of the benefits of the essay over 
a longer discursive text is, the freedom available for the writer to experiment and try ideas out: 
 
But for the essay, culture is not some epiphenomenon superimposed on being that must 
be eliminated, but rather what lies underneath is itself artificial (thesei), false 
society…The essay owes its freedom in its choice of objects, its sovereignty vis-à-vis 
all priorities of fact or theory to the circumstance that for it all objects are equally near 
the centre, to the principle that casts a spell over everything.
87
  
 
 
It must be assumed that „the principle that casts a spell over everything‟ is a reference to the 
totality of late capitalism. This is one fundamental meaning to the concept of the midpoint, that 
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in such a society the experimental cross-disciplinary freedom provided by the form of the essay 
enables the writer to unmask the reality of capitalism. This suggestion is reinforced by another 
passage from the same text: „The essay must let the totality light up in one of its chosen or 
haphazard features but without asserting that the whole is present.‟88 However, there is a second 
important meaning to midpoint within a text. In Minima Moralia Adorno claims that the essence 
of dialectical thinking – in other words, philosophy – can be described as follows: 
 
All bridging concepts, all links and logical auxiliary operations that are not part of the 
matter itself, all secondary developments not saturated with the experience of the 
object, should be discarded. In a philosophical text all the propositions ought to be 
equally close to the centre. Without Hegel‟s ever having said so explicitly, his whole 
procedure bears witness to such an intention.
89
   
 
In this section, (44) of Minima Moralia, Adorno also advocates losing philosophical arguments 
with other philosophers „in such a way as to convict their opponent of untruth.‟ Whilst this 
recommendation on the conduct of arguments may represent a momentary stepping into the 
world of Jonathan Swift in order to make a point ironically, the main point demonstrates the 
significance of this idea of the midpoint. The reference to Hegel‟s dialectical anti-
foundationalism allows Adorno to explain that philosophy must always start in the middle, that 
there is „no first principle.‟ Nothing in philosophy can be built up from an initial point, unless it 
is acknowledged that this initial point is in reality already in the middle. This second meaning to 
midpoint within a text is the more important as far as the structure of the text is concerned. So in 
philosophical terms, along with Heidegger, Adorno believes in philosophy as being already in 
the middle. In Heidegger‟s terms that middle is the meaning of the existence of Dasein which 
can only be fully understood by the philosophical recovery of the truth of Being.  By contrast, 
for Adorno, that middle is a historical materialism the truth of which is revealed by philosophy 
and art against the negative totality of late capitalism. The idea that philosophy should start in 
the middle was also held by Friedrich Schlegel as this extract from his lectures shows: 
    
Philosophy must have at its basis not only a reciprocal proof but also a reciprocal 
concept. In the case of every concept, as in the case of every proof, one can in turn ask 
for a concept and a proof of the same. For this reason philosophy, like an epic poem, 
must start in the middle, and it is impossible to lecture on philosophy and to pay it out 
piece by piece in such a way that the first piece would be completely grounded for itself 
and explained. It is a whole, and thus the path to recognising it is no straight line but a 
circle.
90
  
 
 
This is another reminder of Adorno‟s Romantic heritage. As one of the revelations of truth for 
Adorno, as for Heidegger, is art, and as the truth of art for both philosophers is only recoverable 
by philosophy, art is extremely important for Adorno‟s theory of meaning. As well as the 
literary form of the essay, Adorno also used the term model to describe the sections of the long 
text Negative Dialectics. Models, like essays, are the antithesis of a system: 
 54 
 
The call for binding statements without a system is a call for thought models, and these 
are not merely monadological in kind. A model covers the specific, and more than the 
specific, without letting it evaporate in its more general super-concept. Philosophical 
thinking is the same as thinking in models; negative dialectics is an ensemble of 
analyses of models.
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The same structure for an extended text used for Negative Dialectics was clearly planned for 
Aesthetic Theory. The twelve sections of Aesthetic Theory each deal with a constellation of 
concepts on a subject area of art and aesthetics set up in opposed conceptual pairs. Each section 
is clearly intended to be an „essay‟ or „thought model‟ and the entire book a paratactical 
„ensemble‟.  
We have seen that there are two types of meaning to midpoint within a text – first that it 
points to the underlying unfreedom of the whole and second, that the text itself takes the form of 
an essay, model or fragment. This makes the text into a structural form that cannot start with 
first principles but must already be in the middle. The structure, the juxtaposition of ideas and 
concepts  
in antinomic tension presents the reader with a text that they are forced to read carefully and 
interpret. Nothing is offered in the way of a discursive argument. 
The second main use of midpoint by Adorno comes with his analysis of artworks, 
particularly musical works. Art is seen as having a midpoint, particularly traditional forms of 
music such as Beethoven‟s, where the articulation of the form is understood as a dynamic 
totality where the parts go to make up the meaning, and hence the truth of the whole. It is not in 
any one part that truth resides but in the relations between the parts, in the „nexus‟ of meaning 
hidden in the processes of art: „Art tends towards processes in which everything that occurs is 
equidistant to the midpoint [Mittelpunkt]; where everything accidental arouses the suspicion of 
being superfluously ornamental.‟92 With the breakdown of traditional forms, the experimental 
artworks of the twentieth century become more diffuse in their internal organisation, in 
particular music. However the same problems of how to begin – the example Adorno uses is 
Proust – are faced by an author as well as by a composer: 
 
The contemporary problem faced by all artworks, how to begin and how to close, 
indicates the possibility of a comprehensive and material theory of aesthetic form that 
would also need to treat the categories of continuity, contrast, transition, development, 
and the “knot‟, as well as finally whether today everything must be equally near the 
midpoint or can have different densities.
93
   
 
Later in this section of Aesthetic Theory Adorno criticizes contemporary artworks such as 
happenings for getting so close to reality as to be indistinguishable from it and for becoming in 
effect, anti-art. The problem revolves around the structure of the artwork. If a modern work 
does not have a midpoint as the above passage indicates is possible, but has parts of „different 
densities‟ can these be understood as parts? Can they be explained by a „material theory of 
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aesthetic form?‟ Clearly they could not be so described. An understanding of an artwork as if it 
were a structure cannot deal with unstructured works of art, unless it is assumed, as Adorno 
seems to, that the structureless is predicated on the structured.  
It is generally clear that when it comes to modern music the idea of the „midpoint‟ is 
extremely important, in fact as the next quotation demonstrates, it becomes a formal concept of 
what Adorno calls „static form‟. Whereas a „midpoint‟ was essential to a traditional dynamic 
work, it still is important for modern works that do not appear to progress in the same way: 
 
If it is at all possible to point to something like a [basic] „idea‟ underlying the shaping 
of form in the new music, then one would have to put forward the idea of static form in 
which each single event is equidistant from the centre, in which concepts like 
development [Entwicklung] and progression [Fortgang] – even if for different reasons 
in the different schools [of composition] – increasingly lose their meaning and in which 
in a certain sense the music relates indifferently to time.
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Modern music has a new type of structure that as Adorno suggests involves a new relationship 
to time. A highly structured work such as a classical symphony, from say Beethoven‟s mid 
period, depends on using the audience‟s memory and expectation tied into their experience of 
time whilst they listen to the work. Recapitulations, echoes, the sonata form; all these formal 
elements depend on a dynamic temporal progression being an integral part of both the intention 
of the composer and the experience of the audience. By contrast some modern music seems to 
float and does not contain easily identifiable structures, let alone tunes and themes. Whilst 
modern music is necessarily in time it is also in terms of its structure in a sense out of time. This 
new music is still understood by Adorno as having a „midpoint‟ precisely because of its new 
structure: 
 
Until the most recent developments in art, differentiation between the intensive and the 
secondary within a whole was an accepted artistic means; the negation of the whole 
through partial wholes is itself demanded by the whole. If today this possibility is 
disappearing, this is not only the triumph of structuration that at every instant wants to 
be equally near the midpoint [Zentrum] without falling slack; it is also the result of the 
lethal potential inherent in the contraction of the means of articulation.
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The danger for music that becomes no more than a sound experience is that it runs the risk of 
being a form of anti-art, runs the risk of ceasing to be describable as music. This again is a 
question of fragmentation and disintegration. The structure of the artworks of modern music has 
fragmented  and is in danger of becoming so unstructured that it finally disintegrates all 
aesthetic form. As long as there is some form of relational as opposed to literal „midpoint‟ there 
is a form of structure. A relational form, akin to Adorno‟s concept of the philosophical 
constellation. 
The third form of midpoint in Aesthetic Theory is concerned with society. There is a 
sense in which Adorno‟s view of society parallels his view of modern art. As was seen above, 
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for Adorno modern society cannot be grasped as a whole, it is like modern music, no more than 
sets of abstract relations. Modern society takes the fragmented form it presents to an observer 
because of the negative totality of late capitalism that lies behind it. If modern art is fragmented 
and disintegrating it is because, in Adorno‟s view, art is in revolt against precisely the same 
negative totality expressed as „affirmative‟ art and taste. When it comes to society a „midpoint‟ 
can also be seen to exist for ideology: „Today, ideology means society as appearance. Although 
mediated by the totality behind which stands the rule of partiality, ideology is not simply 
reducible to partial interest. It is, as it were, equally near the centre in all its pieces.‟96 In effect, 
Adorno is arguing, the negative totality that is late capitalism at work „touches‟ everything, art 
and society alike. To call his view of society, „aesthetic‟ or to call his view of art „societal‟ in 
the end comes to the same thing: „Causality has withdrawn to totality… Every state of things is 
horizontally and vertically tied to all others, touches all others, is touched by all others. …In a 
total society all things are equidistant from the center; that society is as transparent, and its 
apologia as threadbare, as those who see through it are certain to die out.‟97 This form of 
midpoint is the same as the first one for texts, namely that the midpoint indicates the underlying 
reality of the negative totality of late capitalism. So midpoint or centre is clearly an extremely 
important concept for Adorno whether he is concerned with a text, philosophy, artwork or 
society. I will now move on to examine the related concept of constellation.  
 
The constellation as a formation 
The notion of a constellation is thought to have been derived by Adorno from Walter 
Benjamin‟s „Epistemo-Critical Prologue‟ to his The Origin of German Tragic Drama where 
Benjamin illustrates his discussion of ideas, concepts and objects with „an analogy‟ - „Ideas are 
to objects as constellations are to stars.‟98 The meaning comes from the form, the form of the 
constellation of ideas gives rise to an insight. It is a methodology for doing philosophy that 
avoids writing systematically. The system is impossible, the time of the system is past. However 
a constellation is a mini-system. In another text, the exact date of which is hard to judge as it 
was also left unfinished with the death of the author, Walter Benjamin put forward the idea that 
knowledge is often achieved in flashes of insight: „In the fields with which we are concerned, 
knowledge comes only in lightning flashes. The text is the long roll of thunder that follows.‟99   
It is interesting to note that an earlier source of the notion of a constellation, which may 
have been known to both Adorno and Benjamin, can be found in the writings of George 
Simmel, who also used the concept of Verdictung. This can be variously translated as 
condensation, coalescence and crystallization.
100
 Verdictung is clearly very close the idea of the 
constellation. A constellation is a synchronic spatial form, whereas Verdictung is formation, the 
process of creating the formed. A liquid that has the form only of its container can in the process 
of crystallization form crystals in an analogous way to vague and random thoughts forming into 
the presentation, the Darstellung, of a concept. In his essay „The Adventure‟ Simmel refers to 
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the similarity between a work of art and an adventure. An adventure is „A fragmentary incident, 
it is yet, like a work of art, enclosed by a beginning and an end.‟101 Later in the same essay 
Simmel refers to all the elements that go to make up an adventure as „a constellation‟.102 
The idea of a constellation or conceptual construction can also be found in Max 
Weber‟s theory of ideal types. In his essay „Objectivity‟ Weber writes of „synthetic constructs 
which have been designated as „ideas‟ of historical phenomena.‟103 Weber describes this in the 
following way: „This conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of 
historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system.‟104 At 
another point in the essay Weber refers to this „complex‟ as a constellation.  
Constellation is a key idea that Adorno uses as the methodology of his philosophy. 
Once concepts are arranged in a constellation they form a pattern, a relationship, a kind of 
„gestalt‟ in which recognition of meaning can occur in a moment and in that moment the 
question that lay behind the formation of the constellation fragments, disintegrates, „disappears‟. 
For Benjamin constellations were composed of objects or images, whereas for Adorno 
constellations are of concepts. Both the ideas from Benjamin quoted above, of formation and 
recognition in an instant, can be found being made use of in Adorno‟s inaugural lecture at the 
University of Frankfurt in 1931: 
 
…the function of riddle-solving is to light up the riddle-Gestalt like lightning and to 
negate it (aufzuheben), not to persist behind the riddle and imitate it. Authentic 
philosophic interpretation does not meet up with a fixed meaning which already lies 
behind the question, but lights it up suddenly and momentarily, and consumes it at the 
same time. …so philosophy has to bring its elements, which it receives from the 
sciences, into changing constellations, …into changing and trial combinations, until 
they fall into a figure which can be read as an answer, while at the same time the 
question disappears.
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The multi-disciplinary nature of philosophy/theory as understood by Adorno, is clear in this 
extract. Philosophy is free to make use of „elements‟ that come from the entire totality of 
thought. Adorno goes on to claim that he thinks this approach is a materialist praxis. This is 
because he believes, perhaps näively even for the early 1930s, that the interpretation of an 
„untrue‟ reality in whatever aspect implicitly calls for its abolition: 
 
The interpretation of a given reality and its abolition are connected to each other …out 
of the construction of a configuration of reality the demand for its [reality‟s] real change 
always follows promptly. …Materialism has named this relationship …dialectic. Only 
dialectically, it seems to me, is philosophic interpretation possible. When Marx 
reproached the philosophers, saying they had only variously interpreted the world, and 
contraposed to them that the point was to change it, then the sentence receives its 
legitimacy not only from out of political praxis but also out of philosophic theory…the 
annihilation of the question compels praxis.
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This use of the concept of dialectics is certainly Hegelian for the expectation is that the 
recognition of the meaning of the opposed concepts will result in a positive result in political 
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praxis. The fact of making the analysis makes a change. Whilst Adorno clearly optimistically 
believed this in the early 1930s he also still held a similar view over 30 years later: „Where 
thought transcends the bonds it tied in resistance - there is its freedom. Freedom follows the 
subject‟s urge to express itself. The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all 
truth.‟107 Lending „a voice‟ is a weaker form of praxis. So a text is not to be systematic, in the 
traditional sense of being built around a comprehensive narrative argumentative structure, but is 
to be more informal, as close perhaps to reflective musings as to structured theorisation. One 
way of doing this is to make the text a set of fragments such as Adorno chose to do with Minima 
Moralia. His rationale for this was his belief that by attending to the thoughts of an individual, 
himself, he could thereby say more about society and the world in general in a fragmented text 
than by directly addressing the issues in a discursive theoretical text: „…in an individualistic 
society, the general not only realises itself through the interplay of particulars, but society is 
essentially the substance of the individual.‟108 As was noted above, another manifesto for 
Adorno‟s preferred manner of writing philosophy is contained in „The Essay as Form.‟ For 
Adorno the essay has great unmasking power precisely because it stands outside standard 
philosophical forms: „By transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes visible in 
the object which it is orthodoxy‟s secret purpose to keep invisible.‟109 Earlier in „The Essay as 
Form‟ Adorno sets out an account of the essay as a constellation: 
 
The essay becomes true in its progress, which drives it beyond itself, and not in a 
hoarding obsession with fundamentals. Its concepts receive their light from a terminus 
ad quem hidden to the essay itself, and not from an obvious terminus ad quo. In this the 
very method of the essay expresses the utopian intention. All of its concepts are 
presentable in such a way that they support one another, that each one articulates itself 
according to the configuration that it forms with the others. In the essay discreetly 
separated elements enter into a readable context; it erects no scaffolding, no edifice. 
Through their own movement the elements crystallize into a configuration. It is a force 
field, just as under the essay‟s glance every intellectual artefact must transform itself 
into a force field.
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There are a number of points to note in this extract. First Adorno still holds onto his belief, first 
expressed in 1931, that the correct materialist interpretation of „a given reality,‟ through an open 
experimental form such as the essay holds out an expectation for change in the sense of it being 
utopian. He is no longer making the unrealistic claim that the formation of such a set of ideas on 
its own „compels praxis.‟ The second point to note is that, in line with Simmel, a constellation is 
formed by a process akin to crystallization. The third point is that a further related concept 
„force field‟ is being used. Once formed, the constellation acts like „a force field‟ analogous to 
the way a magnetic field attracts objects of the right kind around it. Fourth, as was seen above in 
„The Actuality of Philosophy,‟ a constellation disintegrates once the force field is, so to speak, 
switched off. It is switched off by being understood, Benjamin‟s „lightning‟ flash, the 
momentary gestalt of understanding. The formation, the crystallization of the constellation 
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shows, like a gestalt, the relations of the concepts out of which it is formed as being related 
equally around a relational „midpoint‟ or centre. This formation is the presentation, the 
Darstellung, of the constellation. Reading the constellation is analogous to reading a gestalt. 
The gestalt psychology of perception was developed in the 1920s by Köhler and others, 
the basic idea being that wholes are perceived as opposed to particular parts, the parts are 
perceived as already in sets. Previous theories assumed perception was of discrete bits of the 
blooming buzzing confusion. To put it in Benjaminian terms, constellations are perceived. 
There are two aspects to this theory, the first is that the basic structure of visual perception is 
perception by means of wholes, the second aspect is that such wholes are actively sought in the 
visual field. If the structural form of gestalt theory is moved from the sphere of visual 
perception to the sphere of philosophical understanding then it is constellations of concepts that 
provide insight and understanding. Within philosophy, in parallel to visual perception, there is a 
desire to find and construct conceptual wholes. Within gestalt psychology the suggestion was 
that this is account of how visual perception worked, and was a new discovery. Within 
philosophy the claim is not so much that this approach is a new discovery as just the best way to 
do philosophy in the twentieth century. This would be Adorno's claim in The Actuality of 
Philosophy.  
Gestalt psychology is an account of visual experience. The visual has long been a model 
for philosophical thought, Descartes „clear and distinct ideas‟ and Kant‟s  „intuitions without 
concepts are blind‟ being prime examples. Perception as „seeing through or „seeing clearly‟ in 
discursive knowledge was most probably originally borrowed from philosophy for psychology. 
Adorno uses the concept clarity and blindness throughout his writings, mostly derived from 
Leibniz‟s blind monads but very possibly also a reference to Kant‟s blind intuitions. 
„Experience‟ of philosophy for Adorno becomes metaphysical experience and is closely linked 
to the experience of artworks. Once a set of dialectically related concepts are arranged in a 
particular pattern, in a constellation, they can be seen and understood, an insight is revealed. 
This is all visual language at work. This model depends on a moment in time when 
understanding is achieved. It depends on a moment, a shudder, shock, recognition, explosion, a 
singular moment. Such a moment can only be experienced against a background. A firework 
depends on a dark sky for its effect. Watchers see the momentary flashes sparks and explosions 
and movements of coloured particles taking place against a dark background that is integral to 
their effect. Fireworks in bright sunlight against a blue sky are of no interest. The dark 
background for Adorno in both both philosophy and art is a form of totality, a presupposition, 
an assumed presence, a dark partially hidden reality; the administered world of late capitalism. 
This reality can be broken down in various ways as sets of interrelated descriptions and 
analyses, political, economic, sociological, and psychological. There is an antominic 
relationship between the moment and the totality against which the moment is experienced. 
Autonomous artworks and philosophical insights are privileged moments, privileged 
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experiences against and out of the totality. At this point it is time to bring in the third part of my 
suggested complex, parataxis.  
  
Parataxis 
As noted above, „midpoint‟ can refer both to the structure of a text and to the negative totality of 
capitalism pointed to by that text. Aesthetic Theory is a text that Adorno claimed to be 
paratactical. In other words, each sentence sits alongside every other sentence, each sentence is 
calculated to have the same relation to each other sentence. Each sentence, in a sense, reflects 
all the others. As well as the level of the sentence, in the context of Aesthetic Theory, 
„paractical‟ is also mean to describe the sections or chapters as being in a relationship without 
constructed connections. Parataxis literally means the placing of words, phrases or statements 
next to each other without the use of conjunctions. The effect of parataxis is that the reader is in 
a sense forced to interpret the text for themselves. In this sense a paratactical text is open and 
can mean „more‟ than it appears to. Samuel Beckett was a master of parataxis as this extract 
from Lucky‟s speech in Waiting for Godot demonstrates: 
 
  hockey of all sorts penicilline and succedanea in a  
word I resume and concurrently simultaneously for 
reasons unknown to shrink and dwindle in  
spite of the tennis I resume flying gliding golf over 
nine and eighteen holes tennis of all sorts in a  
word for reasons unknown in Feckham Peckham 
Fulham Clapham namely concurrently 
simultaneously what is more for reasons unknown 
but time will tell to shrink and dwindle I resume
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It is well known, that for Adorno, Samuel Beckett‟s work served as a paradigm for 
contemporary art. Adorno also shared with Heidegger a fascination for the late poetry of 
Hölderlin. In his essay „Parataxis,‟ on the poetry of Hölderlin, Adorno makes clear that there is 
an ideal sense in which a poetic text, and by implication a philosophical text, can mean more 
than it appears to: 
  
The path followed by the determinate negation of meaning is the path to the truth 
content. If the truth content is to be true in the emphatic sense, if it is to be more than 
merely what is intended, then it leaves immanence behind as it constitutes itself. The 
truth of a poem does not exist without the structure [Gefüge] of the poem, the totality of 
its moments; but at the same time, it is something that transcends this structure, as a 
structure of aesthetic semblance: not from the outside through a stated philosophical 
content, but by virtue of the configuration of the moments taken together signify more 
than the structure intends.
112
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This aspect of the configuration, meaning „more than the structure intends‟ could at first sight 
be taken to be a species of Heideggerian mysticism. Adorno is very careful in this essay to 
distance himself from what he regarded Heidegger‟s misinterpretation, or misappropriation, of 
Hölderlin‟s poetry. Adorno makes it clear that philosophy is necessary in order to do justice to 
the parataxis of the poetry: „While Hölderlin‟s poetry, like everything that is poetry in the 
emphatic sense, needs philosophy as the medium that brings its truth content to light, this need 
is not fulfilled through recourse to philosophy that in any way seizes possession of the 
poetry.‟113  
Later in this essay Adorno describes great music as „aconceptual synthesis‟ and sees 
this as protypical for Hölderlin‟s late poetry. „In poetry, unlike music, aconceptual synthesis 
turns against its medium; it becomes constitutive dissociation.‟114 If a poem by employing 
parataxis can so move against the structural logic of ordinary language then it can conjure up, or 
create, a new meaning, a „more‟ where one does not apparently exist then this means there is an 
escape route from the conceptuality of traditional philosophic texts. If a philosophical text can 
be so arranged that its parts conjure up „more‟ than is apparently there, „more than the structure 
intends‟ then this exactly fits in with Adorno‟s approach to philosophical writing. A traditional 
Jena Romantic fragment points to „more‟, points to a form of fragmented totality through the 
impossibility of completion of the fragment. Yet, paradoxically, by its constitutive 
incompletness such a fragment itself becomes a system. As Schlegel put in in Athaneum 
Fragment 206: „A fragment, like a miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the 
surrounding world and be complete in itself like a porcupine.‟115 For Adorno the essay is a form 
of fragment – it is a whole and yet as with Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory a set of 
essays, or models, could be arranged to make a greater whole at the level of the book. These two 
books operate without a traditional discursive structure, their textual juxtapostion of elements is 
intended to mean „more.‟ It does not take very much reflection to realise that meaning „more‟ 
than the structure intends is precisely what happens in many works of art, both in the tradition 
of western art and in the twentieth century. A work of art is a thing, an artifact, a construction 
that also at the same time has meaning and value over and above the bare bones of its 
thinghood. It is characteristic of both collage in painting and montage in film that they are forms 
that point to „more‟ than is at first sight apparent in the elements that are juxtaposed. In music 
dissonance has the same effect, something „more‟ can be heard, this is also true of the twelve 
tone row. These constructions conjure up a „more‟. There is a sense in which Aesthetic Theory 
is a hermeneutics of „more‟. Meaning „more‟ is a characteristic of language, and it no accident 
that Adorno refers to the reading of a constellation as if it were a „script‟, „a figure which can be 
read as an answer‟ as he put it in „The Actuality of Philosophy.‟ This „more‟ however can only 
be identied by means of an interpretation, a reading, it is a hermeneutic practice. 
So we have the three elements of what I am suggesting might be called Adorno‟s theory 
of meaning: midpoint, constellation and parataxis. Allied to these three concepts are the three 
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ideas of formation (Verdictung), presentation (Darstellung) and reading or interpretative 
understanding (Verstehen). Formation takes place in an experimental and experiental freedom. 
The kind of freedom Adorno attributes to metaphysics: „Philosophy has the curious 
characteristic that, although itself entrapped, locked inside the glasshouse of our constitution 
and our language, it is nevertheless able constantly to think beyond itself and its limits, to think 
itself through the walls of its glasshouse. And this thinking beyond itself, into openness - that, 
precisely, is metaphysics.‟116 Presentation as constellation allows a number of concepts that 
might not normally be brought together, perhaps because of the divisions between disciplines, to 
be shown together as a kind of gestalt. „Reading‟ [Verstehen] is a form of interpretative 
understanding derived from the philosophical hermeneutics of the Romantics such as 
Schleiermacher. „Reading‟ allows more to be read in the script of the constellation than might 
be expected to be there, this more being achieved by conceptual parataxis of the force field. 
Reading a constellation may on occasion operate instantaneously like Benjamin‟s „lightning‟ or 
a process of reflection – akin for Adorno to Jena Romanticism‟s concept of reflection. As 
Benjamin stated, „...the infinity of reflection for Schlegel and Novalis, is not an infinity of 
continuous advance but an infinity of connectedness.‟
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  This in turn is remarkably similar to 
Hölderlin‟s „They hang together infinitely (exactly).‟ As Benjamin remarks this is very much 
the same as Schlegel and Novalis‟ understanding of „the infinitude of reflection as a full 
infinitude of interconnection... systematically…‟118 In this Romantic sense a constellation can 
be thought of as a non-hierarchical open system of interconnectedness. In this sense it differs 
from a closed traditional philosophical system.  
It is in this sense as a system of interconnectedness that Aesthetic Theory is like a work 
of art, not in its style, but in its structure in which the aesthetic and the philosophical are 
entwined. Indeed this analysis is beginning to lead to the thought that perhaps the reason why 
Aesthetic Theory can be regarded as if it were a work of art is because for Adorno a 
constellation of ideas, philosophy, is structured in exactly the same way as a modern artwork. 
Both are a form of configuration that say „more‟ than they appear to. This „more‟ requires 
philosophy, „theory‟ to reveal it, to reveal the truth content of the artwork, and to reveal the 
truth content of the set of philosophical models. If an artwork has the same abstract structure as 
a philosophical constellation, then this means it has a structure such that it requires philosophy 
to complete it. This is a thoroughly Romantic idea. The final section of this chapter examines 
the third form of totality in Aesthetic Theory, the artwork understood as monad. 
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Section Three: Monad 
In the section of Aesthetic Theory entitled „Towards a Theory of the Artwork‟ There is a 
paragraph concerning the artwork as monad. This is how it opens: „The artwork is both the 
result of the process and the process itself at a standstill. It is what at its apogee rationalist 
metaphysics proclaimed as the principle of the universe, a monad; at once both a force field and 
a thing. Artworks are closed to one another, blind, and yet in their hermeticism they represent 
what is external.‟119 This sentence contains a number of ideas concerning artworks used by 
Adorno throughout Aesthetic Theory; force field, blindness, hermeticism and representation of 
the external, often described as mirroring. The above sentence does not include two other 
related ideas often found in Aesthetic Theory, that an artwork, as a monad, is the ultimate 
particular individual work and at the same time a universal exemplar of art. All of these 
metaphorical ideas about artworks being understood as if they are monads are taken from 
Leibniz. 
    
The background to Adorno’s monads 
Leibniz‟s monads are individual spiritual essences that make up the structure of the universe. 
Each monad is blind and yet reflects the entire universe. The main text by Leibniz for this 
metaphysics of substance is The Monadology (1714). This text is a brief summary, in 90 
numbered paragraphs, of his philosophical position. A monad is „a simple substance‟. It is one 
simple substance, a unit, so simple it cannot be made out of smaller parts or broken up for it has 
no parts. „These Monads are the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things.‟120 
Monads can only be created or annihilated. As a numerical unit, „one‟, monad has a long 
philosophical history originating with Pythagorus. „Monad‟ is the Greek word for the number 
„one.‟  According to Leibniz monads have no windows, nothing can come in or out, they are 
blind. In order to have an identity they must be distinguishable one from another, „each Monad 
must be different from every other.‟ Monads are dynamic in their existence in time, they must 
be both subject to change and have perceptions of this change. It is the quality of these 
perceptions, or „apperceptions‟ that distinguish between three levels of monads.  The lowest 
level are bare monads, „in a state of stupor‟. The next level are conscious monads with memory. 
The third level consists of a single monad, God. The „final reason of things must be in a 
necessary substance.‟121 „Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance, of 
which all created or derivative Monads are products…‟122 Each monad „has relations which 
express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe.‟123 
Only one monad, God, has a clear view of the universe, of reality, for lesser monads the 
appearance of the universe can be chaotic and confused. A living body, such as a plant or 
animal consists of a collection of monads each with one dominant monad or soul. In higher 
beings, such as humans, the soul is described as a mind. There is a „pre-established harmony 
between all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe.‟124 This 
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leads Leibniz to the thought that out of all the possible worlds God could create, the world he 
has created must be the best of all possible worlds: „Whence it is easy to conclude that the 
totality of all spirits must compose the City of God, that is to say, the most perfect State that is 
possible, under the most perfect of Monarchs.‟125 Since Adorno clearly thought this was 
possibly the worst of all possible worlds the selection of monad as a symbol for art was 
probably not without ironic intent. This metaphysics of substance, based on monads, allows 
Leibniz to claim that he has solved several philosophical problems of his day. The distinction 
between mind and body is erased and the existence of god proved. Furthermore, a rational order 
of nature has been established that is integral with science and morality.
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 In philosophical 
terms monads are both universals and particulars. The Monadology is like a Bach fugue, a 
perfect logical metaphysical system, it is at the same time also an exact fantasia. 
As has been noted before, Adorno often takes over an idea from Walter Benjamin and 
develops it. In his Theses on the Philosophy of History Benjamin describes „materialist 
historiography‟ as being based on „a constructive principle:‟ 
 
Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking 
suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a 
shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad. A historical materialist approaches a 
historical subject only where he encounters it as a monad. In this structure he recognises 
the sign of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, to put it differently a revolutionary 
chance in the fight for the oppressed past.
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Here Benjamin‟s monad is virtually the same idea as Adorno‟s constellation, a crystallized 
„configuration‟ at a standstill. The standstill being the „cessation of thinking‟ at the recognition 
of the configuration, it is the shock of recognition that creates the monad for Benjamin. 
In Minima Moralia Adorno uses the monad as a symbol for an individual who is in 
opposition to society. The individual as monad reflects the ills of society, it is „the precise 
opposite of the collective.‟128 Society here is understood as the whole „system‟ of individual 
monads. This use of the word monad to represent an individual person can also be found in 
Aesthetic Theory: „…monads are the locus of experience in all existing societies. Because 
individuation, along with the suffering that it involves, is a social law, society can only be 
experienced individually.‟129 The individual, as monad, both represents, mirrors, the bad totality 
of society and is the only „locus‟ for any experience of society. This again emphasises Adorno‟s 
conception of society being composed of lone individuals as opposed to groups. Part of this 
emphasis on the lone individual for both art and experience comes down to Adorno‟s idea of 
experience. Whilst it is true that only an individual can experience society, or an artwork, it is 
undeniable that there are collective modes of experience that Adorno appears to ignore entirely. 
For example members of a particular audience for art, or as a member of a particular group 
within society, can have shared experiences as a group. 
 65 
  There are several references to monads understood in philosophical terms in Adorno‟s  
Negative Dialectics such as: „Only a philosophy in fragment form would give their proper place 
to the monads, those illusory idealistic drafts. They would be conceptions, in the particular, of 
the totality that is inconceivable as such.‟130 For Leibniz monads mirror the totality of the 
universe, each one is itself an idea of the whole even though each one has no conception of the 
whole. In parallel to this, philosophy for Adorno has itself to be composed of fragments which 
do not add up to a whole system. A philosophical book consisting of fragments such as Minima 
Moralia is a good example of this at work. Here Adorno selects many of the subject areas for 
the fragments from apparently insignificant aspects of his life in mid-twentieth century 
America. These aspects have been selected by Adorno in accordance with Benjamin‟s insistence 
on the importance of minutiae. The larger later texts such as Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic 
Theory are structured in the same way as Minima Moralia in that they consist of fragments, 
models in the case of the first and constellations in the case of the second. A fragmented 
philosophy points towards an impossible whole consisting of the fragments. This is another 
example of Adorno‟s Romantic heritage.  
There are three aspects of monads that Adorno selected for use in Aesthetic Theory to 
refer to artworks - spiritual beings, mirrors and dynamism. 
Spiritual beings: artworks, like monads, are in some respects spiritual beings, they can 
only be experienced as individual works. They also participate in the universal, art.  
Mirrors: artworks reflect the exterior „administered‟ world in their own constitution, 
history is „sedimented‟ into them. 
Dynamisn: Artworks, like monads, are dynamic totalities in time. 
 I will examine each of these in turn. 
   
Monads as spiritual beings 
There are many places in Aesthetic Theory where Adorno writes about works of art as if they 
were selves or beings of some kind.  Examples of this are: „art itself thinks,‟131 and, „Any 
artwork that supposes it is in possession of its content is plainly naive in its rationalism:‟132 That 
this is not merely a stylistic device is proved by the fact that artworks possess „spirit.‟As 
Benjamin also pointed out, for the Romantics, „everything is a self,‟133 not just the „I‟ as in 
Fichte. So this is yet another example of the Romantic heritage to Aesthetic Theory. The 
„thingly structure‟ of artworks „makes them into what is not a thing‟134 and „The spirit of 
artworks is constituted in their reity.‟135 There are several senses in which an artwork is a thing 
whether it be a text, a score, an object or an idea. The thing can be traded, can be bought and 
sold. The creator owns the copyright, the legal owner has property rights. As a thing the artwork 
is a commodity where the thing-like character suppresses the real social relations that lay behind 
its production. However, Adorno means more than this as his insistence that all artworks have 
history „sedimented‟ into them bears out. For Adorno all artworks are products of a particular 
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person at a particular time and place working with the latest datable materials. In this sense what 
is also reified in to the artwork, in a kind of reversal of Lukác‟s theory of reification, is a 
mirroring of the social reality of its production which becomes a part, however illusory, of the 
spirit of the work. Spirit „makes artworks, things among things, something other than thing.‟136 
At a later point in Aesthetic Theory Adorno states: „Indeed, because art is essentially spiritual, it 
cannot be purely intuitive. It must also be thought: art itself thinks.‟137 The „thingly structure‟ is 
also perhaps a reference to what is perhaps the best section of Heidegger‟s „On the Origin of the 
Work of Art‟ where Heidegger analyses the work of art as a thing. „The artwork is, to be sure, a 
thing that is made, but it says something other than what the mere thing itself is…‟138 
Heidegger‟s analysis leads him to identify „three modes of defining thingness‟ – „as a bearer of 
traits, as the unity of a manifold of sensations, as formed matter.‟139 Heidegger then proceeds to 
the position that, „The essence of art would then be this: the truth of being setting itself to 
work.‟140 The analysis of the thingly character of artworks led Heidegger to the position where 
he could begin his analysis of the truth of the work of art, which is characteristically both 
crudely political and mystical. In one of his few references to Heidegger in Aesthetic Theory 
Adorno acknowledges the value of this analysis in the „Art Beauty‟ section: 
 
Not only do artworks, as Heidegger pointed out in opposition to idealism, have things 
that function as their bearers–their own objectification makes them into things of a 
second order. What they have become in themselves–their inner structure, which 
follows the works immanent logic–cannot be reached by pure intuition; in the work 
what is available to intuition is mediated by the structure of the work, in contrast to 
which the intuitable is a matter of indifference.
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 There are classes of artworks where there is a clear division between the thing that embodies 
the artwork and the production of the work. Two examples are musical scores and dramatic 
scripts.
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 Whilst there can be no doubt that traditional artworks, as opposed to many examples 
of happenings and conceptual works in the twentieth century, do have the reality of being a 
thing, the reality of an artwork having some kind of being is only an illusion for Adorno. If, for 
Adorno, art „thinks‟ then it is part of the illusion of art that it is a form of thinking being in 
dynamic time: „By virtue of their nexus of meaning, the organon of their semblance, artworks 
set themselves up as things that exist in themselves. By integrating them, meaning itself – that 
which creates unity – is asserted as being present in the work, even though it is not actual.‟143   
In contrast to Heidegger, the spiritual being of an artwork for Adorno is not merely an 
illusion constitutive of artworks per se but an illusion constitutive of artworks created under 
capital: „The semblance character of artworks, the illusion of their being-in-itself, refers back to 
the fact that in the totality of their subjective mediatedness they take part in the universal 
delusional context of reification, and, that, in Marxian terms, they need to reflect a relation of 
living labor as if it were a thing.‟144 Adorno‟s conception of an artwork as „both a force field and 
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a thing‟ goes to the heart of his theory of artworks as monads. For Adorno artworks are both 
things and beings, their ontological status is binary and is probably best expressed as a dialectic 
of thing and being. As was noted above, for Adorno, a dialectic is closer to the structure of a 
Kantian antinomy, than to a Hegelian dialectic. The antinomy of thing and being keeps both 
poles open. The poles are not resolvable under the conditions of late capitalism. If they are 
resolvable at all for Adorno it will be in the future, it is a matter of utopian expectation. 
The final aspect of the monad artwork as a being consists in its individuality as a 
particular work of art: „…the monads, which artworks are, lead by way of their own principle of 
particularization to the universal.‟145 An artwork for Adorno can never be experienced except as 
a particular individual work and yet artworks are always examples of art, the universal. At the 
same time each new artwork changes the idea of art, in a sense it redefines the indefinable 
universal of art. „Not only does the dialectic of the universal and the particular descend into the 
depths of the universal in the midst of the particular. At the same time it destroys the invariance 
of the universal categories.‟146 So in parallel with his conception of society being composed  of 
individuals, art is composed of individual works of art. Adorno is not interested in movements 
or –isms or the whole idea of style. As will be explored in more detail in the next chapter his 
insistence on the importance of individual works leads him to restrict what counts as art to 
singular „great works.‟ 
 
Monads as mirrors 
Adorno‟s analysis of the ontology of the artwork as the antinomy of thing and being leads him 
to one of his most positive and utopian comments: „Only as things do artworks become the 
antithesis of the reified monstrosity. Correspondingly, and this is the key to art, even out of so-
called individual works it is a We that speaks and not an I.‟ 147 As Adorno explains in this 
section of Aesthetic Theory, even though every artwork is the product of an individual „I‟ this 
does not mean that it is an „I‟ that speaks, „the private I is externalized in the work „ as „ the I‟s 
collective essence.‟ It is this „linguistic quality‟ of an artwork that makes it social. This relation 
of the „We‟, as society to the artwork monad is a characteristically antinomic relationship. On 
the one hand, artworks are entirely separate from the administered world and yet at the same 
time they mirror that world in their construction. „The relation of works of art to society is 
comparable to Leibniz‟s monad. Windowless – that is to say, without being conscious of 
society, and in any event without being constantly and necessarily accompanied by this 
consciousness – the works of art, and notably music which is far removed from concepts, 
represent society. Music, one might think, does this the more deeply the less it blinks in the 
direction of society.‟148 Artwork monads have a particular relation to society, that of opposition. 
The autonomous art of modernism has for Adorno a definite and important oppositional 
relationship to the „social whole.‟ Indeed it is the oppositional nature of autonomous art to 
bourgeois taste and belief systems that serves to partly identify it as art at all. „Art, however, is 
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social not only because of its mode of production, in which the dialectic of the forces and 
relations of production is concentrated, nor simply because of the social derivation of its 
thematic material. Much more importantly, art becomes social by its opposition to society, and 
it occupies this position only as autonomous art.‟149 A danger that oppositional art has to face is 
the danger of polarising „… into ideology and protest… Absolute protest constrains it and 
carries over to its own raison d‟etre;‟150 Part of Adorno‟s disagreements with Brecht centred on 
this very issue, the danger that an art of protest would amount to no more than protest, that it 
would not achieve the status of art. The development of art for Adorno was not solely internal to 
art. This development was partly internal but even for autonomous art it also reflected the 
society in which it was made, and the very development of that society was itself a driving 
force. „The more total society becomes, the more completely it contracts to a unanimous system, 
and all the more do the artworks in which this experience is sedimented become the other of this 
society.‟151 The more total society became over historical time the greater was the mimesis of 
society by art. Not in direct mirroring of society, by socialist realism as advocated by Lukács, 
but in more indirect ways. The antinomy of this mimesis is that it looks like an apparent flight 
from reality but it is a different order of realism as authentic contemporary art in its sheer 
abstraction. „New art is as abstract as social relations have in truth become.‟152 It is in this sense 
that Adorno thinks Samuel Beckett‟s works are more realistic and political than some of 
Brecht‟s. Art can show the truth about society, „…art is nevertheless the truth of society in so 
far as in its most authentic products the irrationality of the rational world order is expressed.‟153 
For Adorno art has this „…double character as being socially determined in its autonomy and at 
the same time social.‟154  
One of the themes that runs through all, what might be termed, Hegelian histories of art 
is the idea of progress. There are two main reasons why Adorno does not believe in the 
progressive development of art. For one thing, to be examined in the next chapter, Adorno 
thinks each successful artwork stands alone as a prime example of „Art.‟ Whilst there is a 
necessity for art, in Adorno‟s view, to make use of the most up to date materials, the most 
modern constructions, this is only an illusion of progress. The continual negation of the 
previous style in art is not for Adorno a progression but simply another way of showing how 
under capital an „ever the same‟ rules. „To its very core, art is enmeshed in the historical 
movement of growing antagonisms. In art there is as much and as little progress as in 
society.‟155 Progress in society, as we have seen, consists in the ever-increasing power of the 
negative totality that is late capitalism at work. As well as this general aspect of reflecting 
society Adorno believes art partakes in the capitalist structure of society for it is inevitably 
social through its „mode of production‟. It is clear from the following comment that the 
construction, „the configuration‟ of an artwork mirrors „social forces‟ in society: 
 
The elements of an artwork acquire their configuration as a whole in obedience to 
immanent laws that are related to those of the society external to it. Social forces of 
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production, as well as relations of production, return in artworks as mere forms divested 
of their facticity because artistic labour is social labour; moreover, they are always the 
product of this labor.
156
  
  
In this sense Adorno‟s history of art is Darwinian, art evolves in the situation it finds itself in. 
Adorno clearly believed art also reflected capitalist society in these subtle ways. The very forms 
of art could, by analysis, be tied to forms of production, such as commodity production, 
„nominalistic artworks were unwitting tableaux èconomique.’ 157 Another example is drama: 
„To the extent to which a drama – itself a sonatalike product of the bourgeois era – is in musical 
terms “worked,” that is, dissected into the smallest motifs and objectifivated in their dynamic 
synthesis, to this extent, and right into the most sublime moments, the echo of commodity 
production can be heard.‟158  
A further relationship between monadic art and capitalist society is concerned with 
utopia, a world of future happiness. This, for Adorno, lies in the expectation that in this very 
opposition to totality, art somehow expresses or encodes a spark of freedom that points to the 
possibility of a changed world in the future. „In our totally organized bourgeois society, which 
has been forcibly made over into a totality, the spiritual potential of another society could lie 
only in that which bears no resemblance to the prevailing society.‟159 The „spiritual potential‟ is 
to be found in oppositional autonomous art, even though it is also deeply entwined in capitalist 
society. In the autonomous work of art lies the utopian hope for a changed world in the future:  
 
…art today is scarcely conceivable except as a form of reaction that anticipates the 
apocalypse. Closely observed, even tranquil works discharge not so much the pent-up 
emotions of their makers as the work‟s own inwardly antagonistic forces. The result of 
these forces is bound up with the impossibility of bringing these forces to any 
equilibrium; their antinomies, like those of knowledge, are unsolvable in the 
unreconciled world.
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Art and knowledge share the same antinomic structure. The idea that it might just be in art 
working through the principles of construction derived from the „administered world‟ that hope 
for a different outcome might lie is clearly present in Adorno‟s thought: „The many 
interrelations with technocracy give reason to suspect that the principle of construction remains 
aesthetically obedient to the administered world; but it may terminate in a yet unknown 
aesthetic form, whose rational organization might point to the abolition of all categories of 
administration along with their reflexes in art.‟161 This is an expectation of utopia, embodied in 
this case in the art of the future, as opposed to the art of the present. The negative totality might 
yet, through art, achieve the „negation of the negation,‟ precisely because artworks became 
autonomous monads in response to the form of society. There is one further aspect of monads to 
consider, the dynamic. 
 
Monads as dynamism 
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The third aspect of the artwork as monad concerns the artwork being thought of as an organic 
totality dynamic through time. As Benjamin remarked, the idea that artworks should be thought 
of as works is „a basic concept‟ of Romanticism.162 The „concept of the work‟163 is a modern 
(18
th
 century) conception. As Annie Becq points out: „The fundamental notions of modern 
aesthetics crystallize around the idea of creation: in the work of art, understood as an organic 
totality, are expressed the autonomy of the beautiful and the irreducible originality of the genius 
whose unique gesture has engendered it. Consequently, this concept of the work, fruit of human 
activity, has taken the place of beauty…‟164 In the „First Introduction‟ to the Critique of 
Judgement Kant states that when the „products‟ of nature are „systems‟ such as „crystal 
formations …shapes of flowers, or the inner structure of plants and animals,‟ then „ nature 
proceeds technically,  i.e., it proceeds also as art.‟165 In Aesthetic Theory Adorno comments on 
Kant‟s idea of an artwork. „For Kant artworks are purposive as dynamic totalities in which all 
particular elements exist for the sake of their purpose - the whole - just as the whole exists for 
the sake of its purpose, the fulfilment or redemption through the negation of its elements. At the 
same time artworks were purposeless because they had stepped out of the means-ends relation 
of empirical reality...‟166 This idea that artworks can be understood to be dynamic totalities is 
mainly used by Adorno in an historical sense to refer to the work of Beethoven, although he 
does want to maintain the idea of the artwork as a totality right through into the twentieth 
century. When he states that, „beauty is shifted to the dynamic totality of the work‟167 this 
comment is located in a section where Adorno is discussing disintegration and integration in 
artworks. The coherence of an artwork, its truth content, depends on the integration of all of its 
elements in the whole. A whole that in an important sense falls apart if you look at it too 
closely. As so often he is thinking about music. As Adorno describes listening to music such as 
Beethoven‟s and as he analyses it in detail it somehow disintegrates for him. The particular 
details seem incoherent at the level of the micro-structure. As Adorno says the beauty of the 
work has somehow migrated to the level of the whole. Adorno goes so far as to identify the 
structure of Beethoven‟s music with that of Hegel‟s philosophy in two senses in terms of 
structure as here: „…Cognitive character of Beethoven‟s music … the relationship of part to 
whole revealed at every instant as a process of musical self-reflection. …in this his music is no 
mere analogy for, but is in fact directly identical to, the structure of Hegelian logic.‟168  It is also 
related in terms of coherence at the level of detail: „The tour de force of each of his great works 
is literally Hegelian, in that the totality of nothing determines itself as the totality of being, 
though it does so only as a semblance and not with the claim of absolute truth.‟169 A text by 
Hegel such as the Phenomenology of Spirit is extremely difficult to follow at the level of the 
individual sentence. As Adorno recommends in his Hegel: Three Studies the reader of Hegel 
needs to learn to be able to stand back from any individual sentence with a consciousness of the 
larger context. For Adorno, Beethoven‟s music is the ultimate model for his conception of the 
artwork monad for it reflects the „dynamically unfolding totality‟ of the bourgeois revolution: 
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The kinship with that bourgeois libertarianism which rings through all Beethoven‟s 
music is a kinship of the dynamically unfolding totality. It is in fitting together under 
their own law, as becoming, negating, confirming themselves and the whole without 
looking outward that his themes come to resemble the world where forces move them; 
they do not do it by imitating that world.
170
  
 
Beethoven‟s work „echoes‟ the values of the French Revolution and yet  „Aesthetic totality is 
the antithesis of the untrue whole.‟171 Beethoven‟s music is also seen to be a clear precursor of 
the music of Schoenberg in terms of organisation: 
  
The total rationality of music is its total organisation. By means of organisation, 
liberated music seeks to reconstitute the lost totality - the lost power and responsibly 
binding force of Beethoven. Music succeeds in doing so only at the price of its freedom, 
and thereby it fails. Beethoven reproduced the meaning of tonality out of subjective 
freedom. The new ordering of twelve-tone technique virtually extinguishes the 
subject.
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The construction of a music artwork monad is „currently the only possible form that the rational 
element in the artwork can take.‟   
This last section on the artwork monad as totality has demonstrated how important the 
idea of construction in art is for Adorno. One final comment needs to be made on the artwork 
monad as a dynamic totality and that relates to history. Adorno never thought that artworks 
were static, as will be seen in the next two chapters. Artworks are dynamic not only in 
themselves but over time in that the interpretation of them is never fixed but is always 
developing. In this sense artwork monads are dynamic in historical time by virtue of an 
hermeneutic process of becoming. This same process can of course proceed by a work 
becoming less and less interpretable so some artworks end up as mute alien relics of a bygone 
time. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter there is, for Adorno, something of the 
alien about all artworks.  
This three-part investigation of Adorno‟s use of monad in Aesthetic Theory has revealed 
the importance of the artwork monad as an antinomy between thing and being. As a being an 
artwork is a singular entity which can only be experienced by another singular entity, an 
individual. As a mirror an artwork monad reflects and embodies the time in which it was 
created. As a dynamic totality artworks are both structured totalities and works with a history 
and an hermeneutical becoming over time. 
 
Summary 
This investigation of three forms of totality used in Aesthetic Theory, capitalism as negative 
totality, philosophy as constellation and artwork as monad has shown that all three are 
intimately and inescapably related. It is the first of these forms, capitalism as negative totality 
that gives rise to the other two forms. Constellations of negative dialectics are the only form that 
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philosophy can take for Adorno.  Every work of art, for Adorno, is in opposition to the negative 
totality of capitalism. Every true work of art encapsulates this utopian moment, however 
illusory this may be, so in a sense the utopian moment is a moment of now – even though 
paradoxically this is a moment of capitalism. Does this hold for philosophy? Does every 
Adornian philosophical statement also encapsulate a utopian moment by virtue of its also being 
oppositional to society? His belief, already described above, in „The Actuality of Philosophy‟ 
that philosophical practice was itself a form of revolutionary praxis supports this idea. However, 
it must be the actual form the philosophy takes, the non-discursive antinomic negative form of 
Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory that embodies the idea of a philosophy with a utopian 
moment. The form that is expressed in constellations of concepts in temporary relationships. 
Just as Kant‟s antinomies required a higher realm „the supersensible‟ for their possible 
reconciliation so Adorno‟s antinomies of both art and philosophy by their very form hold out 
the, perhaps illusory, expectation of a better world. „The monadological character of artworks 
would not have been formed without the guilt of the monstrous monadological character of 
society, but only by its means do artworks achieve that objectivity that transcends solipsism.‟173 
It is the history of society that has made artworks monads. The development of capitalism and 
modern autonomous art are therefore the same development. „The artwork is mediated to real 
history by its monadological nucleus. History is the content of artworks. To analyse artworks 
means no less than to become conscious of the history immanently sedimented in them.‟174 So, 
it is the history of a modernist autonomous art that is identical to the history of the social 
development of capital. To this must be added the history of philosophy. The history of the 
development of capitalism is then simultaneously three histories, of society, of art and of 
philosophy. As Adorno wrote in the section of Aesthetic Theory, „Universal and Particular:‟ 
„…the history of the whole of bourgeoise art was not possible except as the effort if not to solve 
the antinomy of nominalism then at least to give it shape, to win form from its negation. In this 
the history of modern art is not merely analogous to the history of philosophy: It is the same 
history.‟175 This is an extremely close structural relationship between art, philosophy and 
capitalist society wrapped up in the metaphor of the artwork as monads.  
The examination of the concept of the artwork as monad has revealed some significant 
aspects of Adorno‟s understanding of the relationship between art and philosophy. The extent to 
which Adorno believes artworks have „history‟ „sedimented‟ into them is of great importance. It 
ties in with his view that precisely in line with the development of the totality of capitalist 
society both art and philosophy have developed as oppositional forms. If art is autonomous for 
Adorno then so must philosophy also be autonomous. Philosophy can no longer be a system but 
it can be systematic, it can be constructed in the form of a constellation which exactly mirrors 
the constructed nature of an artwork monad. So, artworks and philosophy share the same 
abstract structure. For both artworks and philosophy the paratactical „more‟ of their construction 
is a key feature. As will be seen in the next chapter to fully interpret an artwork, for Adorno, 
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requires a form of philosophy. The philosophical interpretation in a sense completes the 
artwork. The next chapter will look more closely at the structure of the artwork understood as 
Adorno‟s seeming insistence that there are only great works of art. The question „whether there 
are only great works of philosophy?‟ will have to wait. 
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 C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
A D O R N O ‟ S  T H E O R Y  O F  T H E  A R T W O R K  
   
The investigation of Adorno‟s theory of the artwork will form the subject matter of this chapter. 
In the previous chapter Adorno‟s concept of the artwork was examined from the narrow point of 
view of his conception of an artwork as a monad. This chapter enlarges the viewpoint and is 
organised into six sections. The first examines autonomous art and commodification; the second 
success and coherence; the third, montage, construction and mimesis; the fourth, interpretation, 
commentary and critique; the fifth section examines Adorno‟s related concepts of spirit and 
truth content. The final section returns to the relationship between art and philosophy in 
Aesthetic Theory.    
 
Section One: The status of the artwork 
Autonomous art and commodification  
For Adorno autonomous art is both independent and social. He has two main reasons for this 
position. The first is that Adorno believes art not just mirrors the society in which it was created 
as a monad mirrors the universe in which it exists, but that it is inevitably opposed to that 
society. The second reason is that the concept of autonomous art for Adorno involves a belief in 
total artistic freedom that relates to the possibility of actual political freedom. „Art is related to 
its other as a magnet to a field of iron filings. Not only art‟s elements, but their constellation as 
well, that which is specifically aesthetic and to which its spirit is usually chalked up, refers back 
to its other.‟1 For Adorno art is fundamentally engaged with the administered world in its utter 
opposition to society and yet it is still autonomous art. He calls this the „double character‟ of art: 
„Art‟s double character as both autonomous and fait social is incessantly reproduced on the 
level of its autonomy.‟2 This „double character‟ is inherently contradictory. „The double 
character of art–something that severs itself from empirical reality and thereby from society‟s 
functional context and yet is at the same time part of empirical reality and society‟s functional 
context–is directly apparent in the aesthetic phenomena, which are both aesthetic and faits 
sociaux.‟3 This is an antinomy between the internal freedom of the autonomous works of art and 
its simultaneous immersion in the totally un-free society of late capitalism. This is one of the 
most important antinomies in Aesthetic Theory and is a key to understanding Adorno‟s 
conception of the work of art. It is an antinomy that is not resolvable under the conditions of late 
capitalism. It is all too easy to assume that autonomy means the work of art is entirely separate 
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from society and some commentators on Adorno have made this mistake as John Roberts 
pointed out.
4
  
The ability of art to be internally free is in origin the result of societal domination 
according to Adorno because the idea of freedom is conceptually dependent on the idea of 
domination, freedom and domination are opposed linked concepts. 
 
The idea of freedom, akin to aesthetic autonomy, was shaped by domination, which it 
universalized. This hold true as well for artworks. The more they freed themselves from 
external goals, the more completely they determined themselves as their own masters. 
Because, however, artworks always turn one side toward society, the domination they 
internalized also radiated externally. Once conscious of this nexus, it is impossible to 
insist on a critique of the culture industry that draws the line at art.
5
  
 
This quotation makes it clear that Adorno does not believe in two separate realms, art and the 
culture industry. In some circumstances a work of autonomous art must be seen as a part of the 
culture industry. Every work of art is created by an artist who is inevitably a part of the society 
in which they live and create. The works are usually traded in some form of organised market if 
the artist is to make a living from their art. For Adorno the best way for an artist to oppose 
society is to be completely free in the making of their work. „By its difference from empirical 
reality the artwork necessarily constitutes itself in relation to what is not, and to what makes it 
an artwork in the first place.‟6 It is the work itself that will then be opposed to society, not 
through its overt content but partly through the encoding of freedom in its very making. 
„Autonomous works provoke the verdict of social indifference and ultimately of being 
criminally reactionary; conversely, works that make socially univocal discursive judgements 
thereby negate art as well as themselves. Immanent critique can possibly break through this 
rigid alternative.‟7 George Lukács, for example, accused Kafka of being an example of  „an 
aesthetically appealing, but decadent modernism.‟8 By contrast Adorno was convinced that 
Brecht‟s political dramas were driven more by ideological beliefs than by purely aesthetic 
considerations. „Art, however, is social not only because of its mode of production, in which the 
dialectic of the forces and relations of production is concentrated, nor simply because of the 
social derivation of its thematic material…Art‟s asociality is the determinate negation of a 
determinate society.‟9 Adorno believed that the relation art has to society is formed at the time 
of the creation of the work. „…the relation of art to society is not to be sought primarily in the 
sphere of reception. This relation is anterior to reception, in production.‟10 Many commentators 
and creators think of art‟s relation to society as being primarily seen in the reception of the 
work, in the effect the work has on an audience. Plays by Brecht, which Adorno criticised for 
being didactic and overtly political, were written specifically to have a cathartic affect on their 
audience, to draw the audience in and to bring them to re-assess their own attitudes to the action 
taking place on stage. Agit-prop theatre seeks to change hearts and minds in a positive manner. 
Adorno believed that the inclusion of an openly political message in the structure of a play will 
damage that work from an artistic point of view. Adorno‟s view is that the autonomous work of 
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art can only be successful if it is purely true to its own structure. It is in this sense that he 
understands Samuel Beckett‟s plays to be more political than Brecht‟s because they are utterly 
uncompromising in their almost abstract language and structure. Adorno‟s pessimism 
concerning the survival of autonomous art in the 1960s is clear in the following passage, where 
he introduces the criterion of expression.  
 
…socially the situation of art is today aporetic. If art cedes its autonomy, it delivers 
itself over to the machinations of the status quo; if art remains strictly for-itself, it 
nonetheless submits to integration as one harmless domain among others… The central 
criterion is the force of expression, through the tension of which artworks become 
eloquent with wordless gesture. In expression they reveal themselves as the wounds of 
society.
11
   
 
He continues by citing Picasso‟s Guernica as an example of an autonomous work that through 
its uncompromising internal abstraction nevertheless operated as a successful protest to an 
atrocity, the bombing of a civilian population. This endorsement of Guernica by Adorno is 
inconsistent when set in relation to his criticism of Brecht. There is no doubt that Guernica is a 
supreme example of agit-prop, it is a political protest as much as it is an expression of horror. It 
clearly makes „A univocal discursive judgement‟ which in Adorno‟s view should „negate‟ it as 
art. But Adorno treats it as if it were a pure expression when it is as calculatingly structured as 
any of Brecht‟s plays precisely in order to express horror. In a sense Adorno‟s valorisation of 
Guernica contradicts his position. „Whereas art opposed society, it is nevertheless unable to take 
up a position beyond it; it achieves opposition only though identification with that with which it 
remonstrates.‟12 This is why the opposition to society is integral to the concept of art.  
In the section of Aesthetic Theory known as „Art, Society, Aesthetics‟ Adorno makes it 
clear that works of art are subject to exactly the same forces of production as any other goods. 
„The aesthetic force of production is the same as that of productive labour and has the same 
teleology; and what may be called aesthetic relations of production – all that in which the 
productive force is embedded and in which it is active – are sedimentations or imprintings of 
social relations of production.‟13 It is clear that Adorno considers any work of autonomous art to 
be an actual commodity. The relationship to commodities goes deeper than this for Adorno 
thinks the work of art shares the same abstract structure as a commodity. He describes it in this 
way: „the commodity character itself: a parody of aesthetic semblance‟.14 Just as an artwork 
appears to be more than a mere thing so a commodity as a desirable fetish appears to be more 
than a thing. 
 
The absolute artwork converges with the absolute commodity. The modern pays tribute 
to this in the vestige of the abstract in its concept. If in monopoly capitalism it is 
primarily exchange value, not use value, that is consumed, in the modern artwork it is 
its abstractness, that irritating indeterminateness of what it is and to what purpose it is, 
that becomes a cipher of what the work is.
 15
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Another way in which an artwork resembles a commodity is in the way that it is made. This is 
especially true of artworks from the era of the bourgeois revolution. The putting together of a 
dynamic whole out of many „details‟ involving „a dynamic synthesis‟ parallels factory 
production of the time. 
  
…right into the most sublime moments, the echo of commodity production can be 
heard. The common nexus of these art-technical procedures and material processes, 
which has developed in the course of industrialization, has yet to be clarified but is 
nevertheless strikingly evident. With the emergence of intrigue and development, 
however, commodity production not only migrates into artworks in the form of the 
heterogeneous life but indeed also as their own law: nominalistic artworks were 
unwitting tableaux économiques.
16
 
 
So autonomous art and commodities are structurally alike in that they share a similar form. An 
artwork is at the same time a pure tradable commodity. For Adorno to examine an artwork 
solely from a traditional aesthetic point of view is a mistake. 
 
Art perceived aesthetically is art aesthetically misperceived. Only when art‟s other is 
sensed as a primary layer in the experience of art does it become possible to sublimate 
this layer, to dissolve the thematic bonds, without the autonomy of the artwork 
becoming a matter of indifference. Art is autonomous and it is not; without what is 
heterogeneous to it, its autonomy eludes it.
17
 
 
Any analysis of modern works of art for Adorno must take into account the other of society, not 
in the sense of a wider context such as is exemplified by the topos of the history of ideas, but in 
the sense of understanding that modern works of art are a product of the development of 
capitalism. Only an aesthetic theory that takes the double character of the artwork into account 
is acceptable for Adorno. 
  
Success and coherence 
„The concept of an artwork implies that of its success. Failed artworks are not art‟.18 This 
astonishing statement by Adorno can be found in the section of Aesthetic Theory called „Toward 
a Theory of the Artwork‟. As Fredric Jameson noted in Late Marxism, „This, the working 
premise of Aesthetic Theory, must at first be laid out as scandalously and as baldly as possible: 
all art is “great art”.‟19 How is this to be understood? It is fundamentally an ontological claim 
involving a judgement, the basis of which at this moment is not clear. This adjudication 
classifies a work as either art or non-art. It is very close to the military use of the word rank in 
that fundamental status is addressed.  A suggestion that Adorno thinks in this binary way about 
works of art can be found in Quasi Una Fantasia where he writes: „Music resembles language 
in the sense that it is a temporal succession of articulated sounds which are more than just 
sounds. They say something, often something human. The better the music, the more forcefully 
they say it. The succession of sounds is like logic: it can be right or wrong.‟20 This is a form of 
logic of art, of binary status, either „right or wrong,‟ either art or not art. If one assumes that it is 
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inherent to Adorno‟s concept of art that it be of high rank, that it be successful, one should also 
assume that as his thinking is inherently antinomical that there must be an opposed concept to 
success which would be failure. There is art and there is failed art, in a sense for Adorno both 
concepts are needed, one to understand the other and vice versa. 
In Aesthetic Theory Adorno states: „No continuum leads from bad by way of middling 
to the good; what does not succeed is a priori bad because the idea of success and coherence is 
inherent to the idea of art.‟21 This suggests that, for Adorno, the very idea of art involves the 
judgement that a work must reach a stage of success before it can be conceived of as art, not 
merely classified as art, but regarded conceptually as autonomous art. It also introduces a 
related concept, coherence, which is involved in this recognition of a work as an artwork. I use 
the word recognition here because, as will become apparent later, there is a similarity to Hegel‟s 
account of one person recognising another in Adorno‟s account of someone recognising an 
artwork as a distinct form of being as opposed to being a mere thing. „…art tolerates neither 
normal works nor middling ones that correspond to a norm or establish their means in terms of 
their distance from it. There is no scale for the ranking of artworks…‟22 Rank [Rang] is here 
being used as a kind of absolute status. Adorno does not mean to imply that there is some form 
of external standard or norm of which artworks must partake as with a Platonic ideal of the 
beautiful, although he is very close to doing so. The very „idea of art‟ according to Adorno 
demands that an artwork reach a certain state of coherence, and therefore a level of success, 
before it can be understood to be a work of art. The beauty of an artwork must also be derived 
from this successful coherence. Coherence is closely related to another concept, articulation. 
Just as all the parts of a skeleton are articulated and held together within one body by means of 
sinews and muscle fibre so the parts of an artwork comprise the whole. „It is not possible to 
conceive the rank or quality of an artwork apart from its degree of articulation.‟23   
For Adorno there is something suspect about the concept of greatness. 
 
The idea of greatness as a rule is bound up with the element of unity, sometimes at the 
cost of its relation to the nonidentical; for this reason the concept of greatness itself is 
dubious in art. …Greatness is the guilt that works bear, but without this guilt they 
would remain insufficient. This is perhaps the reason for the superiority of major 
fragments, and the fragmentary character of others that are more finished, over fully 
complete works.
24
   
  
The concept of greatness here must mean an appreciation of an artwork that is akin to the 
organic type of explanation encountered above. Such an understanding fails to account for the 
contradictory or dissonant elements in a work, the elements that point to the future hope of art. 
For Adorno this future hope seems to be twofold. First, the artwork itself holds open the 
possibility of future works, it is constitutive of art that it holds open the possibility of its own 
development in its own freedom. Second, by analogy this internal freedom of the artwork holds 
open the utopian possibility of political freedom. The other aspect of this concern about 
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greatness is the suggestion by Adorno that the unfinished, the fragmentary  can in some cases be 
superior to more finished great works. This is another aspect of Adorno‟s Romantic heritage, 
the valorisation of the fragment over the completed whole was an important element of the 
aesthetics of the Jena Romantics. Robert Hullot-Kentor argues that in Aesthetic Theory „an 
aesthetics that is devoted to the primacy of the object claims that one art work can be and 
absolutely must seek to be, better than any other art work… Thus Adorno‟s dissatisfaction with 
each and every artwork was his alliance with each one as it seeks to be the only artwork.‟25 
Hullot-Kentor is, I think, exaggerating Adorno‟s position and trying to make it too like 
Schelling‟s. It is not that art works compete with each other to be great, but that they have to 
achieve a certain internal quality to be art at all. Adorno admits in the „Draft Introduction‟ that 
there was a time, the time of Kant and Hegel, when artworks did conform to general aesthetic 
norms, and indeed aesthetics itself saw its task as identifying and to some extent helping create 
these norms. However, despite that, as he claims below, important works inevitably altered such 
norms. „True, there has probably scarcely ever been a work that as important in any regard that 
did not, by virtue of its own form, mediate these norms and thus virtually transform them.‟26  
So far the discussion of external norms has been related to the relationship to earlier 
works. One of the defining characteristics of art in the last 200 years has been the pace of 
change and the extent and frequency with which norms and styles have been transformed many 
times. The concept of style is conservative. In other cultures, such as the Japanese and Chinese, 
particular styles in art can last for hundreds of years. The whole idea of a style imposed on a 
group of works is for Adorno a form of shorthand, a kind of identity thinking, a form of 
categorisation that falls short and is unconvincing. „The concept of style never fully did justice 
to the quality of works; those works that seem most exactly to represent their style have always 
fought through the conflict with it.‟27 Even the best work that seems to exemplify its own style 
will have elements in it that are in conflict with the style. If a work fully exemplified its style it 
would be truly organic, an academic exercise, with no dissonant elements pointing forward. It 
might even be thought of as perfect. However, as he also states, just as there can be no failed 
artworks so there can be no perfect ones either. „The ideological, affirmative aspect of the 
concept of the successful artwork has its corrective in the fact that there are no perfect works.‟28 
Clearly within cultured bourgeois society certain works of art are considered to be, and valued 
as, more successful than others. Such a societal valuation of an artwork creates what for Adorno 
is only an apparent ranking and should be understood to be an affirmative aspect of culture in 
that it only serves to reinforce the ruling ideology and values of bourgeois society. As he states: 
„The truce between the domains of entertainment and serious art bears witness to the 
neutralisation of culture: Because no spirit is binding for culture‟s spirit, culture offers its wares 
in a selection for highbrows, middlebrows, and lowbrows.‟29 Culture is being used here, with its 
three „brows‟, not as art historical comment but as a form of sociological commentary. 
However, there is one statement that makes it clear that rank ultimately depends on the work‟s 
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relationship to the administered world. In short the work‟s opposition to it. „The rank of an 
artwork is defined essentially by whether it exposes itself to, or withdraws from, the 
irreconcilable.‟30 So ultimately the rank of a work of art for Adorno depends on its opposition to 
the administered world of late capitalism. „The deepest antinomy of artworks, the most 
threatening and fruitful, is that they are irreconcilable by way of reconciliation, whereas actually 
their constitutive irreconcilability at the same time deprives them too of reconciliation. Yet they 
converge with knowledge through their synthetic function, the joining of the disjoint.‟31 
 For Adorno artists who have produced work of the first rank are always liable to a 
falling off in quality. „Even artists such as Richard Strauss, perhaps even Monet, diminished in 
quality when, seemingly happy with themselves and with what they had achieved, they forfeited 
the power for historical innervation and the appropriation of the most progressive materials.‟32  
So for an artwork to be successful it must not only be internally coherent and fully articulated, it 
must also, and this „must‟ has the force of an aesthetic imperative for Adorno, employ the most 
advanced materials. But what are the most advanced materials, and who decides what they are? 
As we have already seen, for Adorno, the work decides. The artist who takes up new materials 
to make a work can fail to make the work coherent.  Twentieth century art is full of failed 
experiments. An example would be the computer generated artworks of the late sixties and early 
seventies. Avant-garde audiences sat in small auditoria and watched with utter seriousness what 
we would now think of as no more than screen savers. There may be screen saver art out there 
but it is really a form of modern craft such as the decorated plates or carpets of the past. It often 
takes a long time for a new medium to be available for making successful art. Inventions such 
as photography, coal tar pigments, film, aluminium, acrylic paint, the saxophone, have been 
new technologies in the last hundred and fifty years that have been used by artists, but not 
usually successfully, soon after their invention. The electric motor had to wait a very long time 
for artists to use it in mobiles or machine art such as Tingueley‟s in the 1960s. Whereas other 
innovations such as the electric guitar, video recorder, and digital imaging have come into 
successful use almost immediately. Advanced materials can also mean require advanced 
techniques. After all there was not any advance in the design and construction of orchestral 
instruments needed for the transitions from tonal to atonal, and then to twelve tone row music, 
to take place. These changes took place in the conception of the music, in the innovations made 
by the composers using the latest methods of composition. 
It is already apparent that Adorno considers that any work of art that is considered 
successful by the administered world of culture will inevitably be damaged. Commodification 
of the experience of art as taking pleasure can also lead to consumers of such art who are 
accustomed to such works being easy to understand and enjoy consequently finding themselves 
unable to appreciate more complex and less immediately appealing works of the first rank. 
Someone who enjoys Mozart may well find a later modernist work difficult to follow. „What 
popular consciousness and a complaisant aesthetics regard as the taking pleasure in art, 
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modelled on real enjoyment, probably does not exist. The empirical subject has only a limited 
and modified part in artistic experience tel quel, and this part may well be diminished the higher 
the work‟s rank.‟33 This is a very strange statement by Adorno. What is an empirical subject? Is 
it short hand for an ordinary person with little knowledge and appreciation of art? Is it short 
hand for an oppressed and totally controlled subject at the mercy of the administered world? 
And to what is the empirical subject opposed? To a transcendental subject!? To a subject, such 
as Adorno who inhabits a different realm of being? The context in which this statement is made 
is a paragraph largely concerned with „The Pleasure of Art‟. The quotation continues:  
 
Whoever concretely enjoys artworks is a philistine; he is convicted by expressions like 
“a feast for the ears.” Yet if the last traces of pleasure were extirpated, the question of 
what artworks are for would be an embarrassment. Actually, the more they are 
understood, the less they are enjoyed…For him who has a genuine relation to art, in 
which he himself vanishes, art is not an object;…The bourgeois want art voluptuous 
and life ascetic; the reverse would be better. Reified consciousness provides an ersatz 
for the sensual immediacy of which it deprives people in a sphere that is not its abode.
34
  
 
„Reified consciousness‟ is the key phrase. An „empirical subject‟ would be a „philistine‟ subject 
whose consciousness has been turned into a form of thing by the power of the administered 
world. Such a subject is not capable of fully appreciating a true work of art, they cannot enter 
the „sphere‟ of art, all they can do is enjoy art, they cannot have „aesthetic experience.‟ 
„Aesthetic experience does indeed benefit from an intensified sensual differentiation as a 
medium of giving form, yet the pleasure in this is always indirect.‟35 In short, no more pleasure 
in art than in philosophy! 
The inverse of this situation is that of the opposite of the pleasure taker, the fashionably 
hip member of a counter-culture where the works on offer achieve little more than an anti-
bourgeois stance. „As Boulez points out, many works, of which the question as to their value no 
longer makes sense, are beholden solely to their abstract opposition to the culture industry, not 
to their content or the capacity to realise it.‟36 This is the similar to the criticism Adorno makes 
of Brecht. That if a work sets out to be politically oppositional to its core then it will fail as art. 
„However once artworks are entombed in the pantheon of cultural commodities, they 
themselves - their truth content - are also damaged.‟37 The work itself does not change, it‟s 
internal coherence is the same, but for Adorno there has been some form of erosion in the 
reception of the work once it has become a popular classic masterpiece, a gem of late capitalist 
taste. Adorno‟s insistence on quality and rank opens him to the criticism that he is a high 
bourgeois elitist only concerned with high art. Is his complaint that the shallow interpretation 
that an affirmative audience of „empirical subjects‟ with „reified consciousness‟ enthusiastically 
puts on the work in question is too easy and undemanding, too much in the mode of „How 
beautiful!‟? If this is so, then is he claiming that an erosion of understanding has taken place? 
There is no doubt that a commodification effect occurs with art that becomes popular. Is it that 
the work itself fails as it is no longer challenging, no longer advanced, no longer progressive 
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due to the „decay wrought by time‟ and by popularity? If this is so how does the work fail? One 
way in which the work could fail is that the bourgeois audience is incapable of appreciating the 
intricacies of the form of the work, of the construction, that this form simply becomes an easily 
recognisable style. The failure is also partly historical. The work achieved its status as „great art‟ 
at a particular time when it was genuinely advanced, genuinely oppositional. Perhaps, as 
Adorno suggests early on in Aesthetic Theory, „great art‟ was only possible at a certain time in 
history.  „Rather, art‟s substance could be its transitoriness. It is thinkable, and not merely an 
abstract possibility, that great music–a late development–was possible only during a limited 
phase of humanity.‟38 This would almost certainly be the time of the bourgeois revolution and 
the music in question would be that of Beethoven. By becoming fully accepted by a wide 
bourgeois audience a work such as Beethoven‟s seventh symphony, can no longer point to an 
utopian future, even if it did once in the past, and still does now to the perceptive historically 
minded beholder such as Adorno. The work has now lost its power to disturb, has become a 
pure source of pleasure, a kind of cultural golf. In this situation the perishing has begun. „The 
question, however, of what and what is not an artwork cannot in anyway be separated from the 
faculty of judging, that is, from the question of quality, of good and bad. The idea of a bad 
artwork has something nonsensical about it: If it miscarries, if it fails to achieve its immanent 
constitution, it fails its own concept and sinks beneath the apriori of art.‟39 The message is clear, 
there is no such thing as a bad artwork, there are only artworks and works that fail to make the 
grade that cannot conceptually be categorised as art.  
If the concept of art is narrowed down to include only works of the highest rank and 
quality, then, this also opens the question as to whether a philosophical account of lesser art is 
possible? For Adorno, lesser art, in its most commodified form, includes the products of the 
culture industry. The implication is that aesthetics can only be concerned with successful art.  
 
What is true in positivism is the platitude that without the experience of art nothing can 
be known about it and there can be no discussion of it. But precisely this experience 
contains the distinction positivism ignores: To put it drastically, this is whether one uses 
a hit song, in which there is nothing to understand, as a backdrop for all kinds of 
psychological projections, or whether one understands a work by submitting to the 
work‟s own discipline.40 
 
This is the kind of comment that encourages critics to label Adorno as an elitist. He has often 
been criticised for his restricted view of jazz. By jazz he did not mean the serious exploration 
and development of the blues by ensembles operating in a culture of experimentation and free 
improvisation. He meant extremely popular, lightweight big bands. In The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment there is a reference to jazz that makes it clear that he did realise that there were 
two types of jazz;  „…how to master technical problems at both ends of the scale of music 
experience–real jazz or a cheap imitation;‟41 This comment may of course be by Horkheimer 
rather than by Adorno. A member of the Glenn Miller Orchestra remarked that playing in that 
band was like going to work in a factory. The factory work consisted in the repetition of the 
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familiar with strict rigour. No free form playing was allowed. Understanding „a work by 
submitting to the work‟s own discipline‟ is a central idea of Adorno‟s theory of the artwork.  
It is worth asking whether Adorno was alone among his contemporaries in giving such 
importance to the concept of great art?  Herbert Marcuse expressed his views on great art in the 
preface to his book, The Permanence of Art (in English The Aesthetic Dimension) of 1978.  
 
…the objection that I operate with a self-validating hypothesis seems justified. I 
term those works “authentic” or “great” which fulfil aesthetic criteria 
previously defined as constitutive of “authentic” or “great” art. In defense, I 
would say that throughout the long history of art, and in spite of changes of 
taste, there is a standard which remains constant. This standard not only allows 
us to distinguish between “high” and “trivial” literature, opera, and operetta, 
comedy and slapstick, but also between good and bad art within these genres.
42
  
 
Marcuse clearly operates with a concept of rank, the constant standard, that he admits is largely 
„a self-validating hypothesis‟. What Marcuse calls the constant standard of great and authentic 
art is really a disguised version of the traditional concept of beauty. It appears to be 
indistinguishable from beauty as a Platonic form. Heidegger also believed in a concept of „great 
art‟ that was related to his conceptions of art as a founding event of truth. I plan to discuss the 
differences and parallels  between Adorno‟s and Heidegger‟s conceptions of art and truth in the 
final chapter. 
If there are no external norms, then, the judgement that a work is art, has to be in the 
terms laid down by the artwork itself. Adorno is suggesting that the artwork itself is the source 
of its own norms. If the work fully satisfies its own norms it is good, it is art. Conversely, if a 
work fails to satisfy its own norms then it is a failure and not art. This must be one of the senses 
in which he means there can be no scale, no ranking, for each artwork makes its own rank. This 
is reminiscent of Benjamin's claim in relation to Proust that „all great works of literature found a 
genre or dissolve one‟.43 It is clear that Adorno‟s central belief in Aesthetic Theory is that the 
artwork is only completed in theory, in critique. This is the same theory that can be found in 
Friedrich Schlegel and the Jena Romantics. Art has to be of a constant standard because of the 
impossibility of criticizing inferior work. This is not just because artworks carry their theory 
within them, but because they must be completed by critique. The opposite view was held by 
Goethe that critique is not possible except to bring out what the work contains because the work 
is already complete in itself as it contains its own theory. As Benjamin commented in The 
Concept of Criticism: „Goethe‟s whole theory of art proceeds from his view of the 
uncriticizability of works.‟44 A quotation from Goethe makes this clear. „True works of art 
contain their own theory and give us the measurement according to which we should judge 
them.‟45 For the Jena Romantics the critique was the final form of the work of art. A form that 
would inevitably be constantly renewed and refreshed in critique.   
In the previous section concerning autonomous art, it became clear that some aspect of 
art‟s opposition to the society in which it was formed must be apparent in any analysis of the 
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work. „Reason, which in artworks effects unity even where it intends disintegration, achieves a 
certain guiltlessness by renouncing intervention in reality, real domination; yet even in the 
greatest works of aesthetic unity the echo of social violence is to be heard; indeed, through the 
renunciation of domination spirit also incurs guilt.‟46 This is it seems to me the most difficult 
aspect of Adorno‟s demands for aesthetics. Precisely identifying the source of the „echo of 
social violence‟ in any work other than that it was very probably enjoyed only by a privileged 
minority could turn out to be the preserve of a cultured left wing elite. However, it is clear that 
for Adorno the criteria for success or failure, of coherence and articulation, are not to be found 
outside the artwork in external norms, but, within the artwork itself. „In artworks the criterion of 
success is twofold: whether they succeed in integrating thematic strata and details into their 
immanent law of form and in this integration at the same time maintain what resists it and the 
fissures that occur in the process of integration.‟47  This is a complicated thought that bears on 
Adorno‟s conception of construction in twentieth-century art which he claims is derived from 
montage.   
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Section Two: Construction 
 
Montage  
Montage is one of the most important concepts within Aesthetic Theory as it underpins 
Adorno‟s view that twentieth-century art is both constructed and, as a result of the montage of 
empirical elements within the construction, fragmenting. It is an example of Adorno using a 
foreign word, in this case a French word, partly for it‟s effect, as a form of mild shock. The use 
of „montage‟ is itself a weak montage, a form of parataxis. Adorno was probably ironically self-
aware of this conceit. „Montage‟, as a French word, means assemblage, the mounting together 
of heterogeneous elements. As Benjamin Buchloch points out „photomontage had been 
developed as early as the 1890s as a commercial technique for the design of advertising.‟48 
Whilst montage seems to have started in one genre, that of photography, within the visual arts it 
quickly spread to other genres, particularly film and then to music and literature.  
What does Adorno have to say about montage in Aesthetic Theory? There is an 
extended treatment in only one paragraph in the section of the book dealing with „Coherence 
and Meaning.‟ Apart from this short section, comprising around 600 words in English, there are 
five other fragments scattered through the book. In a discussion of Benjamin‟s „The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction‟ Adorno comments that montage „reached its acme 
in surrealism and was quickly weakened in film.‟49 Adorno was critical of Surrealist montage 
and accused it of  „possessing the remains of a complaisant irrationalism, for adaptation to 
material that is delivered ready-made from outside the work.‟50 Adorno is concerned about the 
transgressing of modernism‟s „law of form‟ by the absorption of „art-alien objects‟.51 He claims 
this has been going on „since early modernism‟ and that „this has led mimesis in art to capitulate 
– as in montage – to its antagonist.‟52 Montage developed, Adorno claims, out of a reaction to 
Impressionism, „in antithesis to mood laden art.‟53 The cubist collages of Picasso and Braque are 
the epitome of this reaction. „The principal of montage was conceived as an act against a 
surreptitiously achieved organic unity; it was meant to shock.‟54 Collage was quickly taken up 
by Dadaists and later by Surrealists. „For the first time in the development of art, affixed debris 
cleaves visible scars in the work‟s meaning. This brings montage into a much broader 
context.‟55 This broader context is twentieth century art understood as construction. At another 
point in Aesthetic Theory Adorno makes one of his most important, and strange, statements 
concerning his central idea that montage was transformed into construction. „Following an 
internal logic whose stages will need to be described by an aesthetic historiography that does 
not yet exist, the principle of montage therefore became that of construction.‟56  The „aesthetic 
historiography that does not yet exist‟ is the aspect of this statement that is strange. At first sight 
this statement should be considered as a typically Adornian over-statement, a piece of 
hyperbole. A Hegelian interpretation of this comment would be that it is only when the 
constructive phase of art is over that its history could be written and this is probably part of the 
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import of the comment. In the longer section devoted to montage the „aesthetic historiography‟ 
is clarified. First, there is a passage in which Adorno claims that: „All modern art after 
impressionism, probably including even the radical manifestations of expressionism, has 
abjured the semblance of a continuum grounded in the unity of subjective experience, in the 
“stream of lived experience”.‟57 Adorno then moves on to the subject of the relationship of 
montage to construction: „This is complemented by the aesthetic principle of construction, the 
blunt primacy of a planned whole over the details and their interconnection in the 
microstructure; in terms of this microstructure all modern art may be called montage.‟58 By 
including scraps of the material world in visual art, and by including in music ordinary sounds, 
such as Satie‟s typewriters, or quotations of earlier music, montage destroyed the organic unity 
of the work of art as being composed solely of art elements. Max Paddision considers that 
Adorno‟s views of „surrealist‟ music are important with regard to a montage of the old with the 
new: „Weill, Krenek and Stravinsky in certain of their works …‟ juxtapose „historically 
devalued fragments in a montage-like manner which enables them to yield up new meanings 
within a new aesthetic unity.‟ Paddision quotes from Adorno‟s 1930 essay, „Reaction and 
Progress.‟ 
 
Insofar as surrealist composing makes use of devalued means, it uses them as devalued 
means, and wins its form from the „scandal‟ produced when the dead suddenly spring 
up among the living…But in any case, the „surrealist‟ technique is capable of producing 
constructive unity, consistent precisely in its enlightened and abruptly expounded 
inconsistency – a montage of the debris of that which once was.59  
 
The holding together of these elements in a construction, in a totality, is the essence of twentieth 
century art for Adorno: 
 
Whatever is unintegrated is compressed by the subordinating authority of the whole so 
that the totality compels the failing coherence of the parts and thus however once again 
asserts the semblance of meaning. …The idea of montage and that of technological 
construction, which is inseparable from it, becomes irreconcilable with the idea of the 
radical, fully formed artwork with which it was once recognised as being identical.
60
 
 
Technical construction is the use in music of „pure‟ natural sounds and in painting the use of 
„pure‟ colours. This allows „the empirical‟ into the work which is ultimately destructive. For 
how can a work that allows „the empirical‟ in to itself still be fully autonomous, still be 
oppositional? This is another aspect of the disintegration Adorno believes is integral to 
twentieth century art.  
As is so often the case with Adorno there is a connection to Walter Benjamin. It is 
possible to identify six usages of montage within Benjamin‟s texts. These references 
demonstrate the extent to which the concept of montage extended over a number of different art 
genres. Montage appeared in „The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction‟61 with 
regard to film production and editing, and is discussed in the correspondence with Adorno. By 
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contrast in „The Author as Producer‟ Benjamin describes succinctly the central technique of 
Dadaism.  
 
The revolutionary strength of Dadaism consisted in testing art for its authenticity. Still 
lifes put together from tickets, spools of thread, cigarette butts, were linked with artistic  
elements. They put the whole thing in a frame. And they thereby show the public: Look, 
your picture frame ruptures the age; the tiniest authentic fragment of everyday life says 
more than paintings. Just as the bloody finger print of a murderer on a page of a book 
says more than the text. Much of this revolutionary content has sought survival in 
photomontage.
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The third usage of montage concerns photography, both as photomontage with the 
juxtaposition of images from different photographs coupled with text and as the addition of a 
text to a photograph in the form of a caption. The addition of a caption to a photograph is 
another form of montage. In his  „A Small History of Photography‟ Benjamin writes 
approvingly of what he calls Surrealist „constructivist photography,‟ which „is where the caption 
comes in, whereby photography turns all life‟s relationships into literature, and without which 
all constructivist photography must remain arrested in the approximate.‟63 As Esther Leslie 
remarks in her study of Walter Benjamin: „Two seemingly dissimilar things, word and image, 
are forced together in a montage, clashing and dialogically relaying back and forth.‟64  
There is a fourth meaning which is theatrical. Brecht‟s alienating technique, described 
by Benjamin as: „This discovery (alienation) of conditions takes place through the interruption 
of happenings.‟65 As Leslie remarks, „In Brechtian drama the interruptions of montage 
counteract the illusion of a completed reality that can be passively consumed and complacently 
acknowledged by audiences.‟66   
The fifth usage of montage concerns „literary montage.‟ This can be found in „N‟, in 
The Arcades Project, where it is „the method of this project.‟67 The whole methodology of The 
Arcades Project was, of course, montage. Also to be found in „N‟, is a sixth usage of montage 
concerning history. 
 
A central problem of historical materialism that ought to be seen in the end: Must the 
Marxist understanding of history necessarily be acquired at the expense of the 
perceptibility of history? Or: in what way is it possible to conjoin a heightened 
graphicalness [Anschaulichkeit] to the realization of the Marxist method? The first stage 
in the undertaking will be to carry over the principle of montage into history. That is, to 
assemble large-scale constructions out of the smallest and most precisely cut 
components. Indeed, to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the 
crystal of the total event. And, therefore, to break with vulgar historical naturalism. To 
grasp the construction of history as such. In the structure of commentary.
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This would be history through images, a history that could be read in the same way a film is 
read but without reading ordinary language. The suggestion that philosophy, as aesthetic theory, 
or as negative dialectics, could be written as a form of montage would be Adorno‟s idea. To be 
literally montage, Adorno‟s texts would have to have been largely composed of quotations. 
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Robert Hullot-Kentor writing about Adorno and Benjamin, in a footnote, addresses their 
relation to montage. 
 
How interpretation is to proceed was the question that ultimately divided Adorno from 
Benjamin. Benjamin wanted to present montages of images; they would speak out of 
their dense juxtaposition. In the vast quotations assembled in Kierkegaard, this book 
stands closest of all Adorno‟s writings to Benjamin‟s ideal: many of its passages are 
expected to speak for themselves. A good part of the obscurity of the book originates 
here. Adorno ultimately rejected montage as a form that would only relive the dream, 
not interpret it, and return the work to the historicism that was his and Benjamin‟s aim 
to overcome. In Adorno‟s later studies quotations become sparser and the weight of 
interpretation increasingly falls to the work of the dialectical concepts.
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Adorno‟s texts took the structural, constructive aspect of montage as created through the models 
and constellations that go to make up the conceptual structure of the text. Another example of 
literary montage is the novel by Thomas Mann Doctor Faustus. Christa Bürger quotes Thomas 
Mann writing about Doctor Faustus in a letter to his son – „determined to use any type of 
“montage”. For what we both mean by the word is directly related to the curious manner in 
which the book goes beyond the literary, the way it “shakes off aesthetic illusion”, in short its 
reality.‟70 The novel is literally montage in that Thomas Mann incorporated sections of text 
written by Adorno on music theory, but in Mann‟s mind it is also a metaphorical montage in 
that he hoped it went beyond the work of art to become a form of reality.  
In a note in the Paralipomena of Aesthetic Theory Adorno suggests that perhaps the use 
of montage is much older than he has allowed for, that it is not just a twentieth century 
phenomena. „If recent art movements have made montage their principle, subcutaneously all 
artworks have always shared something of this principle; this could be demonstrated in detail in 
the puzzle technique of the great music of Viennese classicism, which nevertheless corresponds 
perfectly with the idea of organic development in that era‟s philosophy.‟71 Fredric Jameson 
interprets Adorno to mean no less than Beethoven‟s music can be thought of as montage. 
„Anachronistic as it may seem, therefore Beethoven‟s music is montage and as non-fictive as 
Eisenstein or Juan Gris:‟72 Jameson has in mind Adorno‟s descriptions of Beethoven‟s music as 
being no more than the appearance of music and of the totality being made up a fleeting scraps 
of music which are hard to pin down. Jameson is right that Adorno hinted that principle of 
montage had been present in „Viennese classicism‟ but he is I think over exaggerating the 
position with regard to Beethoven. However, it is instructive to think about whether and in what 
respects montage can be attributed to artworks that pre-date the twentieth century.  
If Hölderlin‟s paratactical poetry can be considered a form of montage, if parataxis is 
montage which in a sense it is, then montage in the form of parataxis has been around a very 
long time. A famous example of literary montage can be found in Madam Bovary. In the scene 
of the agricultural fair Flaubert‟s prose switches scene quickly to and fro from the action in the 
square to Madam herself alone in her room looking out on the event. The effect is startling, and 
amusing. It could have been written to be filmed so cinematic is the treatment. If one thinks 
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about montage as shock then this has also been around in music for some time. Haydn for 
example in his „Il Distratto‟ [The Absent-minded One] symphony (No. 60 in C) makes use of 
musical shocks. Two examples are: the orchestra suddenly comes in with a loud outburst in the 
second movement as if to remind the composer he has lost his way; in the last movement there 
is a moment where the music absent mindedly changes key from F minor to E flat which sounds 
extraordinarly odd and atonal. The „Surprise‟ symphony (No. 94 in G Major) of Haydn also has 
a loud chord in the second movement to wake the audience up. However, these examples are 
more like jokes, which themselves do have an interruptive place in the flow of conversation. 
They are similar to Beethoven‟s musical joke at the end of the third movement of his 7th 
symphony where for a few moments it sounds as if we are to get a third repetition of the trio 
which is then cut short with five abrupt chords. With regard to the late string quartets of 
Beethoven, there are extremely odd musical moments, dissonances, very high ethereal playing 
in places and an almost Jazz set of exchanges between the players in the fourth movement of 
Quartet No. 14. (Op. 131). None of these however can be considered montage. If anything is 
montage, it is the Grosse Fugue which originally was the final movement to Quartet No. 13. 
(Op. 130). Its length and necessary fugal structure make it quite different to the five movements 
that precede it and in a sense qualify it as a montage but in a very loose sense. Beethoven 
removed it as the last movement and published it as a separate work (Op. 133) and wrote a 
different last movement. In the mid twentieth century it became common for this substituted 
movement to be dropped from concert programmes and the Grosse Fuge  re-instated. As 
Adorno remarked - „...quite rightly …restored to its place at the end of the great cyclical work it 
was intended to close.‟73  
Beethoven‟s quartet No. 13, if it can be taken as a montage, exemplifies one of the fundamental 
aspects of montage that of the relationship of part to whole. It is difficult to think of this quartet 
as an organic whole when the final movement  has such an utterly different form. Further a form 
that, in musical historical terms, was out of date. Earlier Beethoven had used fugues as part of 
the construction of symphonic movements such as in the second movement of the Eroica 
symphony where after a re-statement of the funeral march a fugal section resolves the gloom. 
For Beethoven to make an entire movement out of a fugue was in a sense to go against his own 
earlier classical style. Adorno reads late Beethoven in this way. „Beethoven‟s late works can 
therefore be understood as a critique of his classicist works, using the word critique in its proper 
sense to refer to an immanent logic of composition.‟74 Adorno then gives a long quotation from 
Marx‟s Eighteenth Brumaire concerning how the French revolutionaries had adopted classical 
symbols of the Roman Republic, and how the English Civil War rebels had adopted „Old 
Testament … trappings‟. „Thus Marx. Beethoven‟s development gave expression to this feeling 
of dissatisfaction with the drapery, with the claim to classical totality.‟75 Adorno sees this as 
Beethoven refusing a balance between extremes that would have created a classical totality. The 
late works have a different form of totality, of construction. „The music has, as it were, holes, 
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artistically contrived fissures. This puts an end to the affirmative, hedonistic element otherwise 
always inherent in music, and in this respect there is a relationship between Beethoven and 
certain phenomena of modern music as exemplified by Arnold Schoenberg‟s statement: “My 
music is not lovely”.‟76 Adorno thinks the late works of Beethoven involve a refusal of balanced 
form as an organic totality, this could be described as a form of montage. An organic totality has 
a relationship of parts to whole that is balanced, the integrity of the structure depends on this 
balance. A montage work on the other hand is constructed out of parts that do not balance, parts 
that are in a sense mounted together in a kind of forced unity. That this can be read as a form of 
unity is in a sense the memory of the organic at work. As we have seen Adorno stresses the 
importance of construction for modern works of art in the twentieth century. He thinks montage 
as a new form of construction developed out of the older organic forms of the nineteenth 
century.  
 
The blemishes that indelibly mark purely expressive, organic works offer an analogy to 
the antiorganic praxis of montage. This brings an antinomy into focus. Artworks that 
are commensurable to aesthetic experience are meaningful insofar as they fulfil an 
aesthetic imperative: the requirement that everything be required. This ideal, however, 
is directly opposed by the development that it itself set in motion. Absolute 
determination … converges …with absolute arbitrariness.77  
 
That the organic turned into its opposite must be understood as a development, an evolution by 
art in a society increasingly dominated by late capitalism. Whilst Adorno was critical of many 
uses of montage, such criticism he claims has „implication for constructivism, in which montage 
has camouflaged itself, precisely because constructivist form succeeds only at the cost of the 
individual impulse, ultimately the mimetic element.‟78  
 
Mimesis 
Adorno‟s concept of mimesis in Aesthetic Theory is extremely complex and derives not just 
from the philosophical heritage of Plato and Aristotle, but also from Walter Benjamin. In 
addition, Adorno was influenced by anthropological texts that sought to account for human 
development in the distant past particularly in the realms of magic and myth. Jameson 
comments that for Adorno mimesis is „a foundational concept never defined nor argued but 
always alluded to, by name, as if it had preexisted all the texts.‟79 Tom Huhn argues that „for 
Adorno, mimesis was the key term according to which he came to understand the dialectical 
relations between subjectivity and objects, and, more importantly, between subjective and 
objective becoming.‟80 Miriam Hansen considers mimesis in Adorno has several, context 
dependent, meanings. „“Mimesis” notably is a central category in Adorno‟s thought and a 
notoriously difficult one at that. Like many of his key categories, mimesis has a number of 
different, possibly conflicting meanings depending on the constellation in which it is used.‟81 
Jameson is right that Adorno‟s use of mimesis is undefined and Huhn is right that it is partly 
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concerned with subjectivity but Hansen is I think the most accurate commentator with her claim 
that in different contexts mimesis has different meanings for Adorno. This section will be an 
examination of the genealogy of  Adorno‟s conceptions of mimesis. 
It is always worthwhile considering what opposition Adorno may have had in mind, 
often unstated, when considering his use of a term such as mimesis. For Adorno there would 
have been oppositional echoes from Lukács and very probably Erich Auerbach. Mimesis in its 
most usual sense means an imitation of something. In the case of the traditional novel an 
imitation in prose of the lives of a group of individuals. So for Lukács, who valorised the form 
of critical realism he identified with the novels of Thomas Mann, a novel such as Dr Faustus 
exemplified an ideal form of twentieth century mimesis. Adorno on the other hand, whilst he 
admired Mann‟s work, considered Kafka and Beckett, whom Lukács  thought to be degenerate 
bourgeois modernists, to embody a greater truth about society. In a sense this is still mimesis, 
but a form of Adornian negative mimesis. In effect Adorno accuses Lukács of having too simple 
and uncritical a conception of reality. „Art exists within reality, has its function in it, and is also 
inherently mediated with reality in many ways. But nevertheless, as art, by its very concept it 
stands in an antithetical relationship to the status quo.‟82 Auerbach‟s great history of realist 
literature entitled Mimesis was first published in German in 1946.  In Mimesis Auerbach argued 
that  mimesis was fundamental to all forms and styles of Western literature in a history 
stretching from the Oddyssey through to Virginia Woolf.
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 In their respective usage and 
conceptions of mimesis Auerbach is almost certainly too general for Adorno and Lukács too 
particular. However, they must both be assumed to form an opposition to Adorno‟s complex use 
of mimesis. It is clear from this comment in „the „Draft Introduction‟ to Aesthetic Theory that 
Adorno consider the traditional realist artwork such as an escapist novel  is no longer acceptable 
as art in the current state of the world. „The pure mimetic impulse–the happiness of producing 
the world once over– which animates art and has stood in age-old tension with its 
antimythological, enlightening component, has become unbearable  under the system of total 
functional rationality.‟84   
Mimesis is a fully assimilated foreign word in both German and English. However, 
within a philosophical text, mimesis inevitably carries with it conceptual echoes from both Plato 
and Aristotle. Ricoeur draws a distinction between Plato and Aristotle with regard to their 
respective conceptualisations of mimesis. „Platonic mimesis thereby distances the work of art 
twice over from the ideal model which is its ultimate basis. Aristotle‟s mimesis has just a single 
space wherein it is unfolded–human making [faire], the arts of composition.‟85 For Plato, 
mimesis is a type of imitation by temporal particulars of universal timeless forms. This imitation 
involves a form of memory that is also an inevitable forgetfulness, anamnesis. A temporal 
particular is an imitation of a form that involves a retrieval of memory of the partially forgotten 
eternal form. Works of art that imitate things of this world are therefore second order imitations 
as the things of this world are already imitations of timeless forms. For Aristotle by contrast, 
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mimesis was a straightforward imitation, a representation carrying with it the biological aspects 
of mimicry. Adorno also uses the word imitation [Nachamung] which is often employed in 
Aesthetic Theory as a synonym for mimesis when understood as simple imitation.  Whilst this is 
the standard interpretation of Aristotle‟s concept of mimesis Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe, in his 
analysis of Diderot‟s Paradox, identifies two types of mimesis in Aristotle.  
 
First, a restricted form, which is the reproduction, the copy, the reduplication of what is 
given (already worked, effected, presented by nature). …Then there is a general 
mimesis, which reproduces nothing given (which thus re-produces nothing at all), but 
which supplements a certain deficiency in nature, its incapacity to do everything, 
organise everything, make everything its work–produce everything. It is a productive 
mimesis, that is an imitation of phusus as a productive force, or as poiesis.
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In other words the production of art, the creative process is, as a process, an imitation of nature. 
The important difference to note between the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of 
mimesis is that with Platonic mimesis, like imitates like, whereas with the first type of mimesis 
in Aristotle the imitation is of something unlike. Conversely, the second type of mimesis in 
Aristotle the act of creation for the making of art (or magic) imitates a force of nature, like 
imitates like and is thus a „Platonic‟ form of mimesis. This distinction between like and unlike  
as mimesis of the same and mimesis of the other operates with Adorno‟s use of mimesis and 
imitation. Indeed it could be described as an Adornian dialectic of mimesis for he operates with 
both the Platonic and the first of the Aristotelian forms. Adorno‟s use of mimesis in Aesthetic 
Theory is more complex than the Platonic/Aristotelian distinction between mimesis of the same 
and mimesis of the other and this complexity in two respects partly derives from Walter 
Benjamin. 
For Adorno, mimesis includes conceptual echoes from Walter Benjamin regarding 
language and play. In his essay „On the Mimetic Faculty‟ Benjamin argues that it is language 
that now embodies the ancient faculty of mimesis. „In this way language may be seen as the 
highest level of mimetic behaviour and the most complete archive of nonsensuous similarity: a 
medium into which the earlier powers of mimetic production and comprehension have passed 
without residue, to the point where they have liquidated those of magic.‟87 For Benjamin it is the 
magical and divinatory powers of archaic  seers that have over time migrated into language. In 
his „Doctrine of the Similar‟ this theory is described as follows: „it is to writing and language 
that clairvoyance has, over the course of history, yielded its old powers.‟88 Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen describes Adorno‟s use of mimesis, which she argues is partly derived from 
Benjamin, as „the hidden face of a figure whose explicit face is sometimes enigma, sometimes 
language, a figure in which subject and object, psyche and matter are both continuous and 
discontinuous, and to pursue the elusive mimesis is to begin to illuminate the whole conceptual 
design and form of Aesthetic Theory.‟89 She identifies Benjamin‟s short texts A Berlin 
Childhood  as an important influence on Adorno. Whilst these texts do not deal overtly with 
mimesis Weber Nicholsen argues they can be read as significant because they deal with mimetic 
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play, with one thing representing another in the context of children playing with objects, toys 
and with each other. So the fundamental distinction between mimesis of the same and mimesis 
of the other have added to them the ideas derived from Benjamin concerned with archaic 
echoes, the nature of language as mimetic and the play element inherent in childhood mimetic 
games. Two texts by Adorno that pre-date Aesthetic Theory demonstrate how his ideas 
concerning mimesis developed, these are Dialectic of Enlightenment and Negative Dialectics. 
The archaic aspects of mimesis play a key part in Adorno and Horkheimer‟s concept of  
mimesis in Dialectic of Enlightenment, whereas the play aspects of mimesis in philosophical 
language are stressed in Adorno‟s Negative Dialectics.  
In the opening chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno make 
many references to  work by cultural anthropologists such as Hubert and Mauss. This 
anthropological theorising sought to account for the origins and uses of magic and myth in early 
human development.  Freud‟s Totem and Taboo was also cited in the discussion. Anson 
Rabinbach accurately describes the first chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment as:  
 
…an attempt to reconstruct the genealogy of sacrifice through an analysis of the 
concept of mimesis: first, in the order of animistic identification, then in magic, 
subsequently in myth, and finally in reason. At each of these stages the concept of 
mimesis is not understood as mere imitation, but as a form of mimicry or semblance 
that appropriates rather than replicates its object in a non-identical similitude.
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It is clear from the first chapter of their Dialectic of Enlightenment that Adorno and Horkheimer 
regard mimesis as a fundamental component of magic. „Like science, magic pursues aims, but 
seeks to achieve them by mimesis–not by progressively distancing itself from its object.‟91  
Mimesis is thus set up as an essential component of the development of the Enlightenment. 
First, the magical developed into the mythic stage, which in turn, developed into the rationality 
of the Enlightenment. However, it is important to stress that Adorno and Horkheimer regarded 
the magical as an early form of rationality. It was rational to use magic. „One after the other, 
mimetic, mythic and metaphysical modes of behaviour were taken as superseded eras.‟92 It is 
clear that for Adorno and Horkheimer the magical aspect of mimesis is still an archaic echo 
embedded in modern enlightened rationality.  
  As well as the genealogy of mimesis in rationality, outlined in the first chapter of 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, there are further important aspects to mimesis relating to the Jews. 
These aspects are discussed (by Adorno and Lowenthal) in the chapter „Elements of anti-
Semitism‟. Anti-Semitism, they argue, is a mimetic comportment or behaviour towards the 
other. This mimesis of the other „is based on false projection. It is the counterpart of true 
mimesis, and fundamentally related to the repressed form; in fact, it is probably the morbid 
expression of repressed mimesis. Mimesis imitates the environment, but false projection makes 
the environment like itself.‟93 The references to „repression‟ and „false projection‟ emphasises 
the Freudian aspect of this analysis. „There is no anti-Semite who does not basically want to 
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imitate his mental image of a Jew, which is composed of mimetic ciphers:‟94 This account is 
also  cast in the form of a genealogy of  the relationship of the Jews to the societies in which 
they had lived over the centuries. „The Jews were not the sole owners of the circulation sector. 
But they had been active in it for so long that they mirrored in their own ways the hatred they 
had always borne.‟95 Düttmann comments that: „The protagonist of enlightenment is a Jew and a 
persecutor: as a Jew he persecutes himself, exacts upon himself what he struggles against.‟96 
There is a further aspect of mimesis that relates to the Jewish faith and that is the ban on images 
and the ban on  using the name of the deity. These are both mimetic taboos which both depend 
on the idea that  the conception of the deity is for the Jews too sacred to be referenced by an 
image in whatever form or by language in the form of a name. So here are three further aspects 
to the complex of ideas involving mimesis. First, the mimesis involved in anti-Semitism and the 
horror of the Enlightenment ending in Auschwitz, second, the ban on images and third, the 
language ban on naming the deity. Adorno frequently uses the word „taboo‟ in the sense of 
prohibition in Aesthetic Theory. Sometimes this refers to the ban on images or the ban on the 
use of the name of the deity, but sometimes it refers to Plato. In this case the „mimetic taboo‟97 
refers to Plato‟s objection to artist‟s making copies of what are already copies. 
In Negative Dialectics Adorno argues that the „matters of true philosophical interest at 
this point in history …are nonconceptuality, individuality, and particularity.‟ A non-conceptual 
mode of understanding is intuitive, it is intuition. As Adorno explains, „the intuitive mode mode 
of mental conduct does continue to exist in fact as an archaic rudiment of mimetic reactions.‟98 
The non-conceptual aspect of philosophy has „a playful element‟ which Adorno believes derives 
from its mimetic ancestry. Adorno seems again to be arguing that rationality, as it developed 
into conceptuality grew out of mimesis as he did in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Again it is made 
clear that the archaic relic of mimesis is not just a relic but a part of modern rationality. 
However, in Negative Dialectics, the Benjaminian play aspects of mimesis are emphasised 
because philosophical intuition as mimesis still contains a play element. „To represent the 
mimesis it supplanted, the concept has no other way than to adopt something mimetic in its own 
conduct, without abandoning itself.‟99  This is „the esthetic moment‟ of philosophy. „Cogency 
and play are the two poles of philosophy.‟100 Adorno goes on to explain that in its presentation 
philosophy is inevitably expressive. „Its integral, nonconceptually mimetic moment of 
expression is objectified only by expression in language.‟101 
  Adorno‟s use of the word mimesis in Aesthetic Theory is complex as it includes all 
eight aspects of mimesis so far examined, mimesis of the same, mimesis of the other, mimesis 
as creation, mimesis as an archaic relic of primoridial magic still embedded in rationality, the 
mimetic aspects of language, of play, and finally the Jewish and Platonic taboos. Within 
Aesthetic Theory, Shierry Weber Nicholsen has identified five main forms of mimesis.
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However, whether there are eight or five or ten is difficult to decide because of the interweaving 
and the variety of contexts in which the word mimesis is used.  
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Mimesis has often used in a straightforward art historical sense of one artists following 
on from another. Kant used it in this sense in his discussion of genius in the Critique of 
Judgement: „Genius is the talent that gives the rule to art‟.103 Giving the rule to art means laying 
down the possibilities for action on the part of artists who follow on from the „genius‟.  „The 
products of genius must also be models, i.e., they must be exemplary.‟104 This is not a question 
of slavish copying, but more a question of recognising the importance and binding nature of 
changes and innovations brought about by the genius. The artist, according to Kant, has to 
proceed not by „copying‟ but to use the model as something „to be imitated‟.105  This would also 
include a canon of prohibitions of things it is no longer acceptable to do. Adorno in Aesthetic 
Theory clearly recognised the importance and necessity, of such mimesis. It is a form of 
negative mimesis in the sense of an artist using a previous model not as a guide to copy but as a 
spur to move on to something new that nevertheless in an importance sense develops out of the 
earlier work. 
 
That in which artworks over millennia knew themselves to be images of something 
reveals itself in the course of history, their critic, as being inessential to them. There 
would have been no Joyce without Proust, nor Proust without Flaubert, on whom Proust 
looked down. It was by way of imitation, not by avoiding it, that art achieved its 
autonomy; in it art achieved the means to its freedom.
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In essence this form of negative mimesis is the driving force of modern art and therefore lies at 
the heart of Adorno‟s views on art. 
In the section of Aesthetic Theory „Theories on the Origin of Art‟ Adorno returns to 
mimesis in pre-history. He argues that whilst cave paintings are undoubtedly mimetic they 
should be understood as „stages of a process and in no way an early one.‟ Cave paintings 
demonstrate an already existing „mimetic comportment–the assimilation of the self to its 
other,‟107 that must pre-date the making of such paintings. Such primordial „aesthetic 
comportment‟ has, Adorno claims, been „preserved‟ in art and indeed is a „necessity‟ of art. „Art 
is in its most ancient relics too deeply permeated with rationality.‟ Nowadays such „rationality‟ 
as „aesthetic comportment‟ is all too easily understood as „irrational‟. The true rationality of art 
„mimetic comportment‟ is that it pursues ends rather than means. „This is the source of art‟s 
rationality, its character as knowledge. Aesthetic comportment is the capacity to perceive more 
in things than they are; it is the gaze under which the given is transformed into an image.‟108  
Seeing „more‟ in things makes aesthetic comportment very like reading a constellation. Indeed 
reading a constellation can be thought of as a form of mimetic play within and around the 
dialectially opposed concepts of the constellation.  As far as reading a work of art is concerned 
it seems that for Adorno the subject mimetically responds to the expression  embedded in the 
constructed constellation of the work. „Aesthetic comportment, however, is neither immediately 
mimesis nor its repression but rather the process that mimesis sets in motion and in which, 
modified, mimesis is preserved.  …Ultimately, aesthetic comportment is to be defined as the 
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capacity to shudder. …Such a constitutive relation of the subject to objectivity in aesthetic 
comportment joins eros and knowledge.‟109 „Shudder‟ is used throughout Aesthetic Theory 
whenever Adorno refers to a primordial human reaction to nature. The „shudder‟ is a mimetic 
comportment to the ultimate other of humanity, nature. One example of „shudder‟ would be the 
overwhelming awe embedded in the idea of the sublime in late eighteenth century aesthetics. 
Many commentators have read mimesis in Aesthetic Theory as a synonym for 
expression where it is counter-posed to construction as the dialectic of mimesis and rational 
construction.  As Peter Osborne comments, „The dialectic of mimesis and rationality thus stands 
at the very heart of Adorno‟s aesthetics.‟110 There is no doubt that this reading is correct for as 
Adorno states: „…The survival of mimesis, the nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively 
produced with its unposited other, defines art as a form of knowledge and to that extent 
“rational.” For that to which the mimetic comportment responds is the telos of knowledge, 
which art simultaneously blocks with its own categories. Art completes knowledge with what is 
excluded from knowledge, its univocity.‟111  This is the rational element of mimesis first 
encountered in Dialectic of Enlightenment. The rationality of modern art for Adorno is 
exemplified by its form as a constructed illusion. 
 
Art is not to be reduced to the unquestioned polarity of the mimetic and the 
constructive, as if this were an invariant formula, for otherwise works of high quality 
would be obliged to strike a balance between the two principles. But what was fruitful 
in modern art was what gravitated toward one of the extremes, … The dialectic of these 
elements is similar to dialectical logic, in that each pole realizes itself only in the other, 
and not in some middle ground. Construction is not the corrective of expression, nor 
does it serve as its guarantor by fulfilling the need for objectification; rather, 
construction must conform to the mimetic impulses without planning…112    
  
 Mimesis as expression is the dialectical opposite of rational construction, and yet as at the same 
time is a primordial part of rationality. This in a sense of the dialectic of Enlightenment hidden 
within modern works of art. Christophe Menke comments that „The mimetic reenactment of 
aesthetic processuality is not the other to understanding, but rather the other in 
understanding.‟113 
In other words rationality is itself dialectical. 
 
I will now examine with what at first sight seems like a straightforward use of mimesis 
in Aesthetic Theory. The complexity it reveals is symptomatic of the multiple ways Adorno uses 
the word. When a musician follows a score she derives the performance from the score by a 
form of mimesis, but she also interprets the score in a creative act of her own.  Following the 
score can be understood as a mimesis of the same rather than of the other. Although there is of 
course the sense in which the score is other, the music is the other. This aspect is the most 
apparently straightforward of Adorno‟s uses of mimesis in Aesthetic Theory. It looks like a 
mimesis of the same in the Platonic sense but is simultaneously a mimesis of the other. An 
account Adorno gives of an interpretive performance of music in his essay „Music and 
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Language‟ demonstrates this. Adorno writes about interpretation being „essential to both music 
and language.‟ For Adorno interpretation of music means playing the music. „To play music 
correctly means first and foremost to speak its language properly. This calls for imitation of 
itself, not a deciphering process. Music only discloses itself in mimetic practice.‟ 114 Adorno 
goes on to state that this can be entirely silent and solitary. An individual reading a score and 
performing the music as mind music can also count as a successful interpretation. At times, and 
in some places, Adorno suggests this might be the truest and purest form of interpretation.  
 
What is essentially mimetic awaits mimetic comportment. If artworks do not make 
themselves like something else but only like themselves, then only those who imitate 
them understand them. Dramatic or musical texts should be regarded in this fashion and 
not as the quintessence of instructions for the performers: They are the congealed 
imitation of works, virtually of themselves, and to this extent constitutive although 
always permeated with significative elements. Whether or not they are performed is for 
them a matter of indifference; what is not, however, a matter of indifference is that their 
experience – which in terms of its ideal is inward and mute – imitates them. Such 
imitation reads the nexus of their meaning out of the signa of the artworks and follows 
this nexus just as imitation follows the curves in which the artwork appears. As laws of 
their imitation the divergent media find their unity, that of art. If in Kant discursive 
knowledge is to renounce the interior of things, then artworks are things whose truth 
cannot be thought except as that of their interior. Imitation [Nachamung] is the path that 
leads to this interior.
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This approach to interpretation initially seems explains a well known aphorism from Aesthetic 
Theory, „The mimesis of artworks is their resemblance to themselves‟.116 However, this leads to 
the second sense of mimesis. The act of interpreting an artwork is „mimetic comportment‟ in 
Aesthetic Theory. „If mimetic comportment does not imitate something but rather makes itself 
like itself, this is precisely what artworks take it upon themselves to fulfil.‟117  This can be read 
as the performer or the audience member mimetically comporting themselves to the work of art.  
This is the sense in which Huhn reads mimesis as the relationship of the subject to the object, of 
subjectivity to something other. It is also the second sense of Aristotelian mimesis that Lacoue-
Labarthe identified above. „By pursuing its own identity with itself, art assimilates itself with 
the nonidentical: This is the contemporary stage of art‟s mimetic essence.‟118 So expression is 
both mimesis of itself as an artwork and simultaneously mimesis of its opposite as a rationally 
constructed artwork. This mimesis to the other is seen by Adorno as a form of intuition. „The 
intuitive element in art differs from sensuous perception because in art the intuitive element 
always refers to its spirit. Art is the intuition of what is not intuitable; it is akin to the conceptual 
without the concept. It is by way of concepts, however, that art sets free its mimetic, 
nonconceptual layer.‟119 The intuitive aspect of mimesis is a hermeneutic process of sympathetic 
non-conceptuality that can of course only be expressed in conceptual language even as that 
language struggles to express the intuitive reading of the work of art.  
The extent to which the language of art in all forms had become almost unreadable by 
the 1960s was a prime concern for Adorno. As was suggested above the language aspect of the 
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concept of mimesis was partly derived from Benjamin where the basic idea was that language 
makes itself like, imitates in some sense the world it describes. However, there was another 
aspect of Benjamin‟s interest in language that Adorno quotes at length in Aesthetic Theory. This 
is concerned with „the sphere of the wordless‟ and with „the unutterable‟. „What Benjamin  calls 
the elimination of the unutterable is no more than the concentration of language on the 
particular.‟120  Adorno links Benjamin‟s ideas with „Wittgenstein‟s famous maxim‟ from the 
Tractatus („whereof we cannot speak thereof we must remain silent‟) and suggests it „may be 
transposed to art‟.  „The element that in art resembles language is its mimetic element; it only 
becomes universally eloquent in the specific impulse, by its opposition to the universal. The 
paradox that art says it and at the same time does not say it, is because the mimetic element by 
which it says it, the opaque and particular, at the same time resists speaking.‟121  Mimesis thus 
takes on the form of a kind of non-conceptual hermeneutics. As an example of this, Adorno 
suggests a poem by Verlaine that is notoriously difficult to interpret.  
 
In that, however, by means of language, humanity itself becomes mimetic–is itself 
expressed in the nonconceptual without sacrificing its conceptual element–meaning 
achieves a fruitful tension to the work‟s content [Gehalt], to what  has been composed. 
The meaning of a poem such as Verlaine‟s “Clair de lune” cannot be univocally 
established, yet this is not to say that its meaning does not reach beyond the 
incomparable resonance of the verses.
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In a passage where he is discussing Schubert‟s music and its expression, its „eloquence‟ as 
being distinct from language. Adorno speculates about the incompatible relationship of 
eloquence to language in respect of the prose after Joyce.  „…it would in part explain the effort 
of prose since Joyce to put discursive language out of action, or at least  to subordinate it to 
formal categories to the point that construction becomes unrecognizable. The new art tries to 
bring about the transformation of communicative into mimetic language. …The true language 
of art is mute.‟123   
So, for Adorno, the reading of a work of art within its own terms can be seen as a 
mimetic process. This placing of mimesis within the frame of hermeneutics  is similar to the 
way Ricoeur analyses mimesis in Time and Narrative. Ricoeur is concerned with mimesis in 
Aristotelian terms as the mimesis involved in poetic composition.  Ricoeur‟s analysis centres 
around mimesis as imitation of actions, people and events within a text (mimesis2). He identifies 
two further related forms of mimesis, one that pre-exists the creation of the text and that in an 
important sense makes the text possible (mimesis1) „the familiar pre-understanding we have of 
the order of action.‟ The other is a form of mimesis involved in the reception of the text 
(mimesis3) „ a new configuration by means of this poetic refiguring of the pre-understood order 
of action.‟ 124  This threefold mimesis means that for Ricoeur mimesis2 has „a mediating 
function‟ which „derives from the dynamic character of the configuring operation‟ of the plot 
between the „pre-understanding‟ and „the post-understanding of the order of action.‟125 An 
important aspect of this analysis by Ricoeur is that „it is the reader who competes the work.‟ A 
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text such as Joyce‟s Ulysses „challenges the reader‟s capacity to configure  what the author 
seems to take malign delight in defiguring. In such an extreme case, it is the reader, almost 
abandoned by the work, who carries the burden of emplotment.‟126 As has already been 
understood Adorno also believed that the work of art was completed in interpretive philosophy 
in keeping by a perceptive and informed audience in keeping with the views of the Jena 
Romantics. There is one further form of mimesis which is fundamental to Adorno‟s whole 
understanding of the relationship of art to society. 
 Mimesis to the other is the main Aristotelian moment of Aesthetic Theory. As far as the 
Adornian artwork is concerned the central idea of mimesis to the other takes is as monadic 
comportment. The „Paralipomena‟ contains a statement to this effect that would almost certainly 
have been added to the finished text of Aesthetic Theory. 
 
The rationality of artworks has as its aim opposition to empirical existence: The rational 
shaping of artworks effectively means their rigorous elaboration in themselves. As a 
result they come into contrast with the world of the nature-dominating ratio, in which 
the aesthetic ratio originates, and become a work for-themselves. The opposition of 
artworks to domination is mimesis of domination. Even the immanently polemical 
attitude of artworks against the status quo internalizes the principle that underlies the 
status quo, and that reduces it to the status of what merely exists; aesthetic rationality 
wants to make good the damage done by nature dominating rationality.
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This is the mimetic comportment to the ultimate other, capitalism as negative totality, or the 
social aspect of art. This is the reality of the historical moment in which the artwork was created 
that is incorporated within the artwork by „aesthetic rationality‟. It is clear that Adorno hopes 
that the form of rationality employed in the creation of artworks has a utopian aspect, however 
illusory, in a bad world. Of all the forms of mimesis it is clearly the mimesis of the other in the 
sense of an artwork being a mimesis of domination that is the more fundamental for Adorno. 
His theory of the artwork depends on the oppositional relationship between the artwork and its 
other the administered world of late capitalism. Indeed his utopian ideas suggest that ideally the 
position should be reversed, that reality should imitate art. 
 
Rather than imitating reality, artworks demonstrate this displacement to reality. 
Ultimately, the doctrine of imitation should be reversed; in a sublimated sense, reality 
should imitate artworks. However, the fact that artworks exist signals the possibility of 
the non-existing. The reality of artworks testifies to the possibility of the possible. The 
object of art‟s longing, the reality of what is not, is metamorphosed in art as 
remembrance. In remembrance what is qua what was combines with the nonexisting 
because what was no longer is. Ever since Plato‟s doctrine of anamnesis the not-yet-
existing has been dreamed in remembrance, which alone concretizes utopia without 
betraying it to existence. 
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Adorno‟s conception of utopia will be examined in detail at a later stage of this project. It is 
clear that for Adorno only art gives and hope for the possibility of change in the future precisely 
because they „signal the possibility of the nonexisting.‟ In this way, for Adorno, memory and 
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expectation are closely intertwined. The next section will be an examination of Adorno‟s 
conception of judgement as it relates to the work of art.  
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Section Three: Judgement 
Interpretation, commentary and critique 
Adorno‟s idea that the way to understand an artwork is by „submitting to the work‟s own 
discipline‟129 is significant. Understanding is not a term usually used in regard to art; terms such 
as appreciation, liking, enjoyment, stimulating are more normal. Understanding is normally 
reserved for some form of cognition. This suggests that Adorno takes the understanding of an 
artwork to be a form of cognition, an epistemology, the province in short of philosophy. Any 
charge of elitism might well be defused by this supposition of intellectual complexity rather 
than on the bare assertion of rank. However as Adorno recognised, forms such as the circus 
incorporate pre-artistic as opposed to sub-artistic elements  and these survive in artworks. 
 
Although the preartistic dimension becomes poisoned by its exploitation, to the point 
that artworks must eliminate it, it survives sublimated in them. It is not so much that 
artworks possess ideality as that by virtue of their spirituality they promise a blocked or 
denied sensuality. That quality can be comprehended in those phenomena from which 
artistic experience emancipated itself, in the relics of an art-alien art, as it were, the 
justly or unjustly so-called lower arts such as the circus. 
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At another point, Adorno suggests that the lower arts, and indeed „nonart‟ also await  
interpretation. „Artworks, especially those of the highest dignity, await their interpretation. The 
claim that there is nothing to interpret in them, that they simply exist, would erase the 
demarcation line between art and nonart. Ultimately, perhaps, even carpets, ornaments, all 
nonfigural things longingly await interpretation. Grasping truth content postulates critique.‟131 
This is redolent of Benjamin‟s ideas concerning the significance of apparently insignificant 
scraps and his ideas concerning redemption. Adorno seems to imply that a serious philosophical 
treatise (possibly quite brief) on the designs of Wilton carpets could be a critique on the same 
level as one of his books on composers in that there could be an aspect of truth to be discovered. 
That discovering the truth content of an artwork, or even a carpet, involves critique is clearly a 
significant aspect of Adorno's account of works of art. It relates to both cognition and 
understanding. The comment about carpets and ornaments suggests that the accusation that 
Adorno was an elitist concerned only with art of the first rank is misplaced.   
Part of an artwork‟s internally produced rank resides in the critical relation to earlier 
works within interpretative time. There is a sense in which this critical relationship is deeply 
constitutive of the artwork. Who judges what is an artwork? Clearly artists make a judgement 
about earlier work in which they understand their work to be in a critical relation to. This new 
work in turn is judged by artists, critics and knowledgeable experts and knowledgeable 
enthusiasts whose appreciation does justice to the complexity of the work.   
 
At times quality has historically asserted itself against precisely those works that were 
simply content to swim with the tides of the Zeitgeist. It is rare that works that have 
won great renown have not in some way deserved it. The development of legitimate 
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renown, however, necessarily coincided with the unfolding of the inner law of those 
artworks through interpretation, commentary and  critique. This quality is not directly 
produced by the communis opinio, least of all by that manipulated by the culture 
industry, a public judgement whose relation to the work is questionable.
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This statement makes it even clearer that the communis opinio follows on from the well 
informed opinion of experts. Only the preliminary work carried out by the few experts in their 
understanding, appreciation, commentary and critique of the work enables the work to become a 
work of great renown. Interpretation, commentary and critique are key concepts that appear 
many times throughout Aesthetic Theory, always together, always linked. It is only through this 
interpretative process of understanding that the inner law of an artwork can be determined. The 
ranking of artworks is then dependent upon the experts who are capable of recognising what the 
work tells them. In this sense it is the work that makes the judgement. The critics, the theorists, 
the aestheticians, those who are sufficiently expert to see what the work is communicating are in 
a sense a creation of the work, as are the artists. This is not made explicit in Aesthetic Theory 
but it is implicit in the conception Adorno has of the work of art. 
As Adorno remarks in the section „Art Beauty‟ „…every theory of art must at the same 
time be a critique of art.‟133 In other words there cannot be any theory that is not precisely tied 
to the critique of a particular work of art. A critique in the Kantian sense would lay bare the 
conceptual assumptions embodied in the work. „However, if finished works only become what 
they are because their being is a process of becoming, they are in turn dependent on forms in 
which their process crystallises; interpretation, commentary and critique.  …If the unfolding of 
the works in these forms is not to miscarry, they must be honed to the point where they become 
philosophical.‟134 This implies that the work of art is not completed by the artist, it is completed 
by the critical community. It is finally completed by being crystallised in philosophy.  
It is possible to understand Adorno‟s conception of the completion of the work by 
commentary, critique and interpretation as a form of genius, not of creation, but of 
hermeneutics, as the genius of the receiver. This reversal of the usual meaning of genius would 
thus enable the rank of a work to be recognised by the quality, the degree of excellence of the 
interpretation, commentary and critique. This is a Romantic idea, that the work is only finally 
produced and completed by the receiver. It serves to shift genius from the producer of the work 
to the receivers. There is an aspect of this in Kant for the sensis communis forms the social 
counterweight to the creative genius, whereby the genius is reined in by and therefore ultimately 
controlled by, prevailing taste. Gadamer maintains that this double nature of genius is at the 
heart of Kant‟s account of genius. „That the genius of creation is matched by genius in 
appreciating was already part of Kant's theory of taste and genius, …‟135 Adorno is ambivalent 
about the notion of prevailing taste. A work that too many people enjoy uncritically might be 
thought to be well on the way to commodification. However, the genius of the elitist receiver 
does seem to fit Adorno only too well. But one must not ignore the extent to which Adorno‟s 
theory of art grows out of his understanding of the situation that modernism was in crisis, and 
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that this crisis is historical. The becoming of the artwork is of course another form of the time of 
interpretation. The time of creation, which in itself contains a variant of the time of 
interpretation exemplified in a critical relation to earlier work, this is in turn followed by the 
time of becoming of initial interpretation. This implies that artworks are never fixed, they are 
always in their times of becoming until finally at the end of their time of becoming their 
interpretation and re-valuation ceases and they perish and cease to be interpretable. 
However, for Adorno, an artwork can also fail in quite mundane ways. A soloist can 
make mistakes in a performance, or an artist can make some error in their work. „Artworks, 
right up to those of the highest level, know the lesson taught to the bungler whose fingers 
stumble on the piano keys or who sketches carelessly: The openness of artworks - their critical 
relation to the previously established on which their quality depends - implies the possibility of 
complete failure, and aesthetics alienates itself from its object the moment that by its own form 
it deceives on this score.‟136  This passage makes clear the importance of history for Adorno. It 
is stated here unequivocally that the quality of a work of art „depends‟ on its „critical relation to 
the previously established.‟ The key word here is „critical‟. It can be understood in two ways. 
First, that each work has a critical theoretical relationship to previous work encoded with its 
coherent structure. Second, that the critical community will recognise this relationship to the 
earlier work or works. The above passage also makes clear that the possibility of complete 
failure is somehow constitutive of artworks. Whilst it is clear their quality partly depends on 
their critical relationship to earlier work, any failure to establish a fully critical relationship 
would lead to mere stylistic repetition. „Articulation is the redemption of the many in the one‟137 
What is being saved? It must be redemption from failure that is the key to articulation. It does 
seem that without articulation the components of a work would simply fail to be internally 
coherent and so the work would not be redeemed and recognised as art.    
When a new artwork appears, one that breaks with previous conventions in a radical 
way, or a group appear that signal a major stylistic change, then expectations based on the 
known and remembered can be partially confounded. Adorno is concerned to account for such 
change, but characteristically does not believe such progress, such radical change, is necessarily 
a guarantee of quality. 
 
Undoubtedly, the historical materials and their domination - technique - advance; 
discoveries such as those of perspective in painting and polyphony in music are the 
most obvious examples. Beyond this, progress is also undeniable in the logical 
development of established methodology, as is evident in the differentiation of 
harmonic consciousness between the age of thoroughbass composition and the 
threshold of new music, or in the transition from impressionism to pointillism. Such 
unmistakable progress is, however, not necessarily that of quality.
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Many art historians, such as Ernst Gombrich would disagree with Adorno on this point. 
Progress, in the sense that Adorno means it, is from one work of art to another, one work can be 
seen as more progressive within a particular style than another, but this does not mean that the 
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more progressive is necessarily a better work of art for the main criteria for success and failure 
for Adorno are internal to each individual work. Therefore there is no real progress from one 
work to another, only progress within a work. The coherence and articulation and therefore the 
success of an artwork depend on its internal structure and whilst there are no general external 
norms that this success is dependent upon, there are particular external norms in the form of 
historical precedents.  This is a further antinomy, an antinomy of history. The insistence on the 
particularity of artworks leads to the rejection of external norms in favour of the internal 
coherence of the artwork and yet at the same time the work cannot be recognised as an artwork 
unless it fits into some historical schema of which it is either a continuation, or a revolt against, 
either way it is connected by an external norm to the historical continuum.  
However, Adorno also believes there is a hidden degeneration in an unlimited advance 
of materials and techniques at the point where art becomes anti-art or non-art. So, just as works 
of the present day may turn out to be anti-art, or not art at all, and soon fall into oblivion, so 
works from the past can also change status over time, sometimes they cease to be art. „Works 
may become uninterpretable and fall mute; often their quality suffers; in general, the inner 
transformation of works most often involves a decline, a collapse into ideology. The past offers 
up ever fewer works of value.‟139  As works turn into popular affirmative classics the possibility 
that they can be rescued and re-invigorated for future generations becomes remote. „Only the 
most advanced art of any period has any chance against the decay wrought by time. In the 
afterlife of works, however, qualitative differences become apparent that in no way coincide 
with the level of modernity achieved in their own periods. In the secret bellum omnium contra 
omnes that fills the history of art, the older modern may be victorious over the newer 
modern.‟140 This again makes clear that quality is internal to the individual work. The 
recognition of this quality is by interpretation. What then of a work that is constitutively 
uninterpretable? A work that has been  created so as to resist interpretation, resist commentary, 
resist critique? Such a work must surely fail on these grounds alone. However, the full 
importance of interpretation commentary and critique can only be understood by first examining 
what Adorno meant by the spirit and truth content of a work.   
    
Spirit and truth content 
We know that for Adorno, there is clearly one rank, one level which artworks must reach to be 
classified as art, nevertheless, as the next quotation demonstrates, the possibility seems to be left 
open that among these works of the highest rank there might still be some form of hierarchy. 
„Although the question of whom to rank higher is idle, the same cannot be said of the insight 
that the voice of the maturity of the subject, the emancipation from and reconciliation with myth 
- that is, the truth content - reached a higher development in Beethoven than in Bach. This 
criterion surpasses all others.‟141 It is clear that the articulation and internal coherence of an 
individual artwork is paramount in deciding rank, that artworks provide their own rank. 
 105 
However, it is not at this moment clear how truth content and spirit fit in. At first sight it looks 
from the quotation above as if truth content and spirit might be a higher criterion. Even though 
Adorno admits that it is impossible to rank one above the other there is, he claims, a sense in 
which Beethoven can and must be elevated above Bach. This is because a comparison of truth 
content will show that a higher spiritual development was reached by Beethoven. How is this to 
be understood? It looks as if it relates to the historical positions of the two composers. If, as I 
have suggested above, Adorno's account of art is deeply rooted in theories derived from 
Romanticism then one might expect to find that a Romantic composer such as Beethoven would 
produce work that was better fitted to Adorno‟s theory but more is at stake than this. Bach‟s 
music does not contain those wild internal dissonant moments and falling apart of structure that 
Adorno identifies in Beethoven. This is one historical point. Another would be that Bach‟s 
music is pre-revolutionary in a political sense, it pre-dates the French revolution. Adorno claims 
in Aesthetic Theory that the echo of the French revolution can be heard in Beethoven‟s music. In 
Hegelian terms, Beethoven‟s music is at a later stage of the development of humanity and 
contains the promise of revolutionary freedom and exemplifies the energy of the bourgeois 
revolution. It is situated at the start of the epoch of modernity. To describe it in this way is to 
echo Heidegger. If Beethoven is part of the inauguration of autonomous modern art then his 
work is foundational in Heidegger‟s terms. In keeping with Heidegger‟s (Hegelian) theory, then 
the aesthetics of this modernism would appear at the end of modernism, precisely when modern 
art turns into anti-art or non-art, the time of Aesthetic Theory. The question that this relation 
between rank and truth content raises is important. It looks as if truth content is the ultimate 
determinant of status. Why this should be so is not yet entirely clear. „The actual arena of 
transcendence in artworks is the nexus of their elements. …Art fails its concept when it does not 
achieve this transcendence; it loses the quality of being art.‟142 We already know that art which 
fails is not art. The failure is to have not achieved the concept of art which partly depends on 
unity, coherence and articulation. Consequently, to call an artwork great is almost a tautology. 
However the word „transcendence‟ seems to suggest that there is something ineffable that is 
over and above the nexus of the elements. This relates to the suggestion I made earlier that 
Hegelian recognition is a vital concept to bear in mind. The recognition of the other as also a 
spirit when transferred to the realm of art involves treating the artwork as if it were a being, as if 
it were another spirit, however illusory such an aspect of the artwork might be.  Spirit is 
something indefinable over and above the nexus of the elements of a work, over and above the 
work‟s immanent logic, some element that lifts the work to a higher level and yet at the same 
time threatens to destroy it. The key to this idea is how is this spirit to be recognised? Whilst 
spirit and truth content are clearly related to coherence and articulation the recognition of these 
latter depends on artistic criteria internal to the work, internal to the form of the work. „If there 
is something like a common characteristic of great late works, it is to be sought in the breaking 
through of form by spirit. This is no aberration of art but rather its fatal corrective. Its highest 
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products are condemned to a fragmentariness that is their confession that even they do not 
possess what is claimed by the immanence of their form.‟143 Adorno may well be thinking of 
Beethoven‟s late quartets which break with previously established quartet structure by pushing 
their own structures almost beyond the limit of coherence, some of the movements are no more 
than fragments.  
So far the discussion has mainly concerned the concept of spirit, it is now time to turn 
to the concept of truth content. Precisely what does Adorno mean when he writes about an art 
work having truth content? „Spirit, art‟s vital element, is bound up with art‟s truth content, 
though without coinciding with it. The spirit of works can be untruth. For truth content 
postulates something real as its substance, and no spirit is immediately real.‟144 As was 
suggested above, spirit can best be understood as a form of illusion, a semblance that somehow 
emerges, sometimes suddenly, in the experience of a work of art and in reflection upon the 
structure and content of the work. „By reading the spirit of artworks out of their configurations 
and confronting the elements with each other and with the spirit that appears in them, critique 
passes over into the truth of the spirit which is located beyond the aesthetic configuration. This 
is why critique is necessary to the works. In the spirit of the works critique recognises their truth 
content or distinguishes truth content from spirit. Only in this act, and not through any 
philosophy of art that would dictate to art what its spirit must be, do art and philosophy 
converge.‟145 This passage makes it clear that whilst spirit is to be read from the „aesthetic 
configuration,‟ the truth of spirit is somehow located „beyond‟ it, in the philosophical critique of 
the work. Truth is not within the artwork, it is found from a reading of the artwork by means of 
philosophical critique, in this sense truth is to be found outside the artwork within discourse. In 
another passage Adorno again makes clear that spirit is to be found in the configuration of the 
artwork. „The locus of spirit is the configuration of what appears. Spirit forms appearance just 
as appearance forms spirit; it is the luminous source through which the phenomenon radiates 
and becomes a phenomenon in the most pregnant sense of the word.‟146 In a further passage 
Adorno writes about the artwork and how spirit combines with the art object itself to form a 
kind of subject. This is a form of being that has an existence that is more than the existence of a 
mere thing. „In the artwork the subject is neither the observer nor the creator nor absolute spirit, 
but rather spirit bound up with, preformed and mediated by the object.‟147  
In an earlier passage in Aesthetic Theory spirit is referred to as the „other‟ or „the 
negation‟ of the configuration of the artwork. This is once again to introduce an antinomy into 
the very idea of the artwork. If the artwork exists as a form of being, as opposed to being a mere 
thing, then this is because it has the two contradictory parts, object and spirit which are in 
dialectical tension, and yet as the tension is antinomic it cannot be resolved. The first part of this 
passage is as follows: „If the spirit of artworks flashes up in their sensual appearance, it does so 
only as their negation: Unitary with the phenomenon, spirit is at the same time its other. The 
spirit of artworks is bound up with their form, but spirit is such only insofar as it points beyond 
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that form.‟ The antinomy is quite clear here, spirit is opposed to „sensual appearance,‟ spirit is 
dependent on the articulated coherent form and yet is somehow „beyond‟ it in a different realm. 
The passage continues by making clear that the spirit of an artwork cannot necessarily be 
grasped even by the most careful and detailed technical analysis of the work. 
 
The claim that there is no difference between articulation and the articulated, between 
immanent form and content, is seductive especially as an apology for modern art, but it 
is scarcely tenable. This becomes evident in the realisation that technological analysis 
does not grasp the spirit of a work even when this analysis is more than a crude 
reduction to elements and also emphasises the artworks context and its coherence as 
well as its real or putative initial constituents; it requires further reflection to grasp that 
spirit.
148
  
 
„Further reflection,‟ also known as „second reflection‟ in Aesthetic Theory, is another Adornian 
code for critique or philosophy. The truth and spirit of an artwork Adorno believes can only be 
revealed by the „beyond‟ of philosophical reflection. As the same passage continues it becomes 
clear that this philosophical reflection enables the political understanding of an autonomous 
work of art. Indeed it is only the work „as spirit‟ that opposes the world of late capitalism, it 
does not do it purely as an artwork but as spirit. „Only as spirit is art the antithesis of empirical 
reality as the determinate negation of the existing order of the world. Art is to be construed 
dialectically in so far as spirit inheres in it, without however art‟s possessing spirit as an 
absolute or spirit‟s serving to guarantee an absolute to art. Artworks, however much they may 
seem to be an entity, crystallize between this spirit and its other.‟149 As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the notion of crystallization, deriving probably from Simmel, is a useful metaphor for 
apparent opposites. A liquid substance changes into a solid and yet is still fundamentally the 
same substance except that it is now a solid structure, it cannot be both liquid and solid and yet 
at different times and in different conditions it is. Spirit in this passage is not at all like Hegel‟s 
notion of „absolute‟ spirit because for Adorno spirit is restricted to works of art. Indeed he 
claims this is the only way in which spirit can be thought about,  „Spirit today is not imaginable 
in any other form; art offers its prototype.‟150  
It is already possible in the light of the discussion so far to begin to work out what 
might be meant by the concept of the truth content of an artwork. It has already been established 
that truth content can have a higher status than rank in regard to comparing Beethoven with 
Bach. If the full understanding of a work, is a form of cognition carried out by commentary, 
interpretation and critique that can only be completed by philosophy, then, the truth content of a 
work will be what is revealed in this process of becoming. The idea that great works of the past 
can wait for their re-interpretation has been discussed above, but not in relation to truth content. 
„Authentic art of the past that for the time being must remain veiled is not thereby sentenced. 
Great works wait. While their metaphysical meaning dissolves, something of their truth content, 
however little it can be pinned down, does not; it is that whereby they remain eloquent.‟151 It 
must be assumed that only works which can provide sufficient content for the process of 
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becoming of critical interpretation to arrive at the end point of philosophical truth content have 
the rank of art. This process of becoming means that over interpretative time a series of 
differing truth contents can be envisaged for any particular artwork. „The truth content of 
artworks, on which their rank ultimately depends, is historical right into its innermost cell.‟152 
The idea that history is immanent to artworks does seem to bear out the suggestion that for 
Adorno a time of interpretation is operating. In other words each artwork has its own history of 
becoming as successive interpretations serve to keep it alive. But there is another aspect to truth 
content that relates to the utopian time of artworks. The quotation immediately above continues: 
„Truth content becomes historical by the objectification of correct consciousness in the work.‟153 
In this account truth content is linked to the utopian aspect of works of art referred to above, to 
the possibility of freedom. However, truth content is also intimately bound up with the 
judgement of artworks through their interpretation, commentary and critique. Activities that are 
best carried out at a philosophical level. „The truth content of artworks is the objective solution 
of the enigma posed by each and every one. By demanding its solution, the enigma points to its 
truth content. It can only be achieved by philosophical reflection. This alone is the justification 
of aesthetics.‟154 Ultimately artworks can only be understood by philosophy, by cognition. This 
is not just because this is the best mode of understanding but because artworks are themselves a 
form of cognition. „Because the element of truth is essential to artworks, they participate in 
knowledge, and this defines the only legitimate relation to them. …The knowledge of artworks 
is guided by their own cognitive constitution: They are the form of knowledge that is not 
knowledge of an object. This paradox is also the paradox of artistic experience.‟155 Artworks are 
only completed by critical interpretation at the highest level, that of philosophy. If Adorno were 
to be indicted as an elitist then there would seem to be more possibility of doing so successfully 
by this linking of philosophy and art. It would seem to exclude non-philosophers from the 
highest form of critical engagement with art. „The truth content of an artwork requires 
philosophy. It is only in this truth content that philosophy converges with art or extinguishes 
itself in it. The way toward this is defined by the reflected immanence of works, not by the 
external application of philosophems.‟156 It is only by the „reflected immanence‟ of works, by 
what Adorno calls second reflection that philosophical thought operates in regard to artworks 
and not from an imposed external theory. The mimetic philosophical interpretation of a work of 
art reveals that work‟s illusory spirit and truth content. Both are historical in the sense that they 
must relate to the time in which the work was created in „opposition‟ to the external domination 
of the administered world. This is why Beethoven stands higher in Adorno‟s estimation of spirit 
and truth content than Bach. Beethoven‟s music carries within it in the brass fanfares and sheer 
driving energy of its developmental sections an encapsulation of the freedoms and hopes of the 
French Revolution coupled with the energy and speed of the bourgeois revolution. Truth content 
and spirit are only recognised by critique which at its highest level is philosophy and so a return 
is made to Adorno‟s conception of philosophy. 
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Art and philosophy 
In order to underscore Adorno‟s conception of both art and philosophy it is instructive to 
indulge in an exercise in word substitution. An exercise in montage. In the quotation that 
follows from Aesthetic Theory I have consistently replaced the word art with the word 
philosophy  
   
The impossibility of a univocal construction of the history of philosophy and the fatality 
of all disquisitions on its progress–which exists and then again does not exist– originate 
in philosophy‟s double character as being socially determined in its autonomy, when its 
immanent structure explosively contradicts its social relations, autonomy is sacrificed 
and with it philosophy‟s continuity; it is one of the weaknesses of the history of ideas 
that it idealistically ignores this. For the most part, when continuity shatters it is the 
relations of production that win out over the forces of production; there is no cause to 
chime in with such social triumph. Philosophy develops by way of the social whole; 
that is to say, it is mediated by society‟s ruling structure. Philosophy‟s history is not a 
string of individual casualties; no univocal necessities lead from one phenomenon to the 
next. Its history may be called necessary only with regard to the total social tendency, 
not in reference to its individual manifestations. Its pat construction from above is as 
false as faith in the incommensurable genius of individual works that transports them 
out of the realm of necessity. A noncontradictory theory of the history of philosophy is 
not to be conceived: The essence of its history is contradictory in itself.
157
  
 
This montaged substitution makes sense within Adorno‟s terms. It makes sense precisely 
because he does think of art and philosophy as being as fundamentally related as did Schelling. 
Indeed a few pages later on in Aesthetic Theory he underscores this relationship as one of a 
shared history.  
 
Nevertheless the history of the whole of bourgeois art was not possible except as the 
effort if not to solve the antinomy of nominalism then at least to give it shape, to win 
form from its negation. In this the history of modern art is not merely analogous to the 
history of philosophy: It is the same history. What Hegel called the unfolding of truth 
occurred as the same process of unfolding both in art and philosophy.
158
   
 
That both philosophy and art share history as such is obvious. What Adorno means is that they 
both developed together as twin aspects of modernity. I have made the point before that 
Adorno‟s Aesthetic Theory has a strong Kantian aspect in that he operates throughout with 
unresolvable antinomies. The questions of great art and disintegration would seem to be another 
such antinomy. On the one hand a work of art has to be as perfect as it can be within the terms 
of its construction as a work. On the other hand the montage form of twentieth century 
construction is always threatening to disintegrate. Great works disintegrate finally, not because 
they obey a post-Hegelian topos of the end of art, but because of their inevitable construction. 
The dissonant fracture that makes them great in the first place will ensure they fall apart. This is 
intertwined with a politically driven sociological theory concerning commodification and 
bourgeois taste. The artwork is both autonomous and social, it operates in its own art terms and 
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yet carries the stigmata of its social time encoded within it. Interpretation, commentary and 
critique thus have a dual role that is critical in two senses. In the art sense as art theory, as 
aesthetics, and in the social sense as sociology, as political theory. The one discipline that can 
and must deal with these two aspects is philosophy. This is why the history of art and the history 
of philosophy are the same history. Why for Adorno there is no difference between the two 
senses of critique, not just because he refuses to accept disciplinary boundaries but because 
theory is also both autonomous and social because as I have noted before theory or philosophy 
has the same structure as art. 
This analysis of Adorno‟s theory of the artwork has uncovered two main, yet linked, 
problems with Adorno‟s account of art. The first is his understanding of rank and the second is 
his understanding of the completion of art by a form of philosophy. As to the first it is clear that 
he is using rank like the traditional notion of beauty, but, in antinomical opposition to the 
concept of failed art. This opposition is very important. In the Origin of Negative Dialectics, 
Susan Buck-Morrs suggests that Adorno does not just operate with double oppositions but with 
quadruple oppositions.
159
 The example she gives is History – Nature where both History and 
Nature whilst being opposed to each other are also internally opposed, so that History has an 
opposition between social history which is historical and actual history which is not purely 
historical. Similarly, on the other side of the main opposition, Nature splits oppositionally 
between that which exists in history and that which does not yet exist. So each of the two main 
poles is itself split into two poles.  If one assumes this model is operating in Aesthetic Theory 
then art, which must be of high rank to be art, is opposed to failed art. If the main opposition is 
between success and failure then what might be the two internal oppositions to these poles? 
Successful art would split into autonomous art in opposition to heteronomous art, the wares of 
the culture industry. Failed art would split to be internally opposed by works that fail to 
innovate, are mere repetitions of earlier art, works that have the appearance of being art and on 
the other hand by works that are uninterpretable. Such anti-art works are so radical they fail all 
the criteria for inclusion in the category of art except pure opposition to what went before. So 
failed art splits between works that copy what went before without developing it in any way and 
works that are so utterly opposed to what went before that they are unrecognisable as art. If such 
works are unrecognisable as art then they are a crisis not just for art but for critique because art, 
for Adorno, is open to interpretation, commentary and critique. A work that was not open to 
such interpretative strategies, a work that could not be completed in philosophy must fail. The 
main problem with Adorno‟s conception of rank is deciding what to include as art and what to 
exclude. It is the distinction between art and failed art that is crucial. Adorno appears to makes 
this decision based on the quality of the analysis of the truth content of the work and the 
experience of the spirit of the work. This is the second main problem, the completion of art by 
philosophy. Adorno in effect restricts the kind of works that can be identified as art to ones that 
are structured in the requisite way so they can be completed by philosophy. Adorno has in effect 
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developed a form of definition of art that depends for its ultimate justification on the concept of 
rank as explicated by the completion of the artwork by philosophy.  
I will now return to the concept of mimesis as there is a further form of Platonic 
mimesis at work within Aesthetic Theory and this concerns a different other of any artwork, 
namely theory. This theory, for Adorno, is aesthetics, it is philosophical and interpretative 
conceptuality. I will argue that this is also a form of mimetic comportment. If one asks the 
question „what is the relationship between the work of art and its re-inscription as an 
interpretation?‟ there is a strong possibility that it could be mimetic. The interpretation does not 
mirror the work, it is not simply an imitative description. According to Adorno the 
interpretation, and for him philosophy, is interpretation, it extends the work of art and for the 
moment in which it is made completes the work. Any later interpretation may well be 
influenced by the earlier by accepting or rejecting some or all of the earlier interpretation and 
this subsequent interpretation completes the work for the time being at that time. In Aesthetic 
Theory there is a sense in which theory is a mimesis of art. It is art repeated but in theoretical 
terms. It is not a direct imitation, a mockery in the literal sense, but a transformed repetition, 
transformed literally into a different form. What is written about art, has to be recognisably 
about that artwork that form of art. The mimesis partly resides in the recognition of the work of 
art in the and by the theory, and partly in the inescapable referential nature of the theorising. 
The theory must refer to the art. This is true for artworks regarded as theory demonstrated in art. 
Theory here is not in a text composed of theoretical sentences made up of words but in an 
actuality of theory staged as a work of art. A work of art is inevitably related to previous 
artworks and is in an important sense a theoretical statement in the form of an artwork, a 
statement about art. 
Is there a connection between parataxis and mimesis as Adorno seems to understand 
them? In parataxis two ideas are juxtaposed so as to allow a  new meaning to emerge. The 
elements from which the meaning will emerge are juxtaposed so the mimesis involved will be 
that seen by the reader, and possibly intended by the writer. What the reader will read are 
similarities and or differences that will give rise to a fresh insight, a fresh meaning. It is the 
production of the new by mimesis operating as mimesis of the same by the same, one thought 
from two thoughts, one idea from two ideas, one concept from two concepts. This can also be 
viewed as two unlike concepts giving rise to a third by mimesis of unlike others. In either case it 
is a relational mimesis, two moments, giving rise to a third in a form of non-conceptual 
realisation, a reading  as opposed to a deduction. 
When this is extended from parataxis to constellation, from two ideas to a constellation 
of ideas, a juxtaposition of concepts then again what emerges is not a conceptual deduction but 
more like a mimesis operating within the elements of the constellation. This, when extended to a 
long sectional work, Aesthetic Theory itself, which has precisely been designed to present a set 
of presentations together so that some response, (or responses) can emerge for the reader 
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mimetically, through a form of mimetic comportment. The well-read reader has to be familiar 
with the territory of Aesthetic Theory, otherwise Aesthetic Theory becomes really difficult to 
read as it is not attempting to be a discursive guide to the territory – to be more precise – to the 
two territories of art and theory that are intertwined themselves into a mimetic relationship. The 
mimesis in the case of Aesthetic Theory must be between the reader and the text. This, perhaps, 
goes some way to explain the observation that many artists have found the book to be relevant 
to them in pursuit of their own work
160
 and perhaps why for academic readers and 
commentators it has proved a slow burn within the reception of Adorno‟s work.  Reading 
Aesthetic Theory is in short a mimesis. At a number of points in this chapter the subject areas of 
history and time have been apparent. The next chapter examines time and the various 
temporalites at work within Aesthetic Theory. 
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C H A P T E R  F O U R   
A D O R N O  A N D  T I M E  –  T E M P O R A L I T I E S  I N  
A E S T H E T I C  T H E O R Y  
 
To remark that Aesthetic Theory is fundamentally structured by time is to do no more than 
indicate that time, in various different forms, emerges as important in any analysis of the text. 
Even the basic form of dialectical opposition, the antinomy, that Adorno uses throughout the 
text is in a sense a spatialized temporal form as it oscillates back and forth in an endless 
suspension of an achieved meaning or fixed understanding. In this chapter Aesthetic Theory will 
be examined from the standpoint of the relationship between four fundamental forms of time, 
chronological time, historical time, the time of the artwork and phenomenological time. Finally 
I will examine Adorno‟s conception of the instant. Chronological time, a social form of 
cosmological time, and phenomenological time have a long philosophical history. Historical 
time and the time of the artwork are, from a philosophical point of view, more modern forms of 
constructed temporality. The instant is an Adornian Benjaminian construct. 
In Time and Narrative Ricoeur attempts to discover a way of unifying our thought of 
time by mediating cosmological time, the „time of the world‟, with phenomenological time, 
„lived time‟ through the concept of narrative. The aporia between the cosmological time of 
Aristotle and the phenomenological time of St Augustine is bridged for Ricoeur by connectors  
such as the sundial, the clock, and the calendar
1
. The dated past as a narrative, as a history, 
because of its origins in both cosmological time and lived time seems to offer Ricoeur the 
mediating concept he is searching for. Inconclusive as it is, Ricoeur‟s extradordinarily long and 
detailed examination of this problem is nevertheless a significant achievement. He develops a 
bridge between the two positions in terms of narrative based on such social connectors as the 
calendar. However, the two positions of cosmological and phenomenological time remain 
counterposed as basic assumptions in contradiction. Narrative can never do more than mediate 
between them. Rather like a Kantian antinomy the whole discussion needs entirely 
reconfiguring in different terms. As Ricoeur shows, Heidegger attempted to do this with his 
temporal self-interpreting concept of Dasein, but largely failed because the interpretation is 
obsessed with the mystical nature of Being. A better approach would probably be through a 
grounding in the sociality of human life similar to Lefebevre‟s concept of everyday life.2 It is 
not the central issue here. 
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 Chronological time has its origins in the everyday earth events such as the movement of 
the sun and the varying lengths of day and night, the transitions from winter to summer and the 
repetition of the seasons. Astronomy and science advanced this socially-invented theoretical 
construct of cosmological time into a uniform structure. Up until the mid-twentieth century 
chronological time was periodically corrected by astronomical observations. Following the 
invention of the atomic clock and its successors, cosmological time based on observations has 
been found to be incorrect against this new form of „absolute‟ physical time. However, 
ironically, the old cosmological time, in terms of the rotation and orbit of the earth is now again 
used to regulate the new absolute time of physicists. Atomic clock time which many computer 
systems now run on has to be periodically re-adjusted to keep chronological time consistent 
with the everyday experience of night and day. Chronological time is the base level form of 
time in contrast with which historical, phenomenological and the time of the artwork make 
sense. Walter Benjamin called it „empty homogeneous time‟ in his Theses on the Philosophy of 
History.  Adorno sometimes called it empirical time. 
Historical time is the expanded perspective of human history. It too is ultimately based 
on chronological time in terms of calendars and dates and datable events. Its phenomenological 
basis may well be in the everyday involving longer horizons both forwards and backwards in 
time, year, decade, lifetime, century. This enlarged horizon includes the biological clock 
sequences involved in the ideal of a long life. Sequences that start with birth and end in death. 
Sequences that can be truncated to a shorter life than the ideal for multiple causes of death. 
There is for everybody a life story, a narrative, a history. There is a similar story for families, 
for social groups, for societies, and for nations. These histories can be entirely invented.
3
 The 
construction of any history is always carried out from the standpoint of a present moment and 
the social interests inherent in that present can determine the historical interpretation.  
Phenomenological time on the other hand is the experiental time of subjectivity. Being-
with-others is a part of everyday life which is structured by the organising and fulfilling of the 
elements of living against the background of the natural sequences of day and night and the 
perception of measured time. Memory and expectation are built into this ordering of events of 
everyday life. The phenomenological experience of time is not uniform. There are variations in 
experience, waiting, boredom, concentration, activity, inter-personal relationships - all have 
different experiential temporal registers. The recognition of the different experiences of 
phenomenological time as being of apparently different lengths depends on a contrast with 
chronological time.  
Artworks exist in the three forms of time so far described. Art events, be they music, 
film, drama and visual art media, exist in chronological time. Artworks also exist in history. 
They have a „life‟ in the culture for which they were created. Every artwork has a history, it 
exists in historical time within the history of the art-form it exemplifies. This art-form history is 
itself fixable and identifiable in relation to general social, economic and political history. In 
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chapter two I explored the curious nature of Adorno‟s idea that artworks are forms of being, 
kinds of „selves‟ with an ontological status in time. The history of any work of art consists of a 
series of re-interpretations within the critical and interpretative community that keep the artwork 
„alive‟ and relevant to a present that is chronologically and in terms of datable history, 
historically later than the one in which it was created. Artworks also exist in the phenomenal 
time of the person experiencing them. There is an important distinction to be made here, which 
is implicit in Adorno‟s thought but perhaps not always clearly signalled. The distinction is 
between the experiential time of the person experiencing the artwork and the time of the artwork 
in terms of the ways in which that artwork manipulates the experience of time – „aesthetic time‟ 
– because of the method of its construction. The time of the artwork is the internal time-
structure of artworks but of course this can only be experienced in phenomenal time. Many 
artworks be they music, film, theatre and or visual art media involve time, internal time, the 
time of the artwork. This is because they have been structured by their makers so as to alter the 
perception of phenomenological time, and therefore also of chronological time. This is what 
Adorno means by the time of the artwork.  
These four temporal forms of time, chronological, historical, the time of the artwork 
and phenomenological time are all mediated by Adorno‟s philosophical position that truth has a 
temporal basis. There are no eternal truths for Adorno, the nearest thing to an eternal truth 
would be negative, that there are no eternal truths, this is itself an historical position. I will 
return to the question of truth in the next section. History is fundamental to Adorno‟s 
philosophy. That Adorno is deeply concerned about a crisis in our perception of time is clear 
from the following comments from History and Freedom.  
 
Thus the widespread preoccupation with the metaphysics of time arises from the 
circumstance that our consciousness of time itself has gone into crisis. Time has ceased 
to be something we can take for granted, it is no longer substantial, …Enrico Castelli, 
the Italian philosopher, has written a fascinating book about the way in which the 
metaphysics of time is built on the loss of time.
4
  
 
How such change can be perceived is difficult to conceive. What Adorno has in mind 
are philosophical investigations of time such as those of Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger, as 
well as artwork investigations of time by Proust and Joyce and the scientific conceptual 
revolution concerning time brought about by Einstein‟s general theory of relativity.  In this 
theory time and space are irrevocably linked by the speed of light, they can no longer be thought 
of as separate abstractions but as a unified abstraction called space-time.
5
 „ Newton‟s laws of 
motion put an end to the idea of an absolute position in space. The theory of relativity gets rid of 
absolute time.‟6 In one sense this conceptual revolution spatialised time. It is the spatialisation 
of time in music, as will be seen in the second section of this chapter, that Adorno identified as 
crucial to understanding what had happened in the development of avant garde music up to the 
1960s. 
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This chapter will consist of three sections. The first two consist of a description and 
analysis of two forms of time, apart from chronological time which I consider has been 
sufficiently described for these purposes above. I will start with historical time, then move on to 
a genealogical history concerning the time of the artwork and its relationship to 
phenomenological time. In the final third section I shall discuss Adorno‟s conception of the 
instant as a form of understanding.   
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Section one: Historical time 
In Aesthetic Theory Adorno addresses the history of aesthetics from the standpoint of a Marxist 
history of autonomous art. Adorno‟s Marxism is a type of Western Marxism. It creates a 
distinction between the ordinary empirical history of events and the history of modes of 
production, or real history. The idea of ordinary history is misleading for Adorno because it is 
temporally indifferent. Adorno often distinguishes between what he calls a „crude history of 
ideas‟ and real history (realen Geschichte7) which is partly embedded in the artwork. „The 
interdependence of quality [Rang] and history should not be conceived according to the 
stubborn cliché of a crude history of ideas that insists that history is the court that determines 
quality. This wisdom is a historicophilosophical rationalization of its own inadequacy, as if no 
judgement were possible in the here and now.‟8 In other words the historical valuation of an 
artwork of quality has to be understood from the genealogical standpoint of the present. Only in 
the present can such a judgement be made. It is the judgement of the present on the past that is 
vitally important for Adorno as well as the judgement of the present on the present and what this 
might imply for the future. Art, for Adorno, is always thought of as being historically located: 
„The concept of art is located in a historically changing constellation of elements; it refuses 
definition.‟9 If there is a unifying theme to be found in Adorno‟s treatment of time in Aesthetic 
Theory it lies in his conception of history which is derived from Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, 
and partly filtered through Lukács and Benjamin. As the concepts of history and historical time 
play such an important role in Aesthetic Theory it is important to be clear about the complex 
conceptual history that lies behind them. In the first instance it is salutary to remember that 
history itself has a history. 
 
Conceptual background to Adorno’s idea of history 
In his Futures Past Koselleck analyses the changing concept of history in the late Eighteenth 
century. Koselleck‟s analysis in terms of experience and expectation reveals a new 
temporalisation of history. According to Koselleck „historical time is …an entity which alters 
along with history and from whose changing structure it is possible to deduce the shifting 
classification of experience and expectation.‟10 Before the Eighteenth century, Koselleck argues, 
expectations were largely based on experience. The shift implied in the concept of neu Zeit 
meant that, following the ruptural event of the French Revolution and the invention of the 
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modern conception of progress, expectation could from then on be formed on organisation in 
the present for the future. The modern in all areas, art, technology, politics and finance is 
orientated to future expectations. There is a further aspect to Koselleck‟s conception of history 
contained in his article „Geschichte‟ namely the concept of history as a „collective singular‟. As 
Ricoeur explains, „This is the master category, the condition under which the time of history can 
be thought. There is a time of history insofar as there is one single history.‟11 The collective 
singular history covers both „a series of events and the ensemble of discourses pronounced 
regarding this collective singular.‟12  Ricoeur goes on to explain that „In producing itself, history 
articulates its own discourse.‟13 
In his late book Memory, History, Forgetting (2004) Ricoeur theorises a „threefold 
frame‟ for history consisting of „documentary proof, the causal and teleological explanation, 
and the literary emplotment.‟14 This „threefold frame‟ „remains the secret of historical 
knowledge‟. All three elements are necessary for a text to be considered conceptually as history. 
They are in Ricoeur‟s view the fundamentals of an epistemology of history. Historical 
narratives deal with complex events such as the English civil war or the French revolution, or 
with wider conceptualities such as Braudel‟s Mediterranean. Historical narratives also cover 
even broader areas in the form of „world-scale narratives‟15 Here Ricoeur mentions Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Croce in a list that includes noted historians such as Ranke and Michelet. 
Ricoeur does not cite Adorno and Horkheimer‟s Dialectic of Enlightenment but it is a good, if 
extreme, example of a „world-scale narrative‟ even if it is a set of unfinished, or unfinishable, 
fragments.  For a narrative to be history, in Ricoeur‟s view, the three aspects of the „three fold 
frame‟ need to be in place and by implication in balance. One imbalance that can occur is found 
in the rhetorical power of some historical narratives, which can be driven by a framework of 
belief, an ethical position that itself creates an interpretation of history in the form of a narrative 
structure.  
The Dialectic of Enlightenment is driven by such a polemical rhetoric. It is a history of 
reason. It also claims to be a philosophy of history. It is strong on narrative rhetoric, strong on 
causal and teleological explanation, but one of the main documents, The Odyssey is itself 
invention, albeit storytelling of a high order. So the Dialectic of Enlightenment it is not really 
history, yet it is trying to account for a real historical situation, in the then, recent past in terms 
of Nazi fascism and the Holocaust and for, the then, contemporary situation of Western 
capitalist society. It is an attempt to understand „our time‟ by trying to understand the past in the 
present. It is „a piece of documentation‟ but the authors „hope it is also more.‟16 „Our concept of 
history does not believe itself elevated above history, but it does not merely chase after 
information in the positivist manner. As a critique of philosophy it does not seek to abandon 
philosophy itself.‟17 These fragmented texts are a kind of symbolic symptom of the difficulty of 
the problem addressed namely „the necessity for enlightenment to reflect on itself if humanity is 
not to be totally betrayed.‟18 The whole concept behind the book revolves around the distinction 
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between philosophy and history that is captured in the idea of a philosophy of history. For there 
to be a philosophy of history there must be a fundamental conceptual distinction between 
philosophy and history.  
The claim to be a philosophy of history makes the Dialectic of Enlightenment primarily 
a philosophical text. The precedent is Hegel with his Philosophy of History where Hegel 
identifies three forms of history. „Original‟ which is in effect eye-witness testimony from the 
past. „Reflective‟ which is is also divided into three as „universal,‟ „pragmatical‟ and „critical‟ 
which is what is normally thought of as history by historians of Hegel‟s time. The third form of 
history is „Philosophical‟ which is „the history of the world‟ which „presents us with a rational 
process‟ This is the history of “Reason‟.19 Marcuse summarises Hegel‟s position very 
succinctly:  
 
The forms of the mind manifest themselves in time, and the history of the world is an 
exposition of mind in time. The dialectic thus gets to view reality temporally, and the 
„negativity‟ that, in the Logic, determined the process of thought appears in the 
Philosophy of History as the destructive power of time. 
    The Logic had demonstrated the structure of reason; the Philosophy of History 
expounds the historical content of reason.
20
 
 
As Marcuse points out, Hegel was continuing an eighteenth century philosophical tradition „that 
history was progress.‟21  However, what is strange about Hegel‟s history is that it is ultimately 
not temporal at all.  
 
While we are thus concerned exclusively with the Idea of Spirit, and in the History of 
the World regard everything as only its manifestation, we have in traversing the past–
however extensive its periods–only to do with what is present; for philosophy, as 
occupying itself with the True, has to do with the eternally present. Nothing in the past 
is lost for it, for the Idea is ever present; Spirit is immortal; with it there is no past, no 
future, but an essential now. This necessarily implies that the present form of Spirit 
comprehends within it all earlier steps.
22
  
 
In a sense the end of history, as the highest position of the absolute, had been reached in the 
present of Hegel by Hegel. As Adorno and Horkheimer writing about Hegel put in it the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment: „by finally postulating the known result of the whole process of 
negation, totality in the system and in history, as the absolute, he violated the prohibition and 
himself succumbed to mythology.‟23 As Ricoeur understands history, from an epistemological 
point of view, then Hegel is not engaged in history as practised by historians. „How is it, the 
philosopher asks, that Spirit has a history? By the epochal character of the question, 
philosophical history has already seceded from the history of the historians. Factuality has lost 
all philosophical interest; it is relegated to mere narrative.‟24 Following on from Hegel, Marx re-
conceptualized the concept of a „world-scale narrative‟ and based it on an analysis of the real 
concrete conditions of economic life. In The German Ideology Marx and Engels make clear how 
an analysis of the reality of social and economic conditions will rewrite history as „real 
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history.‟25 „Already here we see how this civil society is the true source and theatre of all 
history, and how absurd is the conception of history held hitherto, which neglects the real 
relationships and confines itself to high-sounding dramas of princes and states.‟26  This 
rewriting of history is what Adorno understands as the philosophy of history. Nietzsche seems 
to have been a very influential source for the concept of history that Adorno employed, 
especially with regards to both the future and the idea of a natural history. It is worth recalling 
that the subtitle to Beyond Good and Evil is „Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future‟, and that it 
contains a chapter entitled „On the Natural History of Morals.‟  In his „Untimely Meditation‟ on 
The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Nietzsche also distinguishes between three 
„species‟ of history, „a monumental, an antiquarian and a critical species.‟27  Nietzsche in 
discussing the third species, the „critical history‟ introduces Hegel‟s idea of a „second nature‟ 
(derived from Aristotle).
28
 „The best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature 
with our knowledge, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant 
in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away.‟29  
Throughout the essay Nietzsche counter-poses two ideas, „life‟ and „history‟ which at 
one point he describes on the analogy of „a constellation‟ between which has appeared a new 
star that alters the constellation, this new star is „the demand that history should be a science.‟30 
This text of Nietzsche‟s may well be the origin of  Benjamin‟s concept of constellation. 
Compared to the ancient Greeks with their „unhistorical sense‟ modern men are for Nietzsche 
„walking encycopledias‟31 Even philosophy, according to Nietzsche, has been caught in the 
historical trap of only examining its past and being incapable of „action‟ in the present, „a self-
restrained knowing which leads to no action.‟32 Nietzsche objects to any type of history that 
takes the form of Hegelian teleology. He emphasises how the past should be interpreted in terms 
of the present as a form of genealogy. „If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so 
only out of the fullest exertion of the vigour of the present.‟33 Furthermore the only point in 
studying history is for the sake of action in the present that will create a better present in the 
future. Nietzsche continues, „only he who constructs the future has a right to judge the past.‟34  
„I demand that man should above all learn to live and should employ history only in the service 
of the life he has learned to live.‟35 It is clear from the following quotation that Nietzsche 
expected „we philosophers‟ to be critical of the age in which they lived. By „we‟ he meant not 
only the cohort of professional philosophers he held in such undisguised contempt but the wider 
cultured general readers of his works. „…the greatness of their task, [philosophers] in being the 
bad conscience of their age. By laying the knife vivisectionally to the bosom of the very virtues 
of the age they betrayed what was their own secret: to know a new greatness of man, a new 
untrodden path to his enlargement.‟36  
For Ricoeur, Nietzsche‟s critical history „constitutes only one moment, that of 
judgement‟37 the judgement of the present on the past. Whilst this is correct there is surely 
another aspect to „critical history‟ namely the judgement of the present on the present. This 
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genealogy can be understood in two diametrically opposed ways.  It can be understood as a 
dissatisfaction with the present that looks for a return to an earlier age or stage of civilisation 
that seeks a restitution, a return of the past in the future. Alternatively the dissatisfaction with 
the present looks for change in the present that overturns those aspects in the past that led to the 
present and are still active in it, such change will bring about happiness in the future. The first is 
a reactionary utopia as exemplified by Nietzsche and Heidegger, the second is a progressive 
utopia as exemplified by Marx and Adorno. I will examine Adorno‟s conception of the linked 
ideas of freedom, happiness and utopia in the next chapter. 
Hegel‟s theory of a philosophy of history incorporates, as Marcuse points out, an 
important distinction between progress as human historical change and nature. „Since Aristotle, 
historical change has been contrasted with changes in nature. Hegel held the same distinction. 
He says historical change is “an advance to something better, more perfect,” whereas mutation 
in nature “exhibits only a perpetually self-repeating cycle.” It is only in historical change that 
something new arises.‟38  Adorno and Horkheimer‟s Dialectic of Enlightenment continues 
Hegel‟s investigation of the development of reason but in a negative sense, as a Marxist critique 
of the development of Western rationality. The same distinction between nature and history can 
be found in the introductory section „The Concept of Enlightenment‟. The scientific rationality 
of the enlightenment is a form of domination over nature. „In their transformation the essence of 
things is revealed as always the same, a substrate of domination. This identity constitutes the 
unity of nature.‟39 Myth had a different relationship to nature in that it sought to communicate 
with it by magic and ritual but this in essence was also its opposite, a rational control over 
nature. The dialectic of enlightenment being between the poles of myth and reason. „Just as 
myths already entail enlightenment, with every step enlightenment entangles itself more deeply 
in mythology.‟40 Only by abolishing „the false absolute, the principle of blind power‟41 will the 
enlightenment „fulfil itself.‟ 
 In his 1932 article „The Idea of a Natural History‟ Adorno counter-poses nature, 
understood as myth, with history understood as „the occurrence of the qualitatively new.‟42 This 
dialectical concept of nature-history is based on „aesthetic material,‟43 derived from the work of 
Lukács and Benjamin. In History and Freedom Adorno revisits this discussion: 
 
Through the medium of aesthetics questions concerning the philosophy of history and 
even metaphysics become legible. …for a whole series of thinkers the experience of art 
has become a sort of key to other branches of philosophy. …What is at issue, rather, is a 
particular relation to the experience of structures that purport to be meaningful and that 
provide a model both of meaning that can be explored and of the crisis of meaning.
44
 
 
It is not aesthetic material as such that is important for Adorno but any „structure‟ that purports 
to be „meaningful‟ which includes artworks as well as philosophical theories. Once again 
Adorno presents the artwork from a structural point of view as being similar to a philosophical 
theory which for him is a constellation of concepts intended for interpretation. Hegel‟s idea of 
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second nature was used by Lukács, according to Adorno, to describe „a world of convention as 
it is historically produced,‟45 a world of convention that has, in ideological terms, become a 
second nature, hence a myth. Adorno goes on to state that there is only one correct formulation 
for the problem of natural history and that is „as interpretations of concrete history.‟46  There is a 
„constellation‟ of ideas involved that make up an „alternative logical structure,‟ those ideas are 
„transience, signification, the idea of nature and the idea of history.‟ These ideas „gather round a 
concrete historical facticity,‟47 history in short is an interpretation of this constellation, this 
interpretation is itself „new‟. An historical interpretation can be the production of the new in the 
same way as the making of an artwork is the production of the new. So for Adorno, history, like 
philosophy and art is modelled on structured forms. However, there are several temporal forms 
in Aesthetic Theory that are best thought of as historical forms of temporalisation. These 
temporal forms are, following Nietzsche, based on both the present as genealogy and on the 
expectation of change in the future  
Any form of history has to account for change and for its opposite, no change. It is 
difficult to conceive of a history of a period of time in which there was no change. In 
Aristotelian terms no change would imply no time had passed as the passing of time depends 
upon the observation of change. Allied to the concept of change are the related ideas of progress 
and the new. The constant production of the new is a form of repetition and thus a form of no 
change. The new is usually associated with progress in the sense that this new is better than the 
last new and hence tied in with fashion. There is a form of non-changing temporality, the „ever-
same‟ that Adorno uses throughout Aesthetic Theory. This concept is Marxist in origin. For 
Adorno ever-same time is not neutral like chronological time. Ever-same time is negatively 
charged. It is the time of the commodity. The ideas behind the concept of the ever-same can be 
found in Benjamin‟s set of short statements entitled „Central Park.‟ There are two different ideas 
involved in „Central Park‟. One derives from Nietzsche‟s idea of the eternal return and the other 
from Baudelaire‟s idea of the new. Benjamin puts them into a relationship. „Baudelaire‟s poetry 
reveals the new in the ever-selfsame, and the ever-selfsame in the new.‟48  In this paradoxical 
de-temporalization the eternal return aspect belongs to fashion – „Fashion is the eternal 
recurrence of the new.‟49   
There is a further aspect of Adorno‟s Marxist approach to history which was filtered 
through his absorption of another influence from Walter Benjamin. In the 17
th
 thesis of 
Benjamin‟s Theses on the Philosophy of History there is a statement that clearly influenced 
Adorno. Benjamin begins by contrasting „Historicism‟ with a „Materialist historiography‟ in 
order to make the point that ordinary history simply accumulates „a mass of data to fill the 
homogenous, empty time.‟ A Marxist history by contrast „is based on a constructive principle‟. 
By this Benjamin means a construction that brings thought to a halt. „Thinking involves not 
only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a 
configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes 
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into a monad. A historical materialist approaches a historical subject only where he encounters 
it as a monad.‟50 Here the constellation of historical understanding is turned into a monad as an 
historical repository created by shock and crystallization. It is in this monadic structure, 
Benjamin claims, that a historical materialist „recognizes the sign of a Messianic cessation of 
happening, or, to put it differently, a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past. He 
takes cognizance of it in order to blast a specific era out of the homogenous course of history – 
blasting a specific life out of the era or a specific work out of the lifework.‟51 Adorno interprets 
this passage in History and Freedom in the following way. „The truth is that, while the 
traditional view inserts facts into the flow of time, they really possess a nucleus of time in 
themselves, they crystallize time in themselves. What we can legitimately call ideas is this 
nucleus of time within the individual crystallized phenomena, something that can only be 
decoded by interpretation.‟52 One of the implications of this Benjaminian view of time is that 
history is both continuous and discontinuous, that within the chronological continuity of history 
are atemporal discontinuities, facts or artworks are alike in this. For Adorno both facts and 
artworks sediment historical time within themselves, in this they are equally monadalogical. 
Both require decoding by interpretation in the case of historical facts by the philosophy of 
history. In the case of the artwork by aesthetic theory. 
The influence of Benjamin‟s 17th Thesis can be seen very clearly in this quotation that 
follows from Aesthetic Theory where Benjamin‟s account of a „materialist‟ history is transposed 
by Adorno to art. 
 
Appearance, however, and its explosion in the artwork are essentially historical ...as 
something that exists, the artwork has its own development. What appears in the 
artwork is its own inner time; the explosion of appearance blasts open the continuity of 
this inner temporality. The artwork is mediated to real history (realen Gestichte) by its 
modalogical nucleus. History is the content of artworks. To analyze artworks means no 
less than to become conscious of the history immanently sedimented in them.
53
  
 
Here materialist history has been replaced by appearance but virtually all the other elements are 
present.  
 
Adorno on history 
History according to Adorno, in his Lectures of 1964-5 History and Freedom, never gives the 
truth of any situation in the past because it never gives a true interpretation of the situation, one 
that unmasks the real. History is effectively „meaningless‟. Adorno has „a conception of the 
philosophy of history that permits us to comprehend history, that is to say, to go beyond its 
bounds as mere existence [Dasein] and to understand it as something meaningless. And this 
meaninglessness is itself nothing but the dreadful antagonistic state of affairs I have been 
attempting to describe to you.‟54 The philosophy of history, „rewrites‟ history by interpretation. 
Adorno gives as an example the French Revolution, which he recounts by running through the 
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standard „causes‟ as well as larger patterns such as the change from feudalism to bourgeois 
individualism.  
 
What this tells us about the theory of history, then, is that, taken in isolation none of 
these factors would suffice to give even an approximate explanation of the course of 
history. In short you need to grasp the complexity of the pattern, by which I mean the 
overall process that asserts itself, the dependence on that global process on the specific 
situation, and then again the mediation of the specific situation by the overall process. 
Furthermore, in order to understand this conceptual pattern, you need to press forward 
to the concrete, historical analysis I have hinted at and that goes beyond the categories I 
have been discussing.
55
 
 
Grasping „the complexity of the pattern‟ is exactly like understanding and interpreting the 
relationships set up in a philosophical constellation of concepts. What this example also makes 
clear, and Adorno confirms this in the next lecture, is that his account of the French Revolution 
is essentially a historian‟s account, albeit a Marxist historian‟s account. The way in which this 
account ceases to be merely history and becomes philosophy of history would then lie in the 
dialectical methodology of the interpretation. As Adorno states, „the philosophy of history 
merges with the writing of history.‟56 This he claims is derived from Hegel and Marx. „Thus it is 
important to realise that the philosophy of history does not fall outside the scope of historical 
research, but that the constellation of historical events, both as a whole and in detail, should 
regard itself as the philosophy of history proper.‟57 So history can become philosophy just as 
philosophy can become history, divisions between disciples are not real, conceptual 
interpretation does not recognise such artificial boundaries. In a subsequent lecture Adorno 
identifies „the central question of any theory of the philosophy of history‟58 namely Marx‟s 
theory of value in social exchange. 
 A further aspect of the relationship between nature and history concerns Adorno‟s 
conception of philosophy itself. „…the interweaving of nature and history must in general be the 
model for every interpretative procedure in philosophy.  …it provides the canon that enables 
philosophy to adopt an interpretative stance without lapsing into pure randomness.‟59 It provides 
a link between conceptual rigour and lived experience. He goes on to argue that interpretation is 
the only form philosophy can take today, further that philosophy today is a form of criticism „of 
phenomena that have been brought to a standstill.‟60 Such phenomena appear as second nature, 
interpretation makes clear such phenomena are historically formed: „…interpretation means 
reading nature from history and history from nature. Interpretation teases out of the phenomena, 
out of second nature, out of what has been mediated by history and society, the fact that they 
have evolved …nature is present in history as transience, …history is present in nature as 
something that has evolved and is transient.‟61 In the next section the „second nature‟ of the time 
of the artwork will be explored, but before then I will examine the set of ideas involved in 
Marx‟s concept of the commodity and the way in which Adorno appears to have interpreted 
them. 
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Commodity, absolute, abstraction 
For Adorno the relationship between the new and the ever-same is a dialectical relationship. 
„The dialectic of commodity production: the product‟s novelty (as a stimulant to demand) takes 
on a significance hitherto unknown; in mass production the ever-selfsame manifests itself 
overtly for the first time.‟62  One important aspect of Adorno‟s „ever-same‟ time concerns 
repetition. The repetition involved in the relationship of exchange. This relationship, Adorno 
claims, became distorted once the exchange became that of commodities, within capitalism. A 
clear indication of Adorno‟s thinking on this point can be found in his article, „Progress.‟ 
 
In bourgeois society, which created the concept of total progress, the convergence of 
this concept with the negation of progress originates in this society‟s principle: 
exchange. Exchange is the rational form of mythical ever-sameness. In the like-for-like 
of every act of exchange, the one act revokes the other; the balance of accounts is null. 
If the exchange was just, then nothing really should have happened, and everything 
stays the same. …the societally more powerful contracting party receives more than the 
other. By means of this injustice something new occurs in the exchange: the process, 
which proclaims its own stasis, becomes dynamic.
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The „unequal‟ exchange is an exchange of commodities. Time is built in to Marx‟s idea of the 
commodity. The labour time of the production of a wage-slave working on an hourly rate is 
transformed into the commodity being made. As Marx put it, „The two marks, with which he 
bought twelve hours‟ use of labour power, are the price of twelve hours‟ labour. Labour power, 
therefore, is a commodity, neither more nor less than sugar. The former is measured by the 
clock, the latter by the scales‟64 The commodity produced as a result of this labour power 
possesses a certain social time value, this time value is then re-valued when the commodity is 
sold on the market. This re-valuing of the commodity time of the maker is one of the sources of 
the perceived injustice that is the basis for Marx‟s attack on monopoly capitalism. In this sense 
the commodity is a temporal form that is always the same by virtue of this re-valuing of the 
original time of production. Indeed, Marx claims that economics is at basis about time. 
Labour power has a time aspect as does obviously the length of the working day or indeed the 
length of a working life. Socially free time as envisaged by Marx in his time might have been a 
reality for some people then but now, in the twenty-first century, it must be considered to be 
based on „utterly untenable nineteenth-century assumptions.‟65  
Marx argued that just as Robinson Crusoe does not produce commodities neither does a 
peasant family in a traditional setting. The production of commodities is social and is dependent 
on the commodity producer being in a social structure where the production and exchange of 
commodities is paid for by capital which in turn increases as the exchange value of the 
commodity is realised and its surplus value released in the form of an increase in capital. This 
entire cycle can only be understood in terms of time as it only works in time. It is conceptually 
based on time which is why Marx makes the claim that economics is fundamentally about social 
time. You could also argue that Robinson Crusoe can no more make art than he can a 
commodity. 
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Marx famously describes a commodity as „ a very queer thing, abounding in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.‟66 A commodity whether it takes the form of so 
many yards of linen or a coat is essentially an abstract concept. One „theological‟ nicety is that 
commodities as „productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with 
life,‟ that enter „into relation both with one another and the human race.‟ This is the „fetishism‟ 
of commodities which „has its origin …in the peculiar social character of the labour that 
produces them.‟ This comment makes it clear that Adorno‟s concept of the work of art as a form 
of being conceptually similar to Marx‟s concept of the commodity. The abstract commodity as a 
being can be so much flax, so many yards of linen or a coat. The concept of the abstract does 
not inhere simply in the commodity form for Marx. In one of Marx‟s early writings, Critique of 
Hegel’s Doctrine of the State he discusses the concept of primogeniture as an abstraction „of 
independent private property‟.67 Primogeniture in effect becomes a form of fetish that entirely 
obscures „the barbaric stupidity of independent private property.‟
 68
  Private property is 
autonomous within the state according to Marx. It is precisely the autonomy of abstract private 
property that gives the illusion of independence to the state, this is its real „species-being‟.69 If 
the autonomy of the state derives from abstract private property then the illusion must surely 
also extend to the autonomy of art. This is a further antinomy of art, that its autonomy in its 
„species-being‟ is an illusion. This is another of Adorno‟s antinomies, the work of art is 
autonomous but its autonomy is at the same time an illusion.  
Just as a commodity can take on any form, so can the abstract concept of the work of 
art. It can be a poem, a symphony, a painting or an installation. These artwork forms are 
obviously not progressions in a process as in flax-linen-coat but they are exemplars of an 
abstract form, the work of art. So, Adorno‟s abstract concept of the work of art looks as if it is 
modelled on the abstract concept of the commodity. Hence it is no surprise to find that in a 
paragraph devoted to the discussion of the new in Aesthetic Theory, in the section known as 
„Situation‟, Adorno stresses the abstractness of the new. „The new is necessarily abstract.‟70 
Later on he states, „…The abstractness of the new is bound up with the commodity character of 
art.‟ 71 As this paragraph progresses it moves from a discussion of Poe to Baudelaire. It is 
precisely in Baudelaire‟s work that the new in poetry is seen by Adorno to be aligned with the 
new in consumer goods. Indeed to be not just aligned but identical.  
 
The power of his work is that it syncopates the overwhelming objectivity of the 
commodity character–which wipes out any human trace–with the objectivity of the 
work itself, anterior to the living subject: The absolute artwork converges with the 
absolute commodity. The modern pays tribute to this in the vestige of the abstract in its 
concept. If in monopoly capitalism it is primarily exchange value, not use value, that is 
consumed, in the modern artwork it is abstractness, that irritating indeterminateness of 
what is and to what purpose it is, that becomes a cipher of what the work is.
72
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The historical truth of artworks does not reside in the work itself but in the critique and 
interpretations that develop over time and surround it. „The historical development of works 
through critique and the philosophical development of their truth content have a reciprocal 
relationship.‟73 It is the truth of artworks that is historical, whether they are art or non-art is a 
temporal historical decision. 
 
The antinomy of aesthetic reification is also one between the ever fractured 
metaphysical claim of works to being exempted from time, and the transience of 
everything that establishes itself in time as enduring. Artworks become relative because 
they must assert themselves as absolute. …The perennial revolt of art against art has its 
fundamentum in re. If it is essential to artworks that they be things, it is no less essential 
that they negate their own status as things, and thus art turns against art. The totally 
objectivated artwork would congeal into a mere thing, whereas if it altogether evaded 
objectification it would regress to an impotently powerless subjective impulse and 
flounder in the empirical world.
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It is now clear that this discussion of commodity, absolute and abstract will allow a re-
formulation of what it is that Adorno understands by his concept of an artwork. The 
autonomous work of art is, like the commodity form, an illusion, a semblance, both subject and 
object, both being and thing, both a commodity and a work of free spirit, both within time as 
„transient‟ and an „absolute,‟ this is the relativity of artworks. „Artworks become relative  
because they must assert themselves as absolute.‟75 It is this absolute aspect of works of art that 
make them either art or not art. This is the temporal dialectic at the centre of Adorno‟s 
conception of the work of art, that it is both transient and absolute. This antinomy is what makes 
the work of art an absolute commodity precisely because Adorno‟s concept of the work of art is 
modelled on the commodity form. The work of art is transient because the critique of it is 
always in a process of becoming and at any one historical moment this critique can in that 
historical moment reveal the truth, the absolute, about that work of art, a revelation of the truth 
in the metaphysical medium of philosophy. A truth that is always historically mediated. 
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Section two: The time of the artwork 
The time of the artwork involves both the temporal structure of the artwork and the 
phenomological time experience of that work. There is a simple distinction within common 
sense and ordinary knowledge between chronological time and phenomenological time. 
Chronological time is invariable but our phenomenal experience of it varies. Sometimes we are 
bored and time passes slowly, sometimes we are engaged in some activity and time seems to 
pass quickly, or we are not even aware it has been passing. During the chronological time spent 
listening to a piece of music the listener can experience the aesthetic time of the work as 
somehow removed, somewhat separated from the background chronological time. It can be 
longer or shorter than chronological or just vaguely out of chronological time altogether. This is 
not just true of music but of any activity where the person involved is fully engaged and 
concentrating on what they are doing or experiencing. Conversely chronological time can seem 
to stand still or slow down when one is bored. In any art form where time is involved such as 
music, drama, dance, poetry and the novel, the constituent parts or sections have to be 
experienced in a particular order over time for the whole to appear and be appreciated.  
Adorno uses the term „empirical time‟ (empirische Zeit76) in two discussions in 
Aesthetic Theory in contrast to the phenomenological time of the experience of an artwork. 
„Empirical time‟ is best understood as chronological time. Because the word empirical is 
sometimes used by Adorno in a pejorative sense to refer to the administered world of late 
capitalism care has to be taken to be sure whether he is using it in the general sense of 
chronological time or the pejorative sense. An example of this pejorative usage of empirical is: 
„All artworks, even the affirmative, are a priori polemical. The idea of a conservative artwork is 
inherently absurd. By emphatically separating themselves from the empirical world 
(empirischen welt), their other, they bear witness that that world should be other than it is; they 
are the unconscious schemata of that world‟s transformation.‟77 There is a clear description in 
Aesthetic Theory of the difference between empirical time and musical time. 
 
…there is no mistaking time as such in music, yet it is so remote from empirical time 
that, when listening is concentrated, temporal events external to the musical continuum 
remain external to it and indeed scarcely touch it; if a musician interrupts a passage to 
repeat  it or pick it up at an earlier point, musical time remains indifferent, unaffected; 
in a certain fashion it stands still and only proceeds when the course of the music is 
continued. Empirical time disturbs musical time. If at all, only by dint of its 
heterongeneity, not because they flow together.
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This is the sense in which each individual piece of music has its own temporal structure and this 
structural time flow is clearly dependent on the music being played. In a sense the time flow of 
a musical work is a self-contained time span, it takes place within chronological time, is 
measured by chronological time but is never exactly the same from one performance to the next. 
For example, a Beethoven symphony, such as his Seventh, when conducted by Toscanini was 
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over four minutes shorter than the same work conducted by Klemperer. As a self-contained 
temporal span, which can vary in chronological terms depending on the interpretive 
performance, the musical work of art is also variable in phenomenological terms from the point 
of view of the listener. 
In this section I intend to approach the time of the artwork as a key aspect of Adorno‟s 
understanding of the history of music. Nikolaus Bacht noticed that „Adorno‟s temporal concepts 
change in the application to different historical epochs.‟79 This is true, but what it means is that 
Adorno‟s discussions and views on time in music are largely historical. By this I mean he traced 
a series of fundamental changes in musical time from the era of Bach through Beethoven 
Wagner, Schoenberg, Stravinsky to the era of the experimental music of the 1960s. These 
fundamental changes in music all involve alterations in musical time as an important aspect of 
the developments that took place in composition. It is important to be clear from the outset that 
Adorno‟s various accounts of music are historically situated. All these changes in temporal 
concepts are understood from the standpoint of the present moment in which he wrote about 
them.  He started writing about music in the early 1920s, the time of Schoenberg, Webern, Berg 
and Stravinsky. At that time he was largely writing about the relationship between atonal and 12 
tone row music. His last group of texts on music from the 1950s and 1960s, by contrast, were 
written at a time at a time when 12 tone row music was being superceded by aleatory music, 
music of pure sound and chance, the anti-art of music. I plan to reconstruct Adorno‟s conception 
of the changes that occurred to the time of the musical artwork as a history of time in music 
which is orientated to understanding the past from the standpoint of the present, bearing in mind 
of course that there were a series of presents for Adorno. This history of musical time is 
therefore genealogical.  
  That the art of the past is best understood in terms of the art of the present  derives 
partly from the work of Walter Benjamin and exemplifies Adorno‟s approach to history which 
as was seen above operates from the standpoint of the present. Two comments from Aesthetic 
Theory exemplify this position: „The principle of method here is that light should be cast on all 
art from the vantage point of the most recent artworks, rather than the reverse‟. 80 At another 
point Adorno gives as examples the claim that Beethoven can be more clearly heard after 
Berlioz, and that in painting the Impressionists seemed far better after Gauguin - „The merits of 
a work, its level of form, its internal construction, tend to become recognisable only as the 
material ages or when the sensorium becomes dulled to the most striking features of the work.‟81 
In his essay on the „Relationship of Philosophy and Music‟ from 1953 Adorno states that in 
contrast to any (Heideggerian) attempt to reconstruct the „ontological origin‟ of music, a 
„philosophical knowledge of music‟ should be conducted „from the standpoint of the present.‟ 
Adorno continues: 
 
Beethoven, for example, is revealed much more readily when one starts from what 
confronts us today …what today becomes visible in him, and similarly in Bach, is not 
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the product of a more or less fluid intellectual history, but is determined right down to 
its details by the state that compositional processes have reached today–processes that 
drastically extend the laws of construction that Beethoven‟s or Bach‟s work contained 
in encapsulated form during the nineteenth century. It is only from the vantage point of 
the most advanced production that light is shed on the entire species.
82
  
 
Adorno‟s belief that it is necessary to understand the artworks of the past in terms of the 
artworks of the present will be demonstrated in what follows. It is the key to understanding his 
views on time in music. 
   
Adorno’s history of time in music: Bach to Mahler 
This account of the history of time in music, as understood by Adorno, starts with Bach and his 
contemporary Telemann. Bach wrote highly constructed music -„In Bach‟s oeuvre it is his 
technique, the complexity and density of the composition, that is truly progressive.‟83 But the 
importance of Bach‟s music for Adorno is not just about construction, it also marks a significant 
change in the concept of musical tonality - „Fugue is the form in which polyphony that has 
become tonal and fully rationalized is organised.‟84  Adorno describes a double-fugue of Bach‟s 
as „astonishing not so much for its chromaticism  …but rather for its wavering, deliberately 
vague harmonization  ...it is music broken down into countless coloured facets.‟85 Adorno calls 
this effect „modern‟.  In Aesthetic Theory Bach is described as „…a virtuoso in the unification of 
the irreconcilable. What he composed is the synthesis of harmonic thoroughbass and polyphonic 
thinking. This synthesis is seamlessly integrated into the logic of chordal progression divested, 
however, of its heterogeneous weight because it is the pure result of voice leading; this endows 
Bach‟s work with its singularly floating quality.‟86  This „floating quality‟ for Adorno marks 
Bach‟s work off as both archaic and modern. 
A Bach fugue is a great feat of organisation in time. Once the first voice begins then 
others must join in and so the whole fugue progresses under its own logical temporal dynamic. 
Adorno also describes a fugue from the Well-Tempered Clavichord as „…a driving, thoroughly 
dynamic, thoroughly „modern‟ effect.‟ The fugue, like any artistic form in modernism soon 
became outdated. „Fugues became fetters historically. Forms can be inspiring. Thorough 
motivic work, and hence the concrete structuration of music, is predicated on the universal 
element in the fugal form.‟87 Adorno clearly thought that the constructed nature of the fugue  
continued to have relevance for later composers. Adorno explains that Schoenberg believed 
„Bach‟s technique of the developing variation …then became the compositional principle in 
Viennese Classicism.‟88 At the end of the essay „Bach Defended against his Devotees‟ Adorno 
once again makes it clear that Bach is best understood in terms of the music of the present day 
and not in terms of a spurious historicism. „Justice is done to Bach not through musicological 
usurpation but solely though the most advanced composition which in turn converges with the 
level of Bach‟s continually unfolding work.‟89 Indeed it is precisely in those orchestral 
arrangements [instrumentations as Adorno terms them] of Bach, by both Schoenberg and 
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Webern, that Adorno claims Bach is in an important sense re-invented and re-interpreted best. 
„Such instrumentations are models of an attitude to Bach which corresponds to the stage of his 
truth. Perhaps the traditional Bach can no longer be interpreted. If this is true, his heritage has 
passed on to composition, which is loyal to him in being disloyal; it calls his music in name in 
producing it anew.‟90 The instrumentation of Bach‟s music by Webern and Schoenberg were 
important to them as a means of economic support as they could and did gain an income from 
such instrumentations that was far more difficult to achieve with their own works. In one sense 
they were part of the re-discovery of much of Bach‟s work that took place in the early twentieth 
century. The Art of Fugue was first performed in Leipzig in 1922. Listening to these works 
when one is familiar with Bach‟s works is an interesting experience because it is clear how 
close both Schoenberg and Webern are to Bach in their return to his music. These works are not   
arrangements of Bach that simply sound more modern, but works in their own right that explore 
possibilities in his work in a contemporary idiom. The history of art in all forms is, as Adorno 
clearly knew, full of such returns. In Aesthetic Theory Adorno writes about Bach being difficult 
to „comprehend.‟ „The more intensively one seeks to comprehend Bach, the more puzzling is 
the gaze he returns, charged as it is with all the power that is his.‟91 For Adorno it is the 
structure of the music of Webern and Bach that defines the experience of time in the music – 
„both unfold in time …in both cases the musically established time does not coincide with that 
of its chronometric duration.‟92  This idea, that musical time and clock time are independent, 
was exploited by Telemann and other composers of music intended as light entertainment for 
aristocratic audiences. 
Bach‟s contemporary Telemann wrote court music to be listened to as diversion. This 
was music specifically written to help time pass. The kind of music Adorno refers to at one 
point in Aesthetic Theory as „Dinner music‟ [Tafelmusik] with its „miserable mechanical 
clattering.‟93 Bacht quotes Adorno on this point: „Adorno states in Zweite Nachtmusik 
“Preclassical music …is supposed to kill time; it is „divertimento‟ and its socially determined 
function, that of entertainment appears technically as the music‟s fear of the course of linear 
time.”‟94 This is Adorno‟s model for the heteronomous art music of the culture industry. Music 
that is simply written and intended as mere entertainment, in some cases as no more than 
background music to conversation. It is music that helps time pass for the privileged who have 
time in which to be bored. But it is also an example of the manipulation of phenomenal time by 
the time of the music. 
 In History and Freedom Adorno gives an example of how something „age-old‟ can be 
transformed into something „radically different.‟ The musical divertissment of the „absolutist 
courts‟ was specifically written keep the audience from being bored. „…if the members of the 
aristocracy had no need to amuse themselves, to kill time such music would not have come into 
being. The innermost essence of this music is to compress temporal extension to a single point 
so that a lengthy elaboration sounds as if it had lasted no more than a moment.‟95 This style of 
 132 
writing music with a compressed temporality Adorno claims was then transferred to Haydn, 
Mozart and „ultimately, Beethoven‟s last quartets.‟ This illusion of time passing quickly is an 
effect of the music. In Viennese classicism, so Adorno claims, this effect is exploited in the 
structuring of the music by the sonata form. „The term sonata describes works that are highly 
articulated, motivically and thematically wrought, and internally dynamic; their unity is a 
clearly differentiated manifold, with development and reprise.‟96 This music continues the 
Tafelmusik trick of appearing to take less time than clock time and also exploits memory and 
expectation within the development of the elements that go to make up the dynamic whole, and 
in the repetitions, reprises and echoes. „Thanks to its integration, great music will undoubtedly 
deal with the passage of time by making it shorter. Its ability to drive out boredom has, like 
entire heteronomous musical categories, become an element of the music itself and of its 
autonomous status.‟97 This is an important statement by Adorno because „great music‟ as 
autonomous art embodies a trick of time that was derived from lesser music such as Telemann‟s 
Tafelmusik. 
  Adorno considers that „One of the most central questions in musical aesthetics‟98 is the 
question of „the irreversibility of time‟ in terms of musical elements being necessarily before or 
after each other in a composition as a „meaningful sequence of moments.‟99 He describes 
„development‟ as „a variation in which a later element presupposes an earlier one as something 
earlier, and not vive versa.‟100 This sequence has a „logic‟ to it. On the other hand only two 
years later he identifies an effect in Beethoven‟s music that is a form of illusion of a previous 
musical event having taken place. 
 
The most powerful effects of Beethoven‟s form depend on the recurrence of something 
which was once present simply as a theme, that reveals itself as a result and thus 
acquires a completely transformed sense. Often the meaning of the preceding passage is 
only fully established by this later recurrence. The onset of a reprise can engender a 
feeling of something extraordinary having occurred earlier, even if the perceived event 
cannot in the slightest be located at that specific point.
101
 
 
Music has its own time, the time of the work, which in traditional works such as those by 
Beethoven, memory and expectation play their part. „Precisely in its great and emphatic forms, 
music embodies complexes that can only be understood through what is sensuously not present, 
through memory or expectation, complexes that hold such categorial determinations embedded 
in their own structure.‟102 The key thing about the music of Beethoven is that it is fully 
structured by musical time. 
 The illusion of time passing quickly is, for Adorno, one of the central aspects of 
Beethoven‟s symphonic technique. „The abbreviation of time through the static repetition of 
motifs.‟103  He identifies two „types‟ of music in Beethoven „an intensive‟ and „an extensive‟ 
both of which relate to time but in different ways. „The intensive type aims at a contraction of 
time. It is the true symphonic type…‟104  In „Zweite Nachtmusik‟ of 1937 Adorno maintains that 
a symphony „has its own temporal progression yet lasts, through its concept, for only a 
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moment.‟105 This idea of Adorno‟s that a musical work can be grasped in an instant will be 
discussed fully in the final section as it is central to Adorno theory of the work of art. In the 
second „extensive type‟ „time is set free: the music takes its time …it does not fill time but 
controls it. One might perhaps talk here of a geometrical – instead of a dynamic – relationship 
to time.‟106 But he does admit that he finds the „actual organising principle of the extensive type 
is still very obscure to me.‟107  The first type is characteristic of the early works and both types 
can be found in the large scale late works, with the extensive type contributing to the feeling of 
disintegration in the music.
108
 In Quasi Una Fantasia Adorno also writes about this two fold 
split in the forms of time in Beethoven. The first being Beethoven‟s keeping faith with „the 
general idea of Viennese Classicism with its belief in thematic development and hence the need 
for a process of unfolding in time.‟ The other aspect, the second „type‟ he calls an „accentual 
dialectic [Schlagstruktur]. By both compressing the unfolding of time and mimicking it, time is 
abolished and, as it were, suspended and concentrated in space.‟109  As musical composition 
progressed in the nineteenth century it is precisely this aspect of spatiality that Adorno sees 
exhibited next in the work of Wagner and later in the work of Schoenberg and Stravinsky. 
 This spatiality is also present in Beethoven‟s Missa Solemnis. This work from 
Beethoven‟s late phase clearly fascinated Adorno. It is a large work for huge forces which as 
Adorno remarked to Gretel Adorno cannot from a momentary hearing be by anyone other than 
Beethoven.
110
 Yet, although it sounds like Beethoven, it is not symphonic, it is a religious mass. 
It therefore has a static fixed quality with themes and motifs appearing and disappearing but 
very little in the way of development other than the driving inevitability of a massive fugue. As 
a mass it skips surprisingly quickly over some of the important religious aspects and is more a 
structured hymn to humanity than a traditional mass as an act of Christian worship. „It does not 
fall within the stylistic of the late Beethoven‟.111 Adorno claims the music is written in an 
entirely different way, it may sound like late Beethoven but the structure is atypical and this, for 
Adorno, is because of the systematic „exclusion of the principle of development.‟112 Beethoven, 
as Adorno notes, claimed it was „the greatest of his works‟. Adorno‟s conclusion, concerning 
this strange work, is that it is only now (1957) after „the principle of the musical development 
has run its course historically‟ that it is possible to appreciate that the Missa is structurally 
thoroughly modern. Contemporary „composition now finds itself obliged to accumulate 
sections‟ and „to articulate fields‟113 in just the same way as Beethoven found himself doing 
when he had to step back into an archaic form. The Missa does not play tricks with time, it 
spatialises time and with the use of repeated musical motifs it is quite Wagnerian. 
 The next major change in musical time comes with Wagner whose leitmotifs are not 
developmental but structured wholes that Adorno considers to be more spatially than temporally 
arranged. Adorno first wrote at length about Wagner in his book In Search of Wagner. Four 
chapters were published in 1939 and the full book was finally published in 1952. In a lecture of 
1963, „Wagner‟s relevance for Today‟ Adorno admits that „With regard to Wagner the situation 
 134 
has changed generally‟ and that this is because of „what has newly come to our attention about 
Wagner‟114 In the earlier book Adorno had criticised Wagner‟s leitmotifs as ever-same. In the 
1963 lecture Adorno revised the reasons why he had made this judgement. The „sequences‟ of 
leitmotifs „is much more profoundly connected to the problems and tasks of the internal 
organization of Wagner‟s music than I was capable of comprehending thirty years ago.‟115  
Adorno claims this gives the music a static quality, a „peculiar sensation of floating‟116 which 
ties in to the static nature of contemporary music. However, Adorno is now able to appreciate 
the extent to which the chromaticism is subtly worked in small particulars that „generate‟ the 
totality of the „great dense tonal surfaces… the melding of differential tones into fields, is 
another thing that has attained its first full realization today.‟117  A further aspect is dissonance 
in Wagner‟s music: „It has more power, more substantiality than consonance, and this points 
compellingly in the direction of the new music.‟118 Nevertheless, Adorno still maintains  that the 
„constant sameness‟ of such „unceasing change‟ of continual „becoming‟ „ultimately turns 
static.‟119  In the Philosophy of New Music Adorno describes Wagner‟s operas as being „like 
giant containers, and as such give evidence of that spatialization of temporal movement‟, which 
he describes as a „suspension of musical time consciousness.‟120 Ultimately, for Adorno, 
„Everything in Wagner has its temporal core.‟121 There is a comment by Wagner about Mozart 
that Adorno quotes in „Difficulties.‟ This comment may well be a source for Adorno‟s view that 
the older work of art can be illuminated by later ones. Wagner commented that in some of 
Mozart‟s compositions one „could hear the dishes clatter on the table.‟ In other words Wagner 
could hear the echo of Tafelmusic in Mozart when compared to the position musical 
composition had reached in his own time. As Adorno comments, „One hears, through what is 
newer, weaknesses of the old that were once hidden.‟122 So whilst Webern and Schoenberg 
could hear Bach in terms of their own music in positive terms, Wagner heard the divertimento 
lightness inherent in some of Mozart‟s works. The history of artworks is thus a constant re-
valuing and de-valuing of works from the past. 
 Mahler‟s music involves enormously long symphonic works made up from separate 
sections that, for Adorno, at once acknowledge the impossibility of continuing the symphonic 
form whilst at the same time continuing it and bringing it to an end. In Aesthetic Theory he 
describes Mahler‟s work as „The collapsing constellations of symphonic music‟123 The structure 
of the symphonies, some of which are extremely long, is sectional. As Adorno remarks, „The 
only totality known to this symphonic art is one which arises from the temporal stratification of 
its individual segments.‟124 It seems clear that Adorno, at least, considered the symphony as an 
art form to have come to an end with Mahler. This is a similar view to those who think that 
painting came to an end with Duchamp‟s ready-mades. Just as there are symphonies after 
Mahler so there are paintings after Duchamp. Adorno was scathing in his dislike of the work of 
composers who looked back in emulation of an earlier style. About Sibelius, who continued to 
write symphonies Adorno commented that „attempts to go on speaking the traditional language 
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of music are stricken with impotence.‟125 Presumably Adorno‟s contempt for Sibelius derives 
from Sibelius‟s insistence on continuing to work with a form that Adorno considered outmoded, 
the symphony. For Adorno, Sibelius looked to the past in a different way to Schoenberg and 
Webern. 
 
Adorno’s history of time in music: the twentieth century 
The next generation of composers such as Schoenberg, Stravinsky and Webern  created much 
shorter works than Mahler. Adorno noted the increasing frequency with which very short works 
were being created in the early twentieth century. He had in mind the extreme brevity of some 
of the compositions by Webern.   
 
 Their brevity originates precisely from the need for the highest level of consistency. 
This prohibits the superfluous and turns against that temporal extension that has been 
the basis of the conception of the musical work since the eighteenth century, certainly 
since Beethoven. A single blow strikes the work, time, and semblance. …Music 
contracted to a moment, is true as an eruption of negative experience. It touches on real 
suffering.
126
  
 
 
Adorno sees in this form of very short composition a political aspect, a sense in which the work 
is aligned with „correct consciousness.‟ Once again he refers to music being contracted to a 
moment, an aspect of his theory of the artwork that will be examined in the final section. After 
the experience of expansive works such as Mahler‟s such short work seem to Adorno like 
„negative experience‟. 
 The development of twelve-tone music by Schoenberg was understood by Adorno to be 
a development from the older form of theme and variations where a basic set of notes are 
subject to change whilst remaining the same. In The Philosophy of New Music he writes:  
„Twelve-tone technique arose out of the genuinely dialectical principle of variation. This 
principle postulated that insistence on what is ever the same and its sustained analysis in 
composition–for all motivic labour is analysis insofar as it divides the given into the most 
minimal elements–results in what is ceaselessly new.‟127 Adorno believed that the method of 
composition of Schoenberg and Berg „does not coherently organise temporal succession.‟128 But 
although the new music is radically different from what came before in both tonality and 
temporal structure it nevertheless developed out of „motivic, thematic composition.‟ Both the 
older form of dynamic music and the new form of serial music share the same outcome from 
entirely different methods, that of „total organisation‟. „In serial composition a whole unity is 
regarded as a fact, as an immediate reality. In thematic, motivic music, on the other hand, unity 
is always defined as becoming and thus as a process of revelation.‟129 
 Writing about Schoenberg‟s techniques in The Philosophy of New Music Adorno 
described how his „music achieves an absolutely new relationship to the time within which each 
work transpires. Music is no longer indifferent to time, for in time it is no longer arbitrarily 
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repeated; rather, it is transformed.‟130  Time is negated  „through the suspension of all musical 
elements as a result of omnipresent construction.‟131 This music takes the spatiality of late 
Beethoven and Wagner a stage further, there are no longer repetitions, developments and 
echoes. „Formerly, the intervals were the unequivocal site of musical meaning: of the not yet, 
the now, and the after; of the promised, the fulfilled, and the neglected; of moderation and 
dissipation; of abiding form and transcendence of musical subjectivity. Now the intervals have 
become mere building blocks, and all the experiences accumulated in their differences appear 
lost.‟132 The music is no longer in a dynamic process of becoming. „Today music rebels against 
conventional temporal order;‟133 In the Philosophy of New Music Adorno wrote about the lack 
of temporal development in Schoenberg‟s „twelve tone constructions‟ this is „because it 
tolerates nothing external to itself on which development could be tested.‟  
 The case of Stravinsky is interesting because when he came to revise his first long text 
on Schoenberg Adorno decided to make it dialectical by contrasting the music of Schoenberg 
with that of Stravinsky. This dialectically organised text became the Philosophy of New Music. 
In this text Adorno described Stravinsky‟s music as spatialising time - „in Stravinsky–music 
casts itself as the arbiter temporis and prompts listeners to forget the experience of time and 
deliver themselves over to its spatialization. …Time is suspended, as if in a circus scene, and 
complexes of time are presented as if they were spatial.‟134 Some years later in Quasi Una 
Fantasia Adorno admitted he had misread the temporal aspects of Stravinsky‟s music. He 
admitted that he had failed to allow Stravinsky‟s work to speak for itself and had judged it by 
external values. „By opposing the static ideal of Stravinsky‟s music, its immanent timelessness, 
and by confronting it with a dynamic, emphatically temporal, intrinsically developing music, I 
arbitrarily applied to him an external norm, a norm which he rejected. In short, I violated my 
own most cherished principle of criticism.‟135 Although he went on in this article to attack 
Stravinsky in certain respects it is a second example of Adorno changing a musicological 
aesthetic judgement from an earlier time.  
  As far as the music of the late Schoenberg is concerned Adorno identified a greater 
tendency to negate time in the music than was present in the earlier works where the concept of 
the developing variation still operated. Adorno thinks this new music is static compared to the 
earlier works. It is spatially rather than temporally organised in that sections are placed 
alongside each other. Even though these sections are successive in chronological time they are 
not successive in musical time. „The reversal of the musical dynamic into a static-dynamic of 
the musical structure…clarifies the peculiarly rigid systematic character that Schoenberg‟s 
composition acquired in its late phase. …The music no longer presents itself as being in a 
process of development. …Accordingly, the music becomes static.‟136  The new music is 
constructed rather than composed. „In construction the dynamic reverses completely into the 
static: The constructed work stands still.‟137  The new music comes to a standstill. „In traditional 
listening the music unfolds from the parts to the whole, in tune with the flow of time itself. This 
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flow – that is to say, the parallel between the temporal succession of musical events and the 
pure flow of time itself – has become problematical and presents itself within the work as a task 
to be thought through and mastered.‟138  
 One question that perhaps should be addressed at this point is to determine whether for 
Adorno there is a difference between composition and construction? Clearly the music of the 
early classical composers of modernism is best described as composed, as written. Obviously 
there is a constructive aspect to this composition but construction as Adorno understands it in 
the twentieth century is not the essence of how Beethoven‟s music is created. Although there is 
a contrary position in „Difficulties.‟ 
 
The movements of the greatest composers are based on a discrete number of topoi, of 
more or less rigid elements, out of which they are constructed. The aspect of the 
organic, the developing, which is central to Viennese classiscism, proves, in the light of 
these topoi, to be largely an art of appearances. Music represents itself as if one thing 
were developing out of the other, but without any such development literally occurring. 
The mechanical aspect is covered up by the art of composition…139 
 
It looks once again as if Adorno has changed his mind in this late text over the „organic‟ 
composition of the classical works of the bourgeois revolution. Twelve tone music can be said 
to be constructed, rather than composed, because setting up the row determines the course the 
music must take if it is to work through the possibilities inherent in the initial row. There is still, 
however, a great deal of freedom for a composer such as Schoenberg to depart from the strict 
rigour of the system. Other composers however, dedicated themselves to following the rules of 
twelve tone composition as if following the rules was all that had to be done. This happened to 
such an extent that Adorno in his significant article, „The Aging of the New Music,‟ clearly felt 
that such music was coming to a dead end. „Twelve-tone technique has its justification only in 
the presentation of complex musical contents, which cannot otherwise be organised. Separated 
from this function, it degenerates into a deluded system.‟140 In the later twentieth century music 
became so highly technically constructed that it no longer makes sense to call it a composition, 
no more sense than to call a wall piece by Donald Judd a painting even if there are fundamental 
aspects of the work that rely on the history of painting.  
 
Artistic consistency, the fulfilment of the work‟s own obligation–without which 
aesthetic seriousness is inconceivable– is not there for its own sake, but in order to 
present what was once called the artistic idea, and what in music might be better called 
the composed. In music, however, that is all construction, nothing is composed 
anymore.
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Adorno argued that whilst in late Schoenberg time had become static, the new composers such 
as Boulez and Stockhausen were creating music that was virtually „independent of time‟ with no 
discernable development or drive. „The radicalized constructivists that go beyond Schoenberg 
drew the logical consequences from this when they lose all interest in drive-like relations at the 
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level of detail, and even resist them…‟142 The consequence of this change is that music is no 
longer operating with musical time in the traditional sense. The music is inevitably within clock 
time and because of this „it is dynamic in such a way that in the course of the music the identical 
becomes the non-identical just as the non-identical can become the identical as, e.g., in an 
abbreviated reprise.‟143 Music has an inescapable relationship to clock time for it must take 
place within time. However the constructed nature of the new music of the 1950s and 1960s is 
such that the traditional internal music time of the works is no longer exploited, even if it 
appears to be there as a temporal form of „second nature‟ to any listener skilled in listening to 
the older music. „It is to Stockhausen that we owe the insight that in a certain sense the whole 
rhythmical and metrical structure of music, has remained within the bounds of tonality.‟144 
However with Stockhausen Adorno was in no doubt music had moved on to something new and 
indeterminate. As this description of Zeimaße makes clear. „Dynamic freed from every static 
reference and no longer discernible as such by its contrast to something fixed, is transformed 
into something that hovers and no longer has direction. In the manner of its appearance, 
Stockhausen‟s Zeimaße evokes a through-composed cadence, a fully presented yet static 
dominant.‟145 Even rhythm is strictly controlled and Adorno commented in „Vers une musique 
informelle‟. „These composers have above all attempted to bring rhythm under the strict 
domination of twelve-tone procedure, and ultimately to replace composition altogether with an 
objective-calculatory ordering of intervals, pitches, long and short durations, degrees of 
loudness; an integral rationalization such as has never before been envisaged in music.‟146  
Adorno understood this rationalization to be part of the same process, first identified by Max 
Weber,  „…one might perhaps say that the serialists  did not arbitrarily concoct 
mathematizations of music, but confirmed a development that Max Weber, in the sociology of 
music, identified as the overall tendency of more recent musical history–the progressive 
rationalization of music. It is said to have reached its fulfilment in integral construction.‟147 
Adorno then comments that one might as well compose with a computer. The aspect of time 
that is missing for Adorno in the new music is „musical time.‟ Stockhausen was well aware of 
this according to Adorno as Stockhausen „refers to the antinomy of material and composed 
music. Stockhausen became conscious of it in the context of the problem of the relationship 
between physically measurable and authentically musical time.‟148 Adorno  admitted that he 
found it very difficult to hold some music by Stockhausem, Boulez and Cage in his head and to 
think about how it was written and exactly what was going on in the music as he listened to it. 
„My productive imagination does not reconstruct them all with equal success. I am not able to 
participate, as it were, in the process of composing them as I listen, as I still could with 
Webern‟s String Trio, which is anything but a simple piece.‟149 As will be discussed in the next 
section it was very important for Adorno that he could hold a piece of music in his head and 
understand it. The new music seemed to evade this form of conceptualisation. The new music 
also evades another traditional form of conceptuality the ability of the composer to know more 
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or less what had been achieved in the score, to have some clear idea of the outcome before the 
music was performed. No doubt, throughout history, composers have always had that element 
of surprise, shared by painters, when a work is first performed, or hung on a gallery wall. At 
that moment a certain distancing and objectivity about the work can occur. However, with some 
of the new music the outcome was far from certain at the first performance. „Lately, 
compositional methods are frequently specifically termed experimental whose own results, the 
composed work itself, cannot be predicted either in the process of composing or in the 
imagination of the composer.‟150  With the experimental music that arrived next this was almost 
the whole point of the sound experience as it only with difficulty be called music in any 
traditional sense. 
 The great change that took place in music in the 1950s was the move by John Cage and 
others to use sound not derived from orchestral instruments. They used „found‟ sound and 
combined these sounds with methods involving chance. This aleatory music clearly had a 
profound effect on Adorno because however hard he tried, he found it very difficult to equate it 
with the negative dramas of Samuel Beckett. „Into this situation of serialism barged John Cage; 
it explains the extraordinary effect he had. His principle of chance, which is familiar to you 
under the name of aleatory music, wants to break out of the total determinism, the integral, 
obligatory musical ideal of the serial school.‟151 However one thing that become apparent with 
aleatory music was that it did enable serial music to be thought of in a different way. The 
chance elements buried in serialism became visible. Perhaps it was exactly this aspect of such 
new music that Cage and others had noticed. As Adorno noted in „Vers une musique 
informelle:‟  
 
The challenge of the first twelve-note composition to ears schooled in free atonality lay 
in the way that it strictly related successive musical complexes to each other, without 
one terminating in the other as if that were its rightful goal. To that extent the element 
of chance, which is intensified with the growing tendency towards integral construction, 
is undoubtedly implicit in twelve-note technique. Initially it is the individual 
successions that sound accidental.
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This is why time in the new music seems to stand still, why Adorno thinks time becomes space. 
There is no organic temporal logic to the succession of sound complexes, to this extent the 
music is the equivalent to a Dadaist collage rather than an abstract painting. With an abstract 
painting, such as those of Kandinsky, the elements and logic of earlier objective painting are 
still there on the canvas to be read as an abstract landscape. With Dadaist collage on the other 
hand such a visual link to work of the past is deliberately broken even if the work still contains 
abstract constructed elements from earlier painting. „Ligeti …observed correctly that in their 
effect the extremes of absolute determination and absolute chance coincide. Statistical 
generality becomes the law of composition …it comes close to the Dadaist and surrealist actions 
of the past‟ but without „any politically demolishing content.‟153 The lack of political content is 
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seen here, rather surprisingly for Adorno, to be a missing component in aleatory music. But far 
more than agit-prop content is missing, in some of it music is missing, this is the anti-art of 
music. „John Cage‟s Piano Concerto, whose only meaning and internal coherence is to be found 
in its rejection of every notion of coherent meaning, presents us with catastrophe music at its 
most extreme.‟154  This work for prepared piano is referred to several times by Adorno. In „Vers 
une musique informelle‟ Adorno is clearly ambivalent about such music and about anti-art in 
general which was spreading to all art forms and genres in the 1950s and 1960s. „The 
aspirations of Cage and his school have eradicated all topoi, without going into mourning for a 
subjective, organic ideal in which they suspect the topoi of maintaining an after-life. This is why 
to dismiss anti-art as pretentious cabaret and humour would be as great an error as to celebrate 
it.‟155  The meaning, as with Beckett, becomes the lack of meaning, „even negated meaning is 
still meaning.‟156 The lack of meaning is meaningful in a society in which everything is false. 
The problem of meaning with anti-art is acute for Adorno because how do you tell the 
difference between „authentic‟ anti-art such as he seems to believe Cage created and other 
works that simply are negative because that has become the fashion? In Aesthetic Theory 
Adorno addresses this problem. 
 
The dividing line between authentic art that takes on itself the crisis of meaning and a 
resigned art consisting literally and figuratively of protocol sentences is that in 
significant works the negation of meaning itself takes shape as a negative, whereas in 
the others the negation of meaning is stubbornly and positively replicated. Everything 
depends on this: whether meaning inheres in the negation of meaning in the artwork or 
if the negation conforms to the status quo; whether the crisis of meaning is reflected in 
the works or whether it remains immediate and therefore alien to the subject. Key 
events may include certain musical works such as Cage‟s Piano Concerto, which 
impose on themselves a law of inexorable aleatoriness and thereby achieve a sort of 
meaning: the expression of horror.
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This attempt by Adorno find a deeper political meaning in Cage‟s work is important but it does 
not solve the problem fully. Distinguishing between good anti-art and bad anti-art would seem 
to come down to a matter of judgement, almost a matter of taste, Adorno‟s taste. From a purely 
constructive point of view there is no difference, Adorno maintains, between organised and 
chance music. „The technically integral, completely made artwork converges with the absolutely 
accidental work; the work that is ostensibly not the result of making is of course all the more 
fabricated.‟158 This is because the decision to make a musical work of pure chance, the setting 
up of the circumstances in which the work will take place, the choice of the time span for the 
work is still a decisive conceptual constructive decision even if there is no „music‟ to listen to.  
Anti-art in music completely negates musical time. In one sense with some works such 
as Cage‟s 4’ 33” musical time becomes clock time and the phenomenological time of 
experiencing the work as time passing becomes the most important aspect of the work. John 
Cage‟s 4’ 33” is a work where the audience spends four minutes and thirty three seconds 
listening to the ambient sound in their location instead of listening to an expected composition. 
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This work by Cage exemplifies better than almost any other work of musical art from the 
twentieth century the experience of the work as an experience of time passing. Time does seem 
to pass slowly, the sound is not concentrated on the performer sitting at the piano but comes 
from the surrounding space. What you hear depends partly on how acute your hearing is. In this 
piece all sounds are relevant. It is partly a piece of theatre, an early example of performance art. 
The performer approaches the piano, opens the lid to the keyboard, opens the music all the 
while holding a stop watch in one hand whilst keeping an eye on it so he or she can periodically 
at set times turn over the pages of the score that is not being played and open and close the 
piano keyboard lid to signal the breaks between movements. The audience is expectant, waiting 
for something to happen, slowly it begins to dawn on those who are not outraged by the 
situation that the ambient sounds of the time of the work are the work. The work sounds 
different every time because however well sound proofed the performance space, there is 
always the hum of the building systems and the sound of the audience itself. This is a work of 
pure duration, it depends on random sound to occur and be heard, it is pure anti-art, but it is a 
planned overall conceptual construction. In a sense it is a work that can be experienced in a 
moment even if that moment lasts four minutes thirty three seconds. It is tempting to say that 
with this work phenomenal time is identical with clock time but this will not be true for most 
members of the audience because the four minutes thirty three seconds can seem a much longer 
time. Time slows down. Listening to this work, or listening with this work, becomes a Zen-like 
meditation on the present moment that is out of time. In this sense, 4’ 33” restores a form of 
musical time to music. Stewart Martin is correct to point out that anti-art forms a part of 
Adorno‟s conception of autonomous art159 but it still remains a problem for interpretation, for 
completion by philosophy. 
Adorno‟s basic thesis regarding musical time is that time in music became 
progressively spatialised. This mirrors the spatialisation of time of relativity theory. The time in 
which he wrote his last thoughts on this subject, the late 1960s, was a time when visual art was 
also becoming increasingly spatialised. An equivalent spatialisation occurred in the avantgarde 
novel of the time with William Burrough‟s cut ups and repastings in texts such as Dead Fingers 
Talk. Non narrative films were common in art house cinemas. Time and memory had been 
central to many literary works of art of the early 20th century. There is Proust‟s remembrance of 
an entire life and its detail, and there is Joyce's remembrance of a single day as if it were an 
odyssey. It could be argued that the multiple viewpoints of synthetic cubism reveal a series of 
memories experienced at the same time of the traces of the still life that formed the basis for the 
composition. The other later forms of twentieth century artwork that Adorno may have had in 
mind as being very short as Weber‟s early pieces are short would in all probability have been 
happenings, and works like those of Jean Tinguely that literally set themselves on fire and 
exploded into chaotic remains over a short period of time. In Tinguely‟s „Homage to New York‟ 
(1960), which was widely covered in the press, on TV and in cinema newsreels at the time, the 
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planned chaos ended in farce when the Museum of Modern Art authorities called the fire 
brigade. In England John Latham built towers of books, „Skoob Towers‟ which existed for a 
few hours before he then set them on fire and they reduced to ash. It has been argued by Pamela 
M. Lee that the avantgarde visual art of the 1960s was deeply concerned with „a pervasive 
anxiety‟ about time that she describes as „chronophobic.‟160 Another aspect of the very 
significant changes that took place in the visual arts as part of the expansion of forms with the 
visual arts was the spatial nature of the work. Tinguely‟s and Latham‟s work took place in the 
space previously occupied by sculpture. Works came off the gallery wall and onto the floor, 
came off the plinth, went out of the door, or out of the window and even took the exhibition 
space apart and re-built it. Art work went out into the streets, out into the landscape, became 
performances, rituals, shamanistic events sometimes involving the audience as co-creators. All 
this leads one to the conclusion that far from being a mandarin cultural conservative Adorno 
was attuned to the zeitgeist in an extraordinarily perceptive way. Reading any text is a time-
based activity. It takes less time to read a discursive text, even by Hegel, of say 400 pages than 
it takes to read a paratactical text such as Aesthetic Theory of similar length. Aesthetic Theory is 
undoubtedly a spatially organised text. It is this constructed, spatialised aspect about the text 
that most resembles the avant-garde music of the mid twentieth century. From Beethoven to 
Stockhausen, from Hegel to Adorno is very much the same journey.  
In the third chapter of this study Adorno‟s theory of the artwork was discussed with 
regards to the topic of success and failure. Towards the end of the section of Aesthetic Theory 
generally known as „Coherence and Meaning‟ there is a comment concerning the relationship of 
modern art to the art of the past, in particular to the successful works of the past. „Modern art, 
with its vulnerability, blemishes and fallibility, is the critique of traditional works, which in so 
many ways are stronger and more successful: It is the critique of success.‟161 In parallel to this it 
is possible to understand Aesthetic Theory as a critique of  philosophical aesthetics of the past. 
For Adorno both art and philosophical aesthetics take on the forms they do in the twentieth 
century partly as a reaction to what went before and partly as a reaction to the present in which 
they take on the only forms possible.  
This section has explored Adorno‟s genealogical conception of history by examining 
his statements concerning time in relationship to a series of composers set in calendrical time. 
Underlying his conception of history is Adorno‟s fundamental belief that truth is historical, that 
the truth, the absolute aspect, of any work of art is only identified by philosophical critique. The 
truth of a work of art, its participation in the absolute, is always now in the present time of 
interpretation, commentary and critique.  
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Section three: The instant 
Structured listening 
There is one further aspect of Adorno‟s theory of the artwork which at first sight looks as if it is 
about time. This is his conception of the instant in which a work can be fully comprehended. In 
his article „The Radio Symphony‟ Adorno writes about the suspension of time that can occur for 
him when listening to Beethoven‟s music. „While listening to a typical romantic symphony one 
remains fully conscious, sometimes all too conscious, of the time it consumes, despite the 
immensely progressive novelty of the details. With Beethoven it is different. The density of 
thematic interwovenness, of “antiphonic” work, tends to produce what one might call a 
suspension of time consciousness.‟162 Whilst I agree this does occur his next statement that this 
„suspension of time consciousness‟ can turn into a drastic „contraction of time‟ seems to me to 
be unusual. „When a movement like the first of Beethoven‟s Fifth or Seventh Symphonies, or 
even a very long one such as the first of the Eroica is performed adequately, one has the feeling 
that the movement does not take seven or fifteen minutes or more, but virtually one moment. It 
is this very power of symphonic contraction of time which annihilates, for the duration of the 
adequate performance, the contingencies of the listener‟s private existence…‟ The experience of 
a piece of music depends partly on how skilled the listener is.  Adorno writes about a form of 
structured listening. „The understanding of the meaning of a fleeting musical passage often 
depends on the intellective comprehension of its function in a whole that is not present; the 
purportedly immediate experience itself depends on what goes beyond pure immediacy.‟163 In 
the first chapter to his Introduction to the Sociology of Music entitled „Types of Musical 
Conduct,‟ Adorno describes a set of Weberian „ideal types‟ of listener. The first of these, the 
expert, is extremely illuminating, partly because Adorno could be describing himself. 
 
He would be the fully conscious listener who tends to miss nothing and at the same 
time, at each moment, accounts to himself for what he has heard. …Spontaneously 
following the course of music, even complicated music, he hears the sequence, hears 
past, present, and future moments together so that they crystallize into a meaningful 
context. Simultaneous complexities – in other words, a complicated harmony and 
polyphony – are separately and distinctly grasped by the expert. 
    The fully adequate mode of conduct might be called “structural hearing.”164   
 
Adorno then admits this is a very small class of listeners. „more or less limited to the circle of 
professional musicians.‟ The characteristics of the „expert‟ listener are illuminating because 
they make clear that this „structural hearing‟ depends in the first instance on the work itself. It is 
the structure of the work that is heard. „Simultaneous complexities,‟ or constellations, set out in 
the musical time of the work as „past, present and future moments‟ „crystallize into a 
meaningful content.‟ In his essay „Criteria of New Music‟ Adorno describes this form of 
intellectual conception of a music whole with respect to Beethoven.   
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The great, classical symphonic movements of Beethoven, the first movement of the 
Eroica or of the Seventh, can be heard ideally as if they lasted only a moment. If in 
Beethoven, the profane composer, empty, alienated time fatally oppresses the human 
subject, if life becomes separated out into a mere sequence of experiences, then in the 
name of the secular tension between freedom and necessity the sovereign subject will 
force them together once again into that epiphany that theology once taught as the 
eternity of the fulfilled moment, the concentration of the mere passage of time into a 
single instant, Kairos.
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This is a strange claim that the consciousness of chronological time passing is 
suspended and a work can be experienced almost out of time in an instant. Adorno is claiming 
this is a form of total experience of an artwork that is out of time, this is the instant in which an 
artwork is grasped as a whole work. This seems to mean that Adorno thinks great works of art 
are in some sense out of time, not in a Platonic sense as being ideal eternal forms, but in a 
purely experiential sense which could also be thought of as an intellectualization of the musical 
work of art so that it becomes a form of philosophical experience of a phenomenal experience. 
It is already clear, from the discussion in the previous section, that with the music of 
Stockhausen, Boulez and Cage Adorno found he could no longer carry out this expert 
„structured listening‟. This is a skill that for Adorno depends on the music itself being structured 
and „composed‟ in a recognisable way that can be understood completely during a first careful 
listening. Structured listening seems to require a musical intelligence steeped in the classics of 
modern music and of the older classical heritage. The new music resists interpretation and hence 
resists comprehension.  
 
The artwork comprehended in an instant 
There are a large number of terms in Aesthetic Theory that in one way or another bear on the 
concept of the instant with regards to the artwork. These include, instant, fireworks, shock, 
explosion, ephemera, crystallisation, and apparition. A fundamental statement concerning this 
usage by Adorno would be „The artwork is at once both process and instant.‟166 This embodies 
an antinomy of artworks as Adorno understood them. „Every artwork is an instant [Augenblick]; 
every successful work is a cessation, a suspended moment of the process…‟167 Augenblick 
translated literally means „in the blink of an eye‟. However it should be thought of as a temporal 
term but as a form of awareness of something. Dahlstrom suggests, following McNeill, that 
Augenblick is best translated as „glance of the eye‟ and should not „be understood as a “moment 
of time” in the sense of an “instant”. Rather, it refers to the unfolding disclosure of the 
presencing of a situation in the duration appropriate to it.‟168 This is a phenomenal description 
of a very short experience like watching a firework explode, but it is more than just an 
experience, it is also a form of understanding. As Adorno states in Aesthetic Theory „Ernst 
Schoen once praised the unsurpassable nobles of fireworks as the only art that aspires not to 
duration but only to glow for an instant and fade away. It is ultimately in terms of this idea that 
the temporal arts of drama and music are to be interpreted, the counterpart of a reification 
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without which they would not exist and yet that degrades them.‟169 The firework concept is also 
used to clarify the semblance character of a work of art which appears as if it were an 
apparition. „The phenomenon of fireworks is prototypical for artworks …Fireworks are 
apparition κατ‟ εξοχή [pre-eminently/par excellence] …They appear empirically yet are 
liberated from the burden of the empirical, which is the obligation of duration; they are a sign 
from heaven yet artifactual, an ominous warning, a script that flashes up, vanishes, and indeed 
cannot be read for its meaning.‟170This is another example of visual language at work. For 
Adorno it is essential that the instant is seen, is perceived, is understood. There are two aspects 
to this concern with the instant. The first concerns very short artwork times, that is artworks that 
are brief such as many works by Webern. The second aspect refers to the almost timeless instant 
in which the work is understood.    
„In art something momentary transcends; objectification makes the artwork into an 
instant. Pertinent here is Benjamin‟s formulation of a dialectic at a standstill… If, as images, 
artworks are the persistence of the transient, they are concentrated in appearance as something 
momentary. To experience art means to become conscious of its immanent process as an instant 
at a standstill.‟171  This parallels the moment in which a constellation of ideas or concepts is 
understood in Adorno‟s philosophical theory of meaning. This is borne out by the following 
statement where it is clear from the word „today‟ that Adorno is discussing the 1960s: „Today it 
is conceivable and perhaps requisite that artworks immolate themselves through their temporal 
nucleus, devote their own life to the instant of the appearance of truth, and tracelessly vanish 
without thereby diminishing themselves in the slightest.‟172 This statement, in the context it is 
taken from, is mostly an argument against the permanence of art, about the danger of conceiving 
of artworks as if they will persist through time. It also makes clear that the truth of art in the 
present time of the 1960s can ultimately only be approached through philosophy, through the 
model of Adorno‟s theory of meaning The time of understanding of art is like the blink of an 
eye, it is the glance in which understanding is achieved. It exactly mirrors the metaphorical 
mental glance given by the philosophical interpreter to the constellation of concepts.   
 The idea of a shudder of recognition may derive in part from Benjamin's writing on 
Baudelaire, and in particular from Baudelaire's poem En Passant where an exchange of a single 
glance with a female passer-by opens for the poet a possibility of love that could have been, in 
that instant was achieved, and yet cannot be. Adorno often mentions cubist collage in this 
respect, which he calls montage, and says „was meant to shock‟ and „which developed out of the 
pasted-in newspaper clippings and the like during the heroic years of cubism.‟173 I discussed the 
subject of montage in the previous chapter as it is one of the central concepts of Aesthetic 
Theory and has implications far beyond the instant. The relationship between montage and the 
instant is clearly significant. The whole point of a montage is that its shock effect is experienced 
in an instant. For it to work as intended a montage has to be immediately apparent. A montage 
is not something to be searched for or noticed for the first time at a later experience of the work 
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in question. The shock of a montage must be immediate, it must take place in the instant in 
which it is first apprehended, otherwise the entire point of it is lost. There is thus a 
Surrealist/Dadaist aspect buried in Adorno‟s conception of not only the work of art but also 
philosophy. 
Adorno also speculates that the shudder is akin to „afterimages‟ of the „primordial 
shudder‟ felt by early man in the face of a strange and hostile Nature. To be „overwhelmed by 
an important work‟ is not the same as to be surprised at catching a glance of it when moving 
through a picture gallery, yet Adorno seems to want to insist that a full scale symphonic work 
can have the same effect in that explosive moment when the whole is comprehended. So the 
artwork has embedded in it this antinomy of time as both an instant and a becoming over time. 
 
That in many of its elements the artwork becomes more intense, thickens, and explodes, 
gives the impression of being an end in itself; the great unities of composition and 
construction seem to exist only for the purpose of such intensity. Accordingly, contrary 
to current aesthetic views, the whole exists in truth only for the sake of its parts– that is 
its kαιπόρ the instant– and not the reverse; what works in opposition to mimesis 
ultimately seeks to serve it.
174
   
 
  
This is the moment of truth of a great work of art when the whole is experienced and understood 
in an instant, the moment when the constellation of the parts explodes into a unity. This is the 
reality of „Augenblick‟. So the experiental time of an artwork culminates for Adorno in this 
strange encapsulation of the totality of what a work means in a short space of time, the blink of 
an eye. This is not a temporal experience in terms of either musical time or phenomenological 
time. It is a form of understanding described as if it were a temporal moment. That it is a 
temporal moment is just an illusion. This may well have been Adorno‟s experience but I am not 
at all sure to what extent it is shared by others. It seems to be more of the same conceit, first 
identified in Chapter 2, that ultimately art and philosophy share the same „moment‟ of 
recognition and understanding when art through the interpretation of aesthetic theory turns into 
philosophy. Structural listening as was seen  above is how understanding philosophy works for 
Adorno, it is the same structural model of constellation, crystallization, understanding.  This is a 
temporal model, first the constellation is constructed, and then the moment of understanding is 
reached. One way of describing Aesthetic Theory would be to describe it as a history of 
aesthetic theories understood and re-interpreted from the perspective of the time in which it was 
written. This perspective is grounded in Adorno‟s analysis of the meaning of the present. The 
unsatisfactory present of the 1960s, was for Adorno a bad present in political, artistic, aesthetic 
and philosophical terms. A time when Adorno had doubts whether art could survive, whether 
aesthetics could survive, or whether philosophy could survive. The survival of these three 
seemed possible only as negative forms.  
 Adorno‟s conception of the artwork as an instant is clearly closely related, in a 
structural and conceptual sense, to his conception of how philosophy works. In metaphorical 
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terms, as a form of instant pattern recognition. This recognition of a moment also operates 
within his conception of history and in his theory that works of the past are best illuminated  by 
the forms and structures of works in the present. The new reveals the old. The present moment 
then becomes the essential element in his conception of history, of art and of philosophy. Truth 
for Adorno is always located in the present instant. In the next, and final, chapter I will rotate 
this investigation from time, history and memory to examine Adorno‟s conception of 
expectation. This will take two forms, as the expectation of utopia and as the expectation of 
aesthetics. 
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C H A P T E R  F I V E  
E X P E C T A T I O N S   
Time and history were the subjects of the previous chapter. In a deeper sense the chapter was 
concerned with memory. Adorno‟s memory of art since the bourgeois revolution. In this, the 
final chapter, I will analyse the topos of expectation in Aesthetic Theory from three viewpoints. 
The first concerns Adorno‟s various conceptions of utopian expectation.  The second compares 
the theories of art of Adorno and Heidegger with particular reference to their conceptions of 
expectation for art in historical time. These conceptions of expectation in art relate directly to 
their respective theories of truth. The final viewpoint concerns the problems surrounding the 
continued existence of philosophical aesthetics. Expectation is embedded as a topos within the 
European tradition of the philosophy of art. This tradition is referred to continually in Aesthetic 
Theory and includes and informs the wider frame of reference concerned with both theorising 
and experiencing art, commonly known as philosophical aesthetics. It is the expectation of 
philosophical aesthetics as a discipline dealing with contemporary art that is part of the problem. 
First, however, some general remarks, about the concept of expectation. 
 
Section One: Expectation 
There is a conceptual link between memory and expectation as there is between memory and 
forgetting. There is no forgetting without memory, forgetting only makes conceptual sense 
when thought of in terms of memory. Expectation has a similar conceptual relationship to 
memory as again there can be no expectation without memory, or without experience as 
Koselleck terms memory.
1
 Expectations are dependent on memory. For both expecting and 
forgetting memory is essential. Indeed one might well claim that both expecting and forgetting 
are aspects of memory operating in time present, the one operating with time to come and the 
other with time past. Expectations are generally uncertain. The only certain expectation in 
human life is death and as such it is a limit case of expectation. Indeed one could claim that as 
death is certain the only aspect of death that is really open to expectation is when one might 
expect to die. If one brackets out the certainty of death then the concept of expectation takes on 
a social form based on the uncertain outcome of human action and belief.  
 
Brief history of expectation 
Expectation has taken various forms in the history of philosophy and I shall briefly examine 
some of the key forms of expectation. First of all it is a formal aspect of the concept of time in 
Augustine‟s three-fold present as described in Book XI of his Confessions. „The present time of 
past things is our memory; the present time of present things is our sight; the present time of 
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future things is our expectation.‟2 This wide form of expectation takes on different forms 
depending on the context.  
Husserl distinguishes between what he calls the  „remaining-open‟ aspect of expectation 
and the „prophetic‟ „In general, expectation lets much remain open, and this remaining open is 
again characteristic of the components concerned.‟3 The „remaining-open‟ aspect of expectation 
is the acceptance of contingency, in that things may turn out otherwise than expected. The 
„prophetic‟ aspect can take the form of a carefully made plan that has an expected outcome 
judged to be almost certain in its outcome because he planner considers that all likely 
contingencies have been allowed for in the plan. Such a „prophetic‟ expectation still has an 
aspect of „remaining-open‟. Prophesy, the attempt to foretell the future, is an ancient form of 
expectation. A version of „prophetic‟ expectation with a long history is discussed by Frank 
Kermode in The Sense of an Ending.
4
 This is the extraordinarily strong belief in an apocalypse, 
held by a series of religious sects. A belief that a certain date in the future is the day when the 
world will end. This apocalyptic belief is related to what Ricoeur calls „the modalities of 
Christian hope stemming in one way or another from faith in the Resurrection.‟5 By contrast in 
The Conflict of the Faculties Kant attempts to answer the question as to whether „the human 
race is constantly progressing?‟ In order to answer this question Kant introduces the concept of 
a „predictive history.‟ This is „divinatory‟ of „future time‟ and is another form of prophesy. 
Kant‟s discussion of the problem examines various unsatisfactory bases for such divination. He 
concludes that there is, however, an „Event of Our Time‟ which „demonstrates‟ the „moral 
tendency of the human race‟ to progress. This event is the French revolution – „The revolution 
of a gifted people which we have seen unfolding in our day.‟6 For Kant the sympathy of 
spectators such as himself for the cause of the revolution displays a „moral disposition in the 
human race.‟ Kant argues that whatever the eventual outcome of the revolution it opens up the 
possibility of hope for the future progress of the human race. Kant concludes that – „the painful 
consequences of the present war can compel the political prophet to confess a very imminent 
turn of humanity toward the better that is even now in prospect.‟7 As was described in the 
previous chapter, Koselleck argued that a significant change in the idea of history took place in 
the late eighteenth century. Kant‟s „divination‟ is an example of this change in the nature of 
historical time, involving as it does the idea of history having a prospective aspect. Following 
Koselleck‟s analysis Ricoeur claims that „the word “revolution” now bears witness to the 
opening of a new horizon of expectation.‟8 Ricoeur considers Koselleck‟s expression „horizon 
of expectation‟ to be well chosen because it „is broad enough to include hope and fear, what is 
wished for and what is chosen, rational calculations, curiosity– in short, every private or public 
manifestation aimed at the future.‟9 Kant‟s question concerned the progress of the human race. 
Ricoeur argues that progress gave way to utopia. „The idea of progress which still bound the 
past to a better future, one brought closer by the acceleration of history, tends to give way to the 
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idea of utopia as soon as the hopes of humanity lose their anchorage in acquired experience and 
are projected into an unprecedented future. With such utopias, the tension becomes a schism.‟10  
When Thomas More invented his imaginary island Utopia „no place‟ in the sixteenth 
century it was with a critical intent.
11
 This fictional island was contrasted with sixteenth century 
England which was described as a country with a corrupt and unjust society. The corruption and 
injustice, according to More, derived from the misuse of private property. Utopia, by contrast, 
was an ideal society based on communal property. It was not set in the future, but just 
somewhere else on the globe, supposedly recently discovered by a traveller. So the concept of 
utopia has, from its inception, been critical of the present state of society. However, since the 
sixteenth century the idea of utopia has acquired a setting in the future. Utopia thus became 
entwined with the older concept of prophesy. A utopian prophesy involves a further aspect 
which must always have been present within prophesy and that is the hope that the prophesy 
will come about in a future present. Kant‟s „political prophet‟ is looking forward to the hope of 
a better world in the future – it is a utopian hope. Hope is therefore a further form of 
expectation. 
In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant describes three fundamental questions. „All the 
interests of my reason, speculative as well as practical, combine in the three following 
questions: 
   1. What can I know? 
   2. What ought I to do? 
   3. What may I hope?‟12 
Kant argues that „all hoping is directed to happiness‟. Happiness for Kant is the fulfilment of 
our desires by following an absolute morality. Hope for a better future is a key form of 
expectation. Ernst Bloch argued in The Principle of Hope that art as expressed in its materials 
should not be thought of as merely contemplative as in the aesthetics of Kant and Hegel but as 
possessing a „pre-appearance [VorSchein].‟13 A later translation of the same passage from The 
Principle of Hope in a collection of essays and extracts from various texts by Bloch, renders 
„pre-appearance‟ as „anticipatory illumination‟. Bloch understands art‟s anticipatory illusion to 
be „immanent‟ and „completed‟ as opposed to the religious anticipatory illumination which 
points to a belief for the future. The anticipatory illumination of art seems to consist for Bloch 
in the manner in which the materials employed in the structure of an artwork come to an 
„expressed resolution.‟ „Anticipatory illumination itself is the attainable in that the metier of 
driving a thing to its end occurs in the dialectically spread and open space in which any object 
can be aesthetically portrayed.‟14 The way the artwork is constructed or composed is real rather 
than illusory. For Bloch a „real content‟ is utopian, – „the anticipatory illumination is ordered 
according to the dimension and status of its utopian meaningful subject, [and] provides a 
connection to knowledge at the very least, and it provides a connection to the material of 
grasped hope at the very most.‟15 Disconcertingly vague as Bloch‟s formulation of anticipatory 
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illumination is he is clear that it is only „since Marx‟ that anticipatory illusion is attainable.16 
Bloch describes hope as „the utopian function‟17 an anticipation of the real or „concrete utopia‟ 
which „designates precisely the power and truth of Marxism.‟18 Marxist socialism, for Bloch, 
develops utopia into a science. Hope is thus a central part of the concept of utopia for Bloch. 
Utopian hope, as a Marxist science, falls into the category of prophesy. 
 It is now clear that there are a number of different and related modes of thinking about, 
or being aware of the future that, following Koselleck, involve the basic idea of a horizon of 
expectation. Something in the future is expected, it can be described, it can be envisaged, it may 
conceivably become a reality, it can be hoped for. Following Husserl and Heidegger there 
seems to be a general orientation within Western societies towards the horizon of expectation as 
a way of being in the world. This basic mode of expectation involving a horizon is fundamental 
to a whole set of tropes of expectation which include all of the following, boredom, hope, 
prophesy, and belief. Utopia can involve all of these in varying degrees. This mode of 
expectation is also fundamental to merchant trading through the ages and to capitalism. The 
hope and expectation that investment in the present will yield a profit in the future. 
 
Adorno and utopian expectation 
Adorno addresses the idea of utopia in his essay „Aldous Huxley and Utopia‟ in Prisms. 
According to his biographer, Detlev Claussen, this essay originated in a seminar where 
Huxley‟s Brave New World was introduced by Herbert Marcuse.19 The seminar included 
Adorno, Horkeimer, Eisler, and Brecht. It took place in Los Angeles in 1942. Brave New World, 
then a widely read and fashionable novel, became a post-war best seller that in many ways 
exemplified the culture industry, though this aspect of the novel, surprisingly, is not mentioned 
by Adorno. In this essay Adorno characteristically describes society as both „practical‟ and 
„irrational.‟ Society is irrational because commodity production blocks the real needs of 
humanity. Adorno asks what would happen if commodity production were to be abolished - 
„For the first time, productivity would have an effect on need in a genuine and not a distorted 
sense. It would not allay unsatisfied needs with useless things; rather, satisfaction would 
engender the ability to relate to the world without subordination to the principle of universal 
utility.‟20 Adorno criticizes Huxley for failing in his analysis of present day society. „Full of 
fictitious concern for the calamity that a realized utopia could inflict on mankind, he refuses to 
take note of the real and far more urgent calamity that prevents utopia from being realized.‟21  
  In their 1964 discussion of utopia Adorno and Bloch agree that utopia is negative in two 
senses. First because utopia is a negation of the present state of affairs, of the totality of society 
as it is. Utopia is critical in precisely the same sense for Adorno and Bloch as it was for More. 
Bloch points out, early on in the discussion, that utopia historically moved from being spatial to 
being temporal – „there is a transformation of the topos from space into time.‟22 The second 
sense in which utopia is negative is that Adorno argues that it is fundamentally the negation of 
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death. They also agree that the communist East no longer has any interest in utopia. Adorno 
argues that no one category can be utopia, not freedom nor happiness but that utopia must 
involve all categories.
23
 „Whatever utopia is, whatever can be imagined as utopia, this is the 
transformation of the totality.‟24 
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno writes about the impossibility of concretizing utopia. „Art 
is no more able than theory to concretize utopia, not even negatively. A cryptogram of the new 
is the image of collapse; only by virtue of the absolute negativity of collapse does art enunciate 
the unspeakable utopia.‟25 Utopia cannot be concretised, it cannot be spoken about in a positive 
fashion, only by its own collapse into fragments does art point to utopia as something that 
cannot be spoken of. Conceptual thought, „theory‟ cannot discursively account for utopia. Such 
conceptualisation can only be attempted in negative dialectics. Only in antinomical theory that 
is always open can utopia be written about. Yet another aspect of the antinomy of utopia is that 
one must remain resolutely silent about it and yet attempt to articulate it.  Adorno goes on to 
comment that this is „an age in which the real possibility of utopia–that given the level of 
productive forces on the earth could here and now be paradise–converges with the possibility of 
total catastrophe.‟26  
The main way in which Adorno thinks of utopia in Aesthetic Theory is as the negation 
of the administered world encapsulated within the autonomous artwork. In his letter to Walter 
Benjamin of 18
th
 March 1936 Adorno explained his conception of „the autonomous work of art‟ 
as „inherently dialectical; within itself it juxtaposes the magical and the mark of freedom.‟27 
This is the semblance of freedom within the autonomous artwork that serves to operate as a 
negative reflection of society. „In the midst of a world dominated by utility, art indeed has a 
utopic aspect as the other of this world.‟28 There is always, for Adorno, the ever present danger 
of art‟s utopian aspect being identified as affirmative of the society it appears to be opposed to – 
„art may not be utopia in order not to betray it by providing semblance and consolation.‟29 This 
is the utopian antinomy of art. There is, however, still an affirmative aspect to artworks that is 
purely internal. 
 
The constellation of the existing and the nonexisting is the utopic figure of art. 
Although it is compelled toward absolute negativity, it is precisely by virtue of this 
negativity that it is not absolutely negative. By no means do artworks primarily develop 
this inwardly antinomical affirmative element as a result of their external attitude to 
what exists, that is, to society; rather, it develops immanently in them and immerses 
them in twilight.
30
  
 
This internal structure of artworks has a utopian aspect that is specifically related to structure, to 
how it is constructed. This is the utopian aspect to construction according to Adorno which 
takes two forms. The first is that „Unconsciously every artwork must ask itself if and how it can 
exist as utopia: always only through the constellation of its elements.‟31 Construction is rational 
organisation which for Adorno is a central principle behind the irrationality of a rationally 
organised world of total administration.  The rationality of construction in an artwork as the 
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negation of rationality in the administered world is therefore utopian, „the negative appearance 
of utopia.‟32 But this first negative form of utopian construction also points forward to a 
possibility for hope in the future. An original work of art has a utopian aspect that points to the 
future. „The concept of originality, as in Benjamin‟s sense of the “originary”, does not so much 
summon up the primordial as the yet to be in works, their utopic trace.‟33 This is the second 
form of utopian expectation of construction. The form of an artwork, the rational construction, 
is a pointer to, however illusory, perfected forms in the future. „Each artwork is utopia insofar as 
through its form it anticipates what would finally be itself.‟34 This is the not yet existing aspect 
of utopia inherent in artworks. Adorno speculates that highly technical artworks may yet result 
in entirely new forms of art in the future. „The many interelations with technocracy give reason 
to suspect that the principle of construction remains aesthetically obedient to the administered 
world; but it may terminate in a yet unknown aesthetic form, whose rational organization might 
point to the abolition of all categories of administration along with their reflexes in art.‟35 This is 
one of the most important statements Adorno makes in Aesthetic Theory with regard to utopian 
expectation. It is not just that he is envisaging a new „aesthetic form‟ but that the emergence of 
such a form should occur out of rational construction. That the rationality of the adsministered 
world could possibly turn against itself by being taken up by art. „If the utopia of art were 
fulfilled, it would be art‟s temporal end.  …Hegel …betrayed utopia by construing the existing 
as if it were the utopia of the absolute idea.‟36 The end of art for Adorno is co-terminous with 
the end of the epoch of capital and yet paradoxically this end of art is could also be a beginning. 
A further aspect of Adorno‟s ideas about utopia concerns happiness – „Art is the ever 
broken promise of happiness.‟37 Adorno frequently invokes Stendhal in Aesthetic Theory with 
respect to the promise of happiness made by artworks - „art as the promesse du bonheur implies 
that art does its part for existence by accentuating what in it prefigures utopia.‟38 This 
prefiguring is only encapsulated in art. No action in the wider world can produce happiness. 
„Art‟s promesse du bonheur means not only that hitherto praxis has blocked happiness but that 
happiness is beyond praxis. The measure of the chasm separating praxis from happiness  is 
taken by the force of negativity in the artwork.‟39  The expectation of utopia is also tied to 
remembrance in a Platonic sense. In one version of Plato‟s theory of forms the ideal forms have 
been forgotten and can only be retrieved by a form of memory. „Ever since Plato‟s doctrine of 
anamnesis the not-yet existing has been dreamed of in remembrance, which alone concretizes 
utopia without betraying its existence.‟40 The idea of utopia as the not yet existing is conceived 
of by Adorno as funereal, as a memorial - „draped in black … recollection of the possible in 
opposition to the actual that suppresses it; it is the imaginary reparation of the catastrophe of 
world history; it is freedom, under which the spell of necessity did not–and may not ever––
come to pass.‟41  Adorno did not believe political art was necessarily good art however 
politically correct its content.  As the artwork is the negative of the administered world it is 
inevitably political in Adorno‟s view. He makes this clear in a brief discussion of Brecht in 
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Aesthetic Theory. „Praxis is not the effect of works; rather it is encapsulated in their truth 
content. This is why commitment is able to become an aesthetic force of production.‟42   
 
The utopian moment of negative dialectics 
The final aspect of Adorno‟s complex cluster of ideas concerning utopia concerns the issue of 
how to write philosophical theory in the form of negative dialectics. This is Adorno‟s 
epistemological utopia and adds to the understanding of his style of writing in both Negative 
Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory. This idea can be found in the final section of the „Introduction‟ 
to Negative Dialectics which ends with some illuminating comments concerning Adorno‟s 
belief in the utopian aspect of conceptual thought. The subject matter of the last section is 
rhetoric. „In philosophy, rhetoric represents that which cannot be thought except in language.‟43 
Rhetoric is a form of expression and „all approved traditional philosophy from Plato down to the 
semanticists has been allergic to expression.‟44  Only dialectics, according to Adorno can 
„attempt a critical rescue of the rhetorical element.‟45 Rhetoric is a manner of saying something 
without saying it directly, the power of words to convey thoughts that are embodied in language 
by means of the expressive qualities of that language. It is similar to the „more‟ that for Adorno 
can be read in a constellation, the same more that is expressed by an artwork as spirit over and 
above it‟s thing-like elements. Dialectical theory for Adorno has a rhetorical expressive aspect, 
a non-conceptual aesthetic dimension of language. Adorno seems to believe that when 
philosophical theory uses dialectics it is employing rhetoric to express more than the dialectical 
or antinomically opposed concepts say on their own. It is their dialectical relationship that gives 
rise to this expression. „It is in the rhetorical quality that culture, society and tradition animate 
the thought.‟46  The very language of dialectical thought where ideas and concepts are set in 
opposition to one another has resonances beyond the mere form of words because the reader has 
to think about what they are reading. The reader is not discursively presented with a narration to 
read without involvement. The reader is forced to engage with the text by the act of reading it. 
„In dialectics  …the rhetorical element is on the side of the content. Dialectics seeks to mediate 
between random views and unessential accuracy, to master this dilemma by way of the formal, 
logical dilemma.‟47 The setting of ideas in opposition, dialectical or antinomical, is dependent 
on the logic of contradiction, it is entirely logical that such oppositions should be understood as 
contradictory. Yet it is precisely from out of this clash of logical opposition that Adorno claims 
the expressive rhetorical aspect of thought emerges. „But dialectics inclines to content because 
the content is not closed.‟48 Dialectical reflective thought keeps content open [Offenen] as 
opposed to „the formal juridicality of thinking [Denkgesetzlichkeit].‟ This is the aesthetic of 
theory. This is one of the things the title Aesthetic Theory means.  
The final section of the last paragraph of the „Introduction‟ to Negative Dialectics 
concerns utopia and its relationship to this conception of rhetoric.  
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The cognition which wishes for content, wishes for utopia. This, the consciousness of 
the possibility, clings to the concrete as what is undistorted. It is what is possible, never 
the immediately realized, which obstructs utopia; that is why in the middle of the 
existent it appears abstract. The inextinguishable color comes from the not-existent. 
Thinking serves it as a piece of existence, as that which, as always negatively, reaches 
out to the not-existent. Solely the most extreme distance would be the nearness; 
philosophy is the prism, in which its colors are caught.
 49
 
 
 „The cognition [Erkenntis] which wishes for content [Inhalt], wishes for utopia‟ refers to 
Adorno‟s belief that in the world as it is the only form that thought, cognition, can take is in a 
dialectical form that is necessarily incomplete, open and hence does not have a fixed content. 
Only in a changed world could discursive thought, or something like it, re-emerge. „This, the 
consciousness of the possibility, clings to the concrete as what is undistorted.‟ Only in things 
that are actual, that are not distorted by conceptuality can the possibility of utopia be found. „It 
is what is possible, never the immediately realized, which obstructs utopia; that is why in the 
middle of the existent it appears abstract.‟ Adorno has performed a dialectical reversal by 
stating that possibility blocks utopia. The expectation of utopia blocks it; only in immediate 
reality among existing things can utopia be found, yet compared to these utopia seems a pure 
abstraction. „The inextinguishable color comes from the not-existent [Nichtseinden].‟ Because 
utopia does not exist, because it is a possibility in the future it has the status of the non-existent 
and yet it has an inextinguishable colour. Utopia is like a colour that cannot be extinguished. 
This is a poetic metaphor that precisely represents Adorno‟s idea of rhetoric. The reason for this 
metaphor will become clear in the final sentence. But before that we have: „Thinking serves it as 
a piece of existence, as that which, as always negatively, reaches out to the not-existent.‟ 
Thought is the servant of utopia. Negative thought points to that which does yet not exist. 
„Solely the most extreme distance would be the nearness; philosophy is the prism, in which its 
colors are caught.‟ Although utopia is far distant and does not exist it is also close by because 
philosophy is „the prism in which its colours are caught.‟ Negative dialectical philosophy 
catches the colour of utopia. It is the rhetoric of „prismatic thought‟50 that allows the colour of 
utopia to show itself, however illusory such a showing may be. This utopian element involved 
in writing a negative dialectical text is clearly closely related to the utopian aspect involved in 
the construction of an artwork and is another Adornian parallel between art and philosophy. 
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Section Two: Expectation in art – Heidegger and Adorno 
The one-sided relationship 
All the way through this study the figure of Heidegger has been in the background. Many 
philosophers regard Heidegger as one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century 
largely because of his analytical abilities and his re-invigoration of phenomenogy by his stress 
on the centrality of existence in any account of human life and thought. Now the topic of this 
study has moved to expectation it is appropriate to explore the relationship between Adorno and 
Heidegger in terms of their respective conceptions of expectation in relation to their theories 
concerning the work of art. As Samir Gandesha remarks, in his essay „Leaving Home,‟ 
„comparatively little has been written on the complex and fraught question of Adorno‟s relation 
to Heidegger.‟51  Far more has been written about the relationship between Critical Theory, 
Adorno and the post-Heideggarian philosophers of France. In their „Introduction‟ to Adorno and 
Heidegger Iain Macdonald and Krzysztof Ziarek, the editors, address the problem of the 
relationship between Adorno and Heidegger. They describe it as a one sided relationship, in that 
Heidegger, towards the end of his life, is reported as saying he had never read anything by 
Adorno. Whereas Adorno, from the start of his philosophical career to the end, carried out an 
oppositional „polemic‟ with regard to Heidegger‟s work. The editors argue that „Critical 
examination of the material leads in a rather different direction, suggesting that the terms of the 
critique sharpen because there are undeniable points of proximity between Adorno and 
Heidegger.‟ The editors list resemblances such as their respective views on technology, 
positivism, social existence, and ethical problems. „But such resemblances, often superficial, 
rest on a deeper commonality: the imperative that philosophy should serve history and 
experience, that it should be concerned with “relevant things”.‟ 52 Bubner in his article  
„Concerning the Central Idea of Adorno‟s Philosophy‟ argues that Heidegger‟s theory of Being 
in some respects „comes very close indeed to mirroring many of Adorno‟s theses. In order to 
undermine the outward impression that he might have shared similar insights with Heidegger, 
Adorno emphasized, in the strongest possible terms, the substantial differences between their 
two philosophical standpoints.‟53 
Five of Adorno‟s publications directly address Heidegger. His inaugural lecture of 1931 
„The Actuality of Philosophy,‟ opens with „that question which today is called radical and 
which is really the least radical of all; the question of being...‟54 Adorno goes on to criticise 
Heidegger‟s philosophical approach and concludes that „phenomenological philosophy is 
preparing for its own final disintegration.‟55 In his essay „The Idea of Natural History‟ (1932) 
Adorno accuses Heidegger of still being at best an idealist and at worst tautological.
56
  
„Heidegger says that it is no mistake to move in a circle, the only concern is to enter it in the 
proper fashion. I am inclined to agree with him. But if philosophy is to remain true to its task, 
then entering the circle correctly can only mean that being which determines or interprets itself 
as being makes clear in the act of interpretation the element through which it interprets itself as 
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such.‟57 Over thirty years later in The Jargon of Authenticity Adorno attacked Heidegger‟s use 
of language, „Heideggerrei,’58 as well as his whole philosophical position. In Negative 
Dialectics Heidegger is „the crucial interlocutor.‟59 In „Art and the Arts‟ (1967) Adorno devotes 
three paragraphs to discussing Heidegger: „Heidegger‟s text on the „Orgin of the Work of Art‟ 
in Holzwege has the merit of  providing a sober account of  the thing-like nature of art objects, a 
feature that, as Heidegger remarks with justifiable irony, the much acclaimed aesthetic 
experience cannot ignore.‟60 Adorno goes on to point out that Heidegger claimed „that all art is 
essentially poetry‟ and that „Heidegger specifically emphasized the linguistic nature of all art.‟61 
Adorno then proceeds to accuse Heidegger of being vague: „this vagueness infects Heidegger‟s 
metaphysics of art, turning it into a tautology. The origin of the work of art, he maintains 
emphatically, is art. And, as always in Heidegger, origin is a matter not of genesis in time but of 
the essence of works of art.‟62 Furthermore as Adorno states in the last of these three 
paragraphs, „in the case of Heidegger, art is dissipated in a realm of pure essences without 
content.‟63 By contrast Adorno always stresses the importance of the inner structure of an 
artwork. There are critical references to Heidegger scattered throughout Adorno‟s texts. The 
Swabian spectre haunts his thought throughout Aesthetic Theory. 
Gandhesa makes it clear that Adorno had read Heidegger‟s „The Origin of the Work of 
Art‟ essay on its first publication (1950) in Heidegger‟s collection of essays Holzwege because: 
„Adorno tried to persuade Horkheimer to review Heidegger‟s text Holzwege for the journal Der 
Monat, stating that – “Heidegger was in favour of false trails that are not very different from our 
own”.‟64 There are remarkable apparent parallels between Heidegger‟s views on art and those of 
Adorno. Both have an orientation to time, history and expectation, however, these orientations 
differ significantly because their conceptions of time, history and expectation are not the same. 
Adorno understands modern art as developing by negation of previous work. This is a form of 
expectation of change in art, of the ceaseless production of the new. He never argues that this is 
an improvement, or progress, or evolution because (as was discussed in chapter three) artworks 
are individual and singular. It is one of the antinomies of art for Adorno that artworks are utterly 
singular and yet at the same time part of the wider concept of art. This is precisely why a monad 
is such a good model, both for the individual artwork and for art in general, because a monad is 
both a particular and a universal. For Adorno artworks cannot be judged one against another, 
they are either art, or they are not art. This series of modern artworks is located for Adorno in 
the historical era of the development of capitalism. The revolutionary expectations that this era 
held in the time of Beethoven and later articulated by Marx have clearly not been realised. 
Heidegger also believes that art is temporal and historically situated but that certain works of art 
open a horizon of expectation for a new era. This is a form of expectation in art, a mode of 
prophesy that can only be understood at a later date. This is a strange conception of time.   
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Great art 
In their respective discussions of art and artworks, Adorno and Heidegger seem to share the 
view that in any such discussion only artworks of the highest rank are worthy of discussion. 
Heidegger states this to be the case in a revealing aside in The Origin of the Work of Art: „The 
work is to be released by the artist to its pure self-subsistence. It is precisely in great art - and 
only such art is under consideration here - that the artist remains inconsequential as compared to 
the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to 
emerge.‟65 This phrase, whether consciously or not I cannot judge, echoes Wittgenstein‟s final 
remarks in the Tractatus about throwing away the ladder as a metaphor for discarding first 
simple thoughts in developing  complex conceptions.
66
 Great art is conceived by Heidegger as 
foundational art. It is art that helps define the quality of truth in the Being of an epoch. In this 
sense, art looks forward in time, even if this looking forward is identified retrospectively. The 
epoch, whether it is Greek civilisation or the middle ages, is conceived as historical, as 
temporal, as a form of macro Dasein in the shape of  „the destiny of an historical people‟67 „The 
origin of the work of art - that is the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to 
say of a people‟s historical existence - is art. This is so because art is in its essence an origin: a 
distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical.‟68 Just as Dasein 
lives towards death, so epochs also develop and have an existence that will end in death. The art 
of the epoch is temporal (although not in the same sense as Dasein) for it too will die at the end 
of the epoch. „The beginning already contains the end latent within itself.‟69 When an epoch 
ends, the memory of it can, to a limited extent, be preserved in its art by the „preservers‟. A new 
epoch will create new art specific to and indicative of, the truth of its founding.  
An account of great art and aesthetics occurs in Heidegger‟s lectures on Nietzsche. „For, 
in truth, the fact whether and how an era is committed to an aesthetics, whether and how it 
adopts a stance towards art of an aesthetic character, is decisive for the way art shapes the 
history of that era - or remains irrelevant for it.‟70 The shaping of the history of an era is a form 
of prophetic expectation. Great founding art for Heidegger is prospective, it looks forward, it 
opens up possibilities. „Aesthetics begins with the Greeks only at that moment when their great 
art and also the great philosophy that flourished along with it comes to an end.‟71 Precisely what 
historical period is being alluded to here is unclear, but it is probably that the „great 
philosophy‟of the Greeks consists of the fragments of the Pre-Socratics, particularly those of 
Parmenides and Heraclitus and that the inauguration of aesthetics come later with Plato. 
However what is being set up is the idea that aesthetics follows on from an end of art which is a 
thoroughly Hegelan idea. It soon becomes apparent, that the modern age is an age of aesthetics, 
and thus an age of „irrelevant art‟. 
 
The third basic development for the history of knowledge about art, and that now means 
the origin and formation of aesthetics, is once again a happenstance that does not flow 
immediately from art or from meditation on it. On the contrary, it is an occurrence that 
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involves our entire history. It is the beginning of the modern age. Man and his 
unconstrained knowledge of himself, as of his position among beings, becomes the 
arena where the decision falls as to how things are to be experienced, defined and 
shaped.
72
 
 
The modern age is the age of subjectivity, of the scientific investigation of the human, and of 
the failed attempts to unify science under philosophy. Aesthetics, then, is understood by 
Heidegger as an expression of the „modern age,‟ an integral part of the historical development 
of „man.‟ 
  
What makes art great is not only and not in the first place the high quality of what is 
created. Rather, art is great because it is an “absolute need”. Because it is that, and to 
the extent it is that, it also can and must be great in rank. For only on the basis of the 
magnitude of its essential character does it also create a dimension of magnitude for the 
rank and stature of what is brought forth. 
Concurrent with the formation of a dominant aesthetics and of the aesthetic relation 
to art in modern times is the decline of great art, great art in the designated sense.
73
 
 
So greatness in art, quality in art, for Heidegger, is ultimately dependent on this concept of 
„absolute need.‟ The structure of these two linked concepts, of greatness in art and „absolute 
need‟ for art looks circular, as each depends on the other. Art must be great so it can fulfil the 
„absolute need.‟ If the art fulfils the need, it is great. Art must be great precisely because it has 
fulfilled the need. It is art‟s ability to fulfil the need that enables history to judge it to be great 
art. This is very similar to Marcuse‟s idea of great art as „a self-validating hypothesis.‟ 
Heidegger goes on to explain that the aesthetics of Hegel is the high point of aesthetics and at 
the same time another point where great art comes to an end. Art continues but it is no longer 
great „in the designated sense‟. Aesthetics after Hegel, on Heidegger‟s account, becomes 
increasingly scientific in two senses. Aesthetics becomes an historical investigation of facts 
about art as a part of art history and aesthetics also develops as a psychology of art.   
 
Truth in art 
In „The Origin of the Work of Art‟ Heidegger develops his concept of truth, first described in 
Being and Time as „Dasein‟s disclosedness.‟74 Truth for Heidegger is not propositional but 
ontological, it is the disclosedness of Being. „Being (not entities) is something which „there is‟ 
only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far as and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth 
„are‟ equiprimordially.‟75 In The Essence of Truth Heidegger makes it clear that for him 
propositional truth is a second order form of truth based on the „disclosedness‟ of being. „Truth 
as correctness is grounded in truth as unhiddenesss. …Truth as correctness of assertion is quite 
impossible without truth as the unhiddeness of beings. For that to which the assertion must 
direct itself, in order to be correct, must already be unhidden.‟76 Heidegger‟s account of truth is 
bound up with time and historicity precisely because the significance of an important disclosure 
of truth can only be recognised at a later time. „Genuine historical return is the decisive 
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beginning of authentic futurity. …In the end it is historical return which brings us into what is 
actually happening today.‟77 
Daniel Dahlstrom identifies a „triangulation‟ in Heidegger‟s account of truth in Being 
and Time. This triangulation is between being, truth and time.
78
 Heidegger‟s account of truth is 
thus radically temporal. This time is not what Dahlstrom calls „a fleeting time, the time of the 
world,‟ such ordinary time, according to Heidegger, is less fundamental than „ecstatic 
timeliness‟ and is based on it.79 So just as there is a more fundamental form of time for 
Heidegger so there are also more fundamental forms of truth and being. Truth for Adorno is not 
propositional either. As was discussed in chapter three for Adorno, truth understood as truth 
content is historical, embedded in the construction of an artwork, and understood as part of its 
spirit and identified only by philosophical interpretation. In his „Notes on Philosophical 
Thinking‟ Adorno gives an account of philosophical truth. „Thoughts that are true must 
incessantly renew themselves in the experience of the subject matter, which nonetheless first 
determines itself in those thoughts. The strength to do that, and not measuring out and marking 
off conclusions, is the essence of philosophical rigor. Truth is a constantly evolving 
constellation…‟80 Truth for Adorno is temporal, it is renewed afresh in experience whether is 
aesthetic or philosophical experience. Indeed separating the two is virtually impossible because 
in Adorno‟s theory of the artwork aesthetic experience of an artwork depends on philosophical 
interpretation to uncover the truth content of the work at a particular historical moment. It seems 
that truth for Adorno is not to be found in theoretical structures, whether in the sciences or a 
philosophy, but in the details of material reality as experienced at an individual level. 
 
Resistance to the decline of reason would mean for philosophical thinking, without 
regard for established authority and especially that of the human sciences, that it 
immerse itself in the material contents in order to perceive in them, not beyond them, 
their truth content. That would be, today, the freedom of thinking. It would become true 
where it is freed from the curse of labor and comes to rest in its object.
81
 
 
 By contrast in his later essay „On the Essence of Truth‟ Heidegger argues that truth is not 
propositional and maintains that „The essence of truth is freedom.‟82 The essence of this freedom 
lies in the openness of the disclosure of Being, a disclosure that is at the same time a 
„concealing.‟ The truth of Being had, as we learned at the start of Being and Time, been 
„forgotten‟ historically by metaphysics. „In the thinking of Being the liberation of man for ek-
sistence, the liberation that grounds history, is put into words. …the ably conserved articulation 
of the truth of being as a whole.‟83 There is an implication here that Heidegger thinks of his 
entire project of the „overcoming of metaphysics‟ as an historical event, a founding event for a 
new epoch of history. Lambert Zuidervaart argues that for Heidegger understanding „is 
essentially futural.‟84 Zuidervaart also argues that both Heidegger and Adorno share very much 
the same insight „into the nonpropositional and disclosive character of artistic truth.‟85 
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Zuidervaart identifies Heidegger‟s concept of authenticity as central to his theory of 
truth because in terms of understanding, „authenticity has a projective character and is future 
orientated.‟86 Zuidervaart also criticises Adorno‟s concept of philosophical experience as having 
an „elitist element‟ in that „by describing others as incapacitated by the societal system, he has 
effectively disqualified them as participants in the critical process.‟87 Different as Heidegger‟s 
and Adorno‟s conceptions of authenticity and experience are, Zuidervaart argues that both serve 
to underpin truth in their respective conceptions of truth in a „nondiscursive‟ way. „Both of them 
recognise that truth is not simply a theoretical concern, that truth must be borne out in 
contemporary lives and practices and institutions.‟88 This vague and un-contentious judgement 
does not go far enough towards uncovering the parallels between Adorno and Heidegger. 
Heidegger‟s idea of the aspect of truth as a founding event of history is developed in 
„The Origin of the Work of Art‟ where he makes it clear that the truth of the work is „in‟ the 
work: „In the work, the happening of truth is at work. But what is thus at work is so in the 
work.‟89 The entire essay is as much about truth as about art. It is his analysis of art that enables 
Heidegger to develop his concept of truth.  Heidegger introduces the artist as „maker‟ of the 
work, more specifically as „creator‟ of the work: „to create is to let something emerge as a thing 
that has been brought forth. The work‟s becoming a work is a way in which truth becomes and 
happens.‟90 A few pages later we read: „Createdness of the work means truth‟s being fixed in 
place in the figure. Figure is the structure in whose shape the rift composes itself. This 
composed rift of the fugue of truth‟s shining. What is here called figure [Gestalt] is always 
thought in terms of the particular placing [Stellen] and enframing [Ge-stell] as which the work 
occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth.‟91 This description by Heidegger looks close to 
Adorno‟s idea of the work as a construction, a „gestalt‟ is a structured whole, but the difference 
lies in the importance Heidegger attaches to the placing of the work in society, for Heidegger 
the work is not autonomous. The importance of the work of art, its truth, is only revealed 
retrospectively. It depends on the development of history precisely because it has affected this 
development. It is a hermeneutic circle of understanding. The past affects the future but the 
effect can only be identified in the future retrospectively. The importance of the work along 
with its truth can only be identified at the end of the era it founds. This mirrors Hegel‟s eras of 
art only the first of which would have been foundational in Heidegger‟s sense. This also is very 
close to Adorno‟s idea that the art of the past is best illuminated by the art of the present, and 
similarly that theory in the present can reveal truths implicit in theories of the past. This 
hermeneutic circle of understanding that they both share is one of the closest parallels between 
Adorno and Heidegger. 
In The End of Art Eva Geulen takes up the topos of the end of art in both Adorno‟s 
Aesthetic Theory and Heidegger‟s The Origin of the Work of Art essay. She questions „whether 
in the last analysis Adorno is concerned with art or even with aesthetic experience, or if these 
are actually functions of a latent theory of language.‟92 Guelen is right to raise this concern  to 
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the extent that Adorno‟s theoretical position with regards to both art and philosophy is a form of 
„reading‟ which inevitably involves a theory of language but it is in my view better understood 
as a theory of meaning in the epistemological sense. By contrast she argues that Heidegger fails 
to „escape aesthetics‟93 because he still ties art to truth in keeping with the idealist Romantic 
tradition. Geulen traces Heidegger‟s various re-formulation of Hegel‟s „end of art‟ topos in the 
appendices to „The Origin of The Work of Art‟ essay and concludes that „the familiar end of art 
appears on the horizon wherever Heidegger commits art to beginning, founding, and anchoring 
history.‟94  For Heidegger the end is always a beginning even if it cannot be recognised as such 
at the time. 
   Heidegger‟s „preservers‟ have a form of true knowledge of the work as opposed to a 
mere „aestheticising connoisseurship of the work‟s formal aspects.‟95 This is in effect Heidegger 
pointing to an  ontological understanding of the work of art, it is the work of art as a form of the 
truth. Heidegger never says that the work requires philosophy to complete it as does Adorno but 
rather that the „preservers‟ have a form of true experience of the work. Heidegger also states 
that: „The proper way to preserve the work is co-created and prescribed only and exclusively by 
the work. Preserving occurs at different levels of knowledge, with always differing degrees of 
scope, constancy, and lucidity. When works are offered for sheer artistic enjoyment this does 
not yet prove that they stand in preservation as works.‟96 Heidegger has already stated in his 
example of the Greek temple that, whilst it still discloses a world which no longer exists, it can 
be now be no more than a form of remembrance of that world. This remembrance can only be 
preserved by what Heidegger calls „the art industry.‟97 „But even this remembrance may still 
offer to the work a place from which it joins in shaping history. The work‟s own peculiar 
actuality, on the other hand, is brought to bear only where the work is preserved in the truth that 
happens through the work itself. The work‟s actuality is determined in its basic features by the 
essence of the work‟s being.‟98  A few pages further on we find: „Thus art is the creative 
preserving of truth in the work. Art then is a becoming and happening of truth.‟99 
„Truth, as the clearing and concealment of beings, happens in being composed. All art, 
as the letting happen of the advent of truth of beings, is as such, in essence, poetry.‟100  By 
poetry Heidegger explains he does not mean that all art is linguistic in the sense of a written text 
but in the sense of being enabled by language understood in a wider sense. „Language, by 
naming beings for the first time, first brings being to word and to appearance. Only this naming 
nominates beings to their Being from out of their Being.‟101 In this sense of poetry as language, 
art is „the setting-into-work of truth.‟ „The essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in 
turn, is the founding of truth.‟102  Truth „is thrown‟ towards the preservers, „ a historical group 
of human beings‟103 and in this manner truth in art becomes a founding event in history. 
„Whenever art happens–that is, whenever there is a beginning–a thrust enters history; history 
either begins or starts over again.‟104 Both art and thinking are truth as a founding event, both 
the overcoming of metaphysics and the creation of a work of art are origins. For Heidegger this 
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founding event is only historical in the sense that it founds the history of an epoch. A founding 
event of truth looks forward in expectation but is only identified retrospectively in memory in 
the same manner as Hegel‟s three epochs and their forms of art are identified retrospectively. 
For Heidegger by contrast the significance of the artwork entirely depends on its position as a 
founding event of truth in the history of an epoch. An importance that can only be identified 
retrospectively and makes an important artwork a social event in time.  
 
Epochal expectations 
Whether Heidegger‟s concept of the „Gestell‟ of the technological world of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries is an epoch the truth of whose founding was inaugurated by great art is not a 
question that is addressed in the „Work of Art‟ essay. Neither is the obverse, as to whether the 
age of technology fails to be a truly authentic epoch precisely because it is not founded on great 
art. Heidegger‟s concept of the „Gestell‟ of the technological world of the twentieth century 
structurally plays much the same role in his later thought as does „the administered world‟ of 
monopoly capitalism in Adorno‟s work. Each concept acts as an ultimate opposition to art. 
These are political positions; Adorno has a left-wing position, whereas Heidegger holds a right-
wing position.  
In „The question Concerning Technology‟ Heidegger uses „the word Gestell as the 
name for the essence of modern technology.‟ He explains that „Enframing [Gestell] means the 
way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing 
technological.‟105 Heidegger clearly understands this „Gestell’ as a form of revealing of 
unconcealment, „lets what presences come forth into unconcealment.‟106 The discussion takes an 
extremely interesting and revealing turn a page later when Heidegger explains that whilst in 
chronological time modern „machine power technology‟ started in the eighteenth century and 
the „modern physical science‟ that made it possible started earlier in the seventeenth century 
these dates alone do not provide the truth „historically.‟  There is chronological history in which 
this sequence of discoveries can be traced but for Heidegger this is not  „real‟ history (with 
apologies to Marx!). This is because as the Greeks knew and stated – „That which is earlier with 
regard to its rise into dominance becomes manifest to us men only later. That which is primally 
early shows itself only ultimately to men.‟107 This means that the „real‟ historical truth of the 
gestell of technology is much earlier than ordinary history would account for and can only be 
identified at a later stage. The identification of the origin of technology is thus thrust forward in 
time in exactly the same way as for art.  Two pages later this concept of „real‟ history is 
described. It results from „a way of revealing, destining [Geschick]. It is from this destining that 
the essence of all history [Geschichte] is determined. History is neither simply the object of 
written chronicle nor merely the process of human activity. That activity first becomes history 
as something destined‟.108 This he states is what makes ordinary chronological history, which he 
calls „historiography,‟ as a „science‟ possible. 
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This discussion has now reached a position where the parallels and differences between 
Adorno and Heidegger theories of art can be made explicit.  They both stress the significance of 
great art but for entirely different reasons. For Heidegger only „great art‟ can disclose truth as an  
historical founding event. For Adorno great artworks are the only form art takes, everything else 
is not art.  So there is a shared stress on the importance of great art, even if the meaning of the 
concept differs markedly. There is a perception by Adorno that in the modern age it is 
increasingly difficult to create important works of art, whereas for Heidegger it is impossible to 
create „great art‟ in the age of technology. For Heidegger, the modern age is the framework of 
the technological age at work; for Adorno, it is the administered world of monopoly capitalism. 
Heidegger‟s „Gestell‟ and Adorno‟s „administered world‟ play virtually the same role as 
oppositional constraints. For both, artworks are historical, but they have a very different concept 
of history. For Heidegger this points backwards to a golden age in the past to a founding of 
history at the time of the revelation of truth by the artwork. For Adorno aesthetic history is the 
history of the autonomous singular works of modern art understood from the point of view of 
the present moment. They both have a utopian aspect to art. For Adorno it is the freedom 
encapsulated however illusorily with the construction of a modern work of art in contrast to the 
negativity of the administered world within the spirit of successful artworks. This is paralleled 
in Heidegger. In the final chapter of The End of Philosophy Heidegger introduces the idea of an 
„unworld‟ which is very closed to Adorno‟s concept of the administered world. „In the age of 
the exclusive power of power, that is, of the unconditional pressing of beings toward being used 
up in consumption, the world has become an unworld in that Being does presence, but without 
really reigning.‟109 
Heidegger‟s idea that art is foundational in origin, foundational for an epoch of history 
also involves a prophetic utopian expectation. It could be argued that they share a Hegelian 
impulse to identify epochs of art however different the construction of these epochs are. 
Adorno‟s conception of autonomous modern musical art being „founded‟ with Beethoven (why 
Beethoven is better than Bach) also parallels Heidegger‟s idea that the Greek temple founds a 
civilization. Both rely on a similar concept of a work, of an artwork, or work of art, even though 
Adorno, being better attuned to contemporary art than Heidegger, acknowledges the 
fragmentary nature of the most modern works, this fragmentariness is, for Adorno, nevertheless 
built into the concept of the modern artwork from Beethoven onwards. For both philosophers 
there is a time of understanding of an artwork, the life of an artwork. For Heidegger this is tied 
to the existence of an epoch, for Adorno it is tied to the time of interpretation  and perishing. For 
both Adorno and Heidegger the historical time period of modernity can be interpreted as an 
epoch orientated to expectation. For both of them, a community of specialists keep the art alive, 
keep it in memory. Both of them employ the idea that the significance of an earlier artwork can 
best be appreciated at a later date in the present. For Heidegger it is only at a later date that the 
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epoch the significant work helps to found can be recognised. The recognition of the work 
becomes the recognition of the epoch.  
At the end of the Technology essay Heidegger suggests that possibly „essential 
reflection‟ and „decisive confrontation‟ with technology „must happen in a realm‟ that is both 
similar and dissimilar to it, for example, art. „But certainly only if reflection upon art, for its 
part, does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth, concerning which we are questioning.‟ 
110
 It is a surprise to discover Heidegger‟s „constellation of truth.‟ The surprise is not that 
Heidegger‟s constellation and Adorno‟s constellation involve the use of the same word, it is that 
it seems that for both of them, and this may well be the deepest similarity, philosophy involves a 
form of questioning reflection. In Adorno‟s case ideas and concepts are juxtaposed in a 
constellation and then critically reflected upon. In Heidegger‟s approach a relentless questioning 
revolves around the virtually fixed constellation of Being, time, truth and disclosedness. 
Heidegger uses a set of apparently different, but for him clearly related, subject areas, such as 
Dasein, art, technology and poiesis in this questioning under his fixed constellation.   
The parallels between Adorno and Heidegger are striking despite their obvious artistic, 
political and philosophical differences. Fundamentally they differ over their respective views on 
truth. For both Adorno and Heidegger truth is non-propositional. For Heidegger truth is a 
foundational revealing as exemplified in a great work of art that serves to found an historical 
epoch. Thus both the truth, the work and the epoch are only identifiable after the event. Whilst 
the work looks forward, it is only identified retrospectively. For Adorno by contrast the truth 
content of a work of art is a historically changing constellation of aesthetic elements as 
interpreted by philosophy. The truth content of a work of art is revealed, illusory as it is, by the 
external forms of interpretation, commentary and critique, but in an uncanny parallel to 
Heidegger this is always best done from the point of view of the present as retrospective 
understanding. 
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Section Three: Antinomy and mimesis in the expectation of aesthetics  
The two aspects of expectation examined so far in this chapter are clearly related for Adorno: 
first, the various conceptions of utopia, and second, the historical era of capitalism understood 
as opening with Beethoven for Adorno and as being inaugurated by Hölderlin for Heidegger. 
This final section will examine a third aspect of expectation concerned with the survival and 
expectation of aesthetics as embodied in the antinomic and mimetic relationship between 
philosophical aesthetics and art theory.   
All these question revolve around Adorno‟s interpretation of the world, what in chapter 
two I described as his ethical position. Adorno has certain „prejudices‟ that a reader needs to be 
aware of when reading Aesthetic Theory. These prejudices are overwhelmingly coloured and 
shaped by Adorno‟s view of the negative totality that is late capitalism at work in the over-
administered world. These prejudices also include Adorno and Horkheimer‟s concept of the 
dialectic of Enlightenment as fundamental, as well as the important idea of the non-identical 
that is always in danger of escaping conceptuality. These prejudices include a dependence on a 
negative form of philosophical thought, negative dialectics. This form of philosophy makes its 
philosophical interventions through constellations and models that are open to interpretation. 
The prejudices also include the idea of the autonomous artwork-monad as the negation of the 
administered world. In addition the slow change of art into increasingly negative forms 
produced a crisis for philosophical aesthetics. As far as art is concerned, these prejudices 
involve the idea that artworks are constructed in such a way, that they can be completed by 
interpretation at the level of philosophical critique.  
It is in the very form of this reflective critique, described in the first section of this 
chapter, that Adorno identifies a utopian moment, the aesthetic of theory. In addition this aspect 
of the play of language was identified in Adorno‟s conception of mimesis. Negative dialectics is 
a form of philosophy that takes its cue from also being the negative of the administered world. 
This is Adorno‟s hermeneutic circle, the interpretation of the world, of art, of philosophy and of 
history, are all related. Without that particular interpretation of the world the other positions 
could not be constructed in the forms they take. As was argued in chapter two, Adorno‟s 
interpretation of the world is both under-theorised and over-determined. Assessing the success 
or failure of Aesthetic Theory does not simply rest on accepting or rejecting Adorno‟s ethical 
political position and associated prejudices. It is true that without that ethical position the theory 
of the artwork and the theories of philosophy and history no longer possess the coherence 
provided by his Marxist belief. His theory of meaning is not based in Marxism, nor is his 
fundamental view concerning the interpretation of the artwork.  
In this study philosophical analysis has revealed the structure of Adorno‟s theory of 
meaning in terms of midpoint, constellation and parataxis. Lacoue-Labarthe in his discussion of 
Heidegger‟s reading of Plato maintains that „representation‟ is a form of mimesis. „Mimesis is 
always from like to same. For such is the law of representation–or of (re)presentation 
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(Vostellung and Darstellung, here more than ever are dissociable):‟111 Talking this view into 
consideration means that it is possible to interpret the paratactical reading of a constellation of 
concepts, the „representation‟ of that constellation as a reading that is a form of mimesis. This 
puts mimesis at the heart of Adorno‟s theory of meaning as a mimesis of understanding. The 
mimetic re-presentation, the reading, of a paratactical constellation is not fixed anymore than 
the interpretation of a work of art is fixed. This mode of looking at representation reveals a 
mimetic relationship between Adorno‟s theory of the artwork and his conception of 
philosophical aesthetics. It has also revealed the aesthetic hidden in the very form of his 
reflective antinomical theory. For Adorno critique means attending to the work in the works 
own terms and to do this a subject has to immerse themselves mimetically in an intuitive 
manner to grasp the work of art in its own terms which are non-conceptual, fleeting and 
illusory. The task is to bring the work to completion in critique. In this sense the critique is a 
mimesis of the work, but it is also opposed to the work simply because it is other to the work. 
So the critique and the work also have an antinomical relationship. Critique has other demands 
or constraints put upon it because for Adorno it has to account for the work‟s antinomical 
mimesis of the other of the administered world of late capitalism in which and against which in 
the most general terms the work was created and constructed. If a work does not fulfil this 
fundamental demand in comportment with Adorno‟s beliefs then it sinks below the level of art 
and becomes merely a product of the culture industry. It is only by means of the absolute 
position of art, that the possibility that the world could be other than it is, is preserved. The other 
place where utopian hope is preserved lies is in language. This is in the rhetoric of philosophical 
language, in the non-conceptuality buried in the conceptual, in the mimesis borne out of magic 
that is still a part of rationality and lies at the heart of his theory of the dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Critique itself then also holds the possibility, the potential, for pointing as does 
art, however illusory this may be, at the hope for utopia.  
Adorno, as we saw in the preface, advised that in reading Kant or Hegel it was 
necessary to keep in mind the wider intentions of these two philosophers so as to be in a better 
position not to get lost in the minutiae of possibly conflicting detail. So what might Adorno‟s 
wider intentions be with regards to Aesthetic Theory? In one sense it is his „third critique‟, as 
Negative Dialectics is his „first critique‟. It was well known he planned to write what would, on 
this suggested schema, have been his „second critique‟ on moral philosophy.112 In this desire to 
write an unsystematic system for the twentieth century can be seen the wider intentions as well 
as his close affinity to Kant. As in Kant the link between pure critique, as negative dialectics, 
and morality is the aesthetic, is art.  In 1931 Adorno described philosophy as a text which has to 
be read as „incomplete, contradictory and fragmentary.‟113 This judgement on philosophy could 
well be extended to his last work Aesthetic Theory. It is certainly incomplete, it is certainly 
contradictory and it is undoubtedly fragmentary. Aesthetic Theory is a recent „memory‟ of the 
philosophy of art. Over thirty years since its initial publication in Germany, over twenty years 
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since its initial translation into English and over ten years since its second translation into 
English, the „Now Time‟ of Aesthetic Theory is to be simultaneously still in reception and 
already partially forgotten. This is the contemporary antinomy of Aesthetic Theory. What now 
seems valuable and relevant about Aesthetic Theory and what antiquated and best forgotten? 
Indeed this question leads to a wider question to which Aesthetic Theory is in my view the key 
and this concerns the antinomical and mimetic relationship of philosophical aesthetics as a 
contemporary discipline to the multiple disciplines of art-form theory. 
 
Expectation in Kant and Hegel 
Ever since the time of Kant art has had an horizon of expectation built in as part of its 
conceptualisation. Kant‟s treatment of genius in The Critique of Judgement is a good indication 
of this. „Genius is the talent that gives the rule to art‟.114 This is a prospective form of mimesis, 
it could be called a mimesis of expectation.  Kant uses this to ground his ideas about art in the 
reality of social life as opposed to nature, though the idea of a genius is humanity acting as if it 
were a force of nature. Kant expects artists to „imitate‟ the example of the genius. Such a 
prospective view on the creation of new art would also include a canon of prohibitions, of things 
it is no longer acceptable to do. All this has a prospective aspect that is mirrored in three areas. 
In Kant‟s understanding of „predictive history‟ as a predictive history of art. In the area of 
morality in the hope for happiness and a good outcome. And finally in his critical philosophy 
itself which implicitly claims to „give the rule‟ to philosophical doctrine.  
If the topic of a form of expectation was implicit in Kant another form of expectation 
involving an end was made explicit by Hegel. This is Hegel‟s theory that the end of art as the 
highest possible spiritual experience has already happened by the then, present day Romantic 
era. Art would still continue but not as the „the highest mode in which truth fashions an 
existence for itself.‟115 So it is clear that art has continued, does continue and will continue 
under the banner of what Hegel calls „the „after‟ of art.‟ 
 
Thus the „after‟ of art consists in the fact that there dwells in the spirit the need to 
satisfy itself solely in its own inner self as the true form for art to take. Art in its 
beginning still leaves over something mysterious, a secret foreboding and a secret 
longing, because its creations have not completely set forth their full content for 
imaginative vision. But if the perfect content has been perfectly revealed in artistic 
shapes, then the more far-seeing spirit rejects this objective manifestation and turns 
back into its inner self. This is the case in our own time. We may well hope that art will 
always rise higher and come to perfection, but the form of art has ceased to be the 
supreme need of the spirit.
116
 
  
Hegel‟s „after‟ of art includes the art of his present. For Hegel, Beethoven seems to be 
unimportant indeed he never mentions the leading contemporary composer of his day in his 
Lectures on Fine Art.
117
  The „after‟ must refer to all art that follows the point when art ceased 
to be „the supreme mode of our knowledge of the Absolute.‟118 This theory appears to leave 
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open the possibility of a form of repetition, a repeat of art‟s perfection under the Greeks, about 
which we can only „hope.‟ This is not just a hope that art will continue in the future but that it is 
once again capable of coming to „perfection‟ not as an art which is „the supreme need of the 
spirit‟ but for itself within its own sphere as art. The supreme knowledge for Hegel is of course 
philosophy. Adorno is a Hegelian to the extent that for him truth is only available through the 
medium of philosophical thought. 
 
The Draft Introduction to Aesthetic Theory 
Whilst the whole of Aesthetic Theory is in some sense about the expectations of art and 
aesthetics, one section in particular, the „Draft Introduction‟ is wholly concerned with 
philosophical aesthetics, with both its history, in Kant and Hegel in particular, and with the 
survival and expectations of aesthetics. The „Draft Introduction‟ to Aesthetic Theory is an 
extended meditation on the state and possibility of philosophical aesthetics. Whilst I accept that 
this draft would have been re-written it seems to me extremely unlikely that all reference to the 
state and possibility of aesthetics would have been removed. In one sense this introduction is 
too discursive and not as dialectically structured as the main sections of Aesthetic Theory and on 
this ground alone would have been re-written, it reads like a lecture. Aesthetics is after all what 
Aesthetic Theory is about, it is the central subject of the book, the impossibility and yet 
necessity of theory in relation to art.  
 The „Draft Introduction‟ opens with the idea that „The concept of philosophical 
aesthetics has an antiquated quality.‟119 Adorno then quotes a long critical comment about the 
current state of aesthetics by Ivo Frenzel which in turn contains a quotation from Moritz Geiger. 
Adorno states that whilst this critical account of aesthetics  „well describes the situation, it does 
not sufficiently explain it.‟120 As far as Adorno is concerned the „reason for the obsolescence of 
aesthetics is that it scarcely ever confronts itself with its object.‟121 In other words philosophical 
aesthetics must start from the experience of the artwork and not from some universal concepts 
which are brought to bear on it. Adorno argues that it is „the unconscious consciousness in the 
midst of the work itself‟122 that is important. This is about mimesis. It is what Adorno calls the 
mimetic comportment of the  subject who experiences the artwork. It is only in the experience 
of the work that truth will be found. „All aesthetic questions terminate in those of the truth 
content of artworks: Is the spirit that a work objectively bears in its specific form true?‟ 
Aesthetics has nothing to do with bourgeois pleasure in art. „For most people aesthetics is 
superfluous.‟123 The „flagging interest in aesthetics‟124 is indeed to do with the apparent 
obsolescence of aesthetics but has much more to do with the continued existence of art. For 
Adorno philosophical aesthetics seems to  „silently …imply the possibility of art. This position 
has become uncertain.‟125 This is because of the existence of anti-art which is described here as 
„art that holds fast to its concept and refuses consumption.‟ In other words, art that is 
autonomous, totally negative and yet still claims to be art. Art that „seeks refuge in its own 
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negation.‟126 Art that negates its own concept as art effectively freezes out philosophical 
aesthetics if all that aesthetics can offer is theories derived from other forms of art in the form of 
false universals.  Such art cannot provide reflection upon itself, for this it needs a reflective 
philosophical aesthetics which for Adorno „is demanded by the development of artworks.‟ This 
reflection is carried out by „commentary and critique‟ that have in turn to be „honed to 
aesthetics. The truth content of an artwork requires philosophy.‟ This cannot be achieved by the 
simple employment of existing „conventional‟ aesthetic categories. Such conventional 
categories need to be „elucidated‟ and subjected to „concrete dissolution‟. This is „the only 
remaining form aesthetics can take.‟127 Philosophical aesthetics is also partly dependent on the 
„critical self-awareness of the artist‟ who must „embody reflection‟ within the artwork so it „no 
longer remains external and foreign to it; this would be the role of aesthetics today.‟128 Adorno 
thinks that aesthetics can only be conceived of as „dialectical aesthetics.‟ This is because 
philosophical aesthetics has to keep up with philosophy just as it has to keep up with art. 
Contemporary philosophy for Adorno has no option in the present state of the world to be 
anything other than dialectical. „Aesthetics must no more lag behind art than behind 
philosophy.‟129 This means that aesthetics must follow the exemplar in philosophy of Negative 
Dialectics. Adorno conceives of modern art as the negative contrary to the administered world 
in the form of spirit. „Only as spirit is art the opposite of empirical reality, which becomes the 
determinate negation of the existing world order.‟130 The spirit, and hence the truth, of any 
artwork can only be discovered by philosophy, by philosophical aesthetics. „The determination 
of the spirit in artworks is the highest task of aesthetics.‟ Above all Adorno reminds his readers, 
„Aesthetic theory…has as its arena the experience of the aesthetic object.‟131 Only by total 
immersion in the experience of an artwork is a true form of understanding going to be achieved. 
„Artworks are understood only when their experience is brought to the level of distinguishing 
between true and not true.‟132 The truth content of artworks is their „cognitive constitution‟ they 
are in effect „a form of knowledge‟ however incomprehensible they may appear to be. „The task 
of a philosophy of art is not so much to explain away the element of incomprehensibility …but 
rather to understand the incomprehensibility itself.‟133  There was a time in the nineteenth 
century, according to Adorno, when art and science shared the same ratio or rationale. For 
example Seurat used what he thought were the latest scientific theories about how colour vision 
worked. 
 
Whereas in the history of art scientific theories tend to wither away, without them 
artistic practices would no more have developed than, inversely, these theorems can 
adequately explain such practices. This has consequences for reception: It is inadequate 
if it is less reflexive than the object it receives. Not knowing what one sees or hears 
bestows no privileged direct relation to works but instead makes their perception 
impossible.
134
 
 
 Knowledge and interpretation are essential components for any attempt to understand the 
incomprehensible. If an incomprehensible work is not just baffling but is meant to be not 
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understandable, then what one is left with, as Adorno realised, is trying to understand why 
something cannot be understood. The prime example of what cannot be understood for Adorno 
is the world. The world should not be as it is. The only set of explanations that make any sense 
of why the world is as it is are those derived from the theories of Marx. That works of art are 
incomprehensible in an almost incomprehensible world means that they point, for Adorno, to a 
possibly different future world. In this way the negativity of such artworks encapsulates a 
utopian expectation. 
The immersion in the experience of a work of art is, for Adorno, multifaceted. He gives 
as an example a Beethoven symphony where it is not just a question of being able to appreciate 
and understand „the purely musical course.‟ The listener also has to be aware of wider aspects of 
significance such as being able to hear „the echo of the French Revolution‟ in the music. 
Philosophical aesthetics must be able to able to do justice to the music of Beethoven by being 
aware of its historical setting as well as experiencing the music in the twentieth century. „Not 
experience alone but only thought that is fully saturated with experience is equal to the 
phenomenon.‟ The aesthetician must bring to the work „true consciousness of the external 
world‟ because only such consciousness „participates in the work‟s immanent coherence.‟135 
Truth inheres not just in the internal construction of the work but also in the social dimension as 
well and both are required for aesthetic theory to understand the sprit of the work and hence 
identify its truth content. Both the artistic and the social dimensions are, as in the case of 
Beethoven, historical. „History is immanent to the truth content of aesthetics.‟136 Aesthetics also 
has to be able to deal with aspects of art that are „radically temporal.‟ Beethoven is used again in 
another example concerning the short temporal nature of certain figures in his music. The 
example from the sonata Les Adieux concerns „an evanescently fleeting association‟ reminiscent 
of the sound of „horses hooves.‟ This quickly passing evocation of trotting horses is just as 
important for Adorno as other aspects of the music. „Only a philosophy that could grasp such 
micrological figures in its innermost construction of the aesthetic whole would make good on 
what it promises.‟ Whilst it is critically important for Adorno that aesthetic reflection must 
immerse itself in the particularity of an artwork nevertheless „second reflection …moves in a 
medium removed from artworks.‟137 In an important sense this is a central antinomy of 
Adorno‟s philosophical aesthetics – that it must be able through interpretation commentary and 
critique to immerse itself fully in the structure of an artwork entirely within the terms of that 
artwork and yet retain its external theoretical structures.  
 For Adorno all artworks are historically located in three senses. In terms of the social 
aspects they encapsulate, in terms of the particularity of their form and structure and in terms of 
the external theoretical philosophical aesthetics and art theory of their time. All these three 
aspects are, Adorno seems to believe, encapsulated in the artwork. „It is in the dimension of 
history that the individual aesthetic object and its concept communicate. History is inherent to 
aesthetic theory. Its categories are radically historical.‟ It is precisely the practical and 
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theoretical problems that surround art „the problem nexuses‟ that point to the future expectation 
of art. These problems „lead to what art has yet to become and that in which aesthetics would 
ultimately have its object.‟138 To merely interpret artworks without taking the wider 
philosophical view embodied in negative dialectics would be to fail to reach the truth of art. The 
„Draft Introduction‟ ends with the idea I examined in the previous chapter that the latest works 
should be used to interpret the work of the past. As this commentary has demonstrated the 
„Draft Introduction‟ to Aesthetic Theory does encapsulate the central aspects of Adorno‟s theory 
of art in respect of the expectation of philosophical aesthetics. 
 
The expectations of art and theory 
The very title Aesthetic Theory stages both an antinomy and points to a mimetic relationship. In 
chapter one I suggested the title could be read as an antinomical paratactical title. By this I 
meant that the two concepts, aesthetic and theory, oscillate between themselves as un-resolvable 
opposites, hence the ambiguity in the title many commentators had noticed. However, at that 
stage in this investigation, I had not appreciated that as a mini constellation in paratactical 
tension the two words also had a mimetic relationship for Adorno. The mimesis by theory of art 
and the converse by art of theory. This is both a mimesis of the other, in that the two realms of 
aesthetic and theory are separate, and a mimesis of the same, because art depends on theory to 
complete it. This is an antinomy because the two forms of mimesis, mimesis of the same and 
mimesis of the other are contradictory and resolution is held open. Theory is a mimesis of the 
non-conceptual experience of the work of art, in broad terms traditionally known as aesthetics 
and more commonly nowadays thought of as art theory. Where aesthetics ends and where art 
theory begins is a deeply ambiguous arena. In a sense Aesthetic Theory is the „after‟ (in Hegel‟s 
terms) of philosophical aesthetics. It is primarily a book about aesthetics. Aesthetic Theory does 
not contain any detailed examinations of works of art that demonstrate Adorno‟s reflective 
philosophical aesthetics at work. It is a dialectical and antinomical survey of the concepts of 
philosophical aesthetics written from the point of view of Adorno‟s own theory of the artwork. 
It is constructed as a dislocated, deconstructed fragmented system. This is precisely why it is so 
difficult to follow. It is not meant to be followed but to force the readers to think for themselves 
about the problems that are introduced. Antinomical negative dialectics is not meant to be 
coherent, it is meant to be deconstructive. The coherence comes from Adorno‟s own theory of 
the artwork which  is mirrored by both his conception of philosophy and his conception of 
history. These in turn are, for Adorno, the only forms that art, philosophy and history can take 
under the conditions of late capitalism.    
For Adorno the chronological history of autonomous art is a sequence of negation. This 
sequence of negation can be understood as I suggested in chapter three as a negative mimesis 
that drives the expectation of new work. Adorno‟s phrase „Every work is the mortal enemy of 
the other‟139 neatly encapsulates the germ of the idea of a form of end of art understood as the 
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negation of one work by the next in the historical sequence of modern artworks. It also holds the 
concept of the uniqueness of each work of art as central to the idea of art. This is a temporal 
dialectical sequence that only goes one way in its classic formulation. This is the essence of the 
theoretical system of the concept of art in modernism.  
In parallel to this sequence of artworks runs the sequence of theories about art. Kant, 
Schelling, Hegel, Beaudelaire, Croce, Lukács, Benjamin and Heidegger are all part of a 
sequence of theories of the philosophy of art, of philosophical aesthetics. This sequence can, in 
parallel with the sequence of works of art, be understood as mimetic as one theory negates and 
or builds on the previous one. I suggest Adorno thinks that each of these theorists, in line with 
the artwork sequence, is best understood from the standpoint of the present. For Adorno any 
work or theory in the sequence can only be fully understood and appreciated from the 
standpoint of the present which is effectively the end, albeit temporally, of the sequence. In 
Hegel the end of art is a mode of understanding, whereas for Heidegger, the end of art occurs as 
one epoch replaces another, but the new epoch can only be understood, can only be identified 
from a later position, the present. Aesthetic Theory is itself located at a temporary end in the 
present time of the late 1960s in which it was created. Just as Adorno claims works of art of the 
past can best, and perhaps only, be understood and appreciated from the standpoint of the 
present, so for him the sequence of philosophical accounts of art known generally as 
philosophical aesthetics can be best understood from the standpoint of the present reality of an 
antinomical negative dialectics. It is a paradoxical form of de-historisation of the history of 
aesthetics.   
Adorno argued in his late essay, „Art and The Arts,‟140 that the distinctions between art 
forms were breaking down in the late 1960s. In the visual arts for example the old pivotal 
distinction between painting and sculpture had started to dissolve early in the twentieth century 
and had been almost entirely eroded during the 1950s and the 1960s as new practices were 
invented and as other hitherto separate practices were included as visual art. Art in all forms has 
continued the trend that was already visible to Adorno in the 1960s of diversification into multi-
faceted practices right across the sphere of art so that in no one sector is there a dominant genre. 
What is dominant is diversity. The multi-face is the face of art and has become the fate of art. 
The being of art has morphed into the endlessly new ever-same in multiplicity. Critique has 
also, of necessity, morphed into a multiplicity of art form discourses. It is difficult enough to 
decide what fits under the cover title of visual culture let alone to discern any central 
theorisation that could claim to encompass the multiplicity of practices encompassed by that 
label. The same is true in other sectors of art.   
One could also argue that during the same historical period the distinction between 
theoretical forms was also breaking down. This breakdown between theoretical forms is visible 
in Aesthetic Theory which is undoubtedly an interdisciplinary text drawing on a wide range of 
sources. As discussed in chapter one, Adorno draws on concepts and theories from many 
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different disciplines under the wide framework of a Marxist point of view. Philosophical 
aesthetics is of course only one part of the wider discourse on art. This wider discourse enlarged 
itself considerably during the twentieth century as new disciplines developed based on academic 
studies of linguistics, literature, cultural studies and the wider history of ideas. New discourses 
emerged such as hermeneutics. Older art form disciplines such as the history of art and 
musicology were in many ways informed by the far older theories of philosophical aesthetics. 
The identification of disciplines, of inter-disciplinarity or trans or multi-disciplinarity is possible 
only from the perspective from which these identifications were made. A good example is 
Adorno‟s philosophy of music. 
Adorno was an influential musicologist as well as a sociologist and philosopher. His 
texts on music are musicology, but because they are informed and shaped by his philosophical 
position they are at the same time, from his point of view, interventions into philosophical 
aesthetics. Adorno was consciously writing a philosophy of music immersed in the detail of the 
music and yet at the same time is formed in its expression by his philosophical position of 
negative dialectics. The musicological texts are only a form of philosophical aesthetics because 
they are constructed in accordance with a theory that originates in Adorno‟s own philosophical 
theoretical position. Without that antinomical–dialectical approach these texts on music would 
be interventions into musicology, of interest primarily to musicians and musicologists but of no 
particular interest to philosophers. There is, however, an Adornian antinomy here that undercuts 
the interdisciplinary nature of these texts. At any level of musical detail and expertise, Adorno‟s 
texts on music cannot really be understood or judged except by a musicologist who has also, 
ideally, become fully acquainted with Adorno‟s philosophical and sociological position. So in a 
sense, a musicologist such as Max Paddison, who has carried out such wider studies, is in a 
better position to criticise Adorno‟s texts on music than is a philosophical theoretician not 
trained in musicology. Without a detailed background in musicology a philosopher has to 
remain silent at the level of musical detail. This is one of the disciplinary dilemmas facing any 
philosophically trained commentator on Adorno‟s texts about music. It is also a dilemma that 
confronts any writer of philosophical aesthetics in the present day who comments in detail on 
any art form. It is clear from the historical record that what Adorno had to say about music was 
extremely influential and respected by many contemporary composers and musicologists of his 
time. But, as he clearly realised, the further a discussion about the details of any artwork moves, 
in terms of expertise, it becomes an increasingly  specialist activity. This is the interdisciplinary 
nature of the cross-over between philosophical aesthetics and art form theory. Essentially art 
form theory discourses are related to philosophical aesthetics historically, but operate as 
separate discourses in their own right which nevertheless still reference philosophical aesthetics. 
This leads to the overall question of the meaningful survival of philosophical aesthetics as a 
discipline theorising about any art forms in the present day. One obvious way of distinguishing 
between aesthetics and art theory in the present, is the pragmatic one of noting that those 
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theoreticians trained in the tradition of philosophy and philosophical aesthetics are more likely 
to use the word aesthetics to describe their interventions into art theory. As I noted in the first 
chapter, Hegel, in his discussion of the unsatisfactory use of the word aesthetics pointed out it 
was a „mere name‟ and that as it had an established, albeit contradictory, usage it might as well 
go on being used, as it has been and most probably will.  
How is philosophic aesthetics to be recognised in the present day? How can it be 
distinguished from art theory? Is it just that it is  written by philosophers keeping a tradition 
alive? Is there any real difference anymore and why might it matter? Philosophical aesthetics 
cannot simply be recognised as theory about art for this takes many forms. Art historians 
theorize about art, psychologists have a sector concerned with the psychology of art, literary 
theorists write about literary texts, music theorists write about music and sonic art, film theorists 
write about film, and the same is true for animation, dance, theatre, visual art, jazz, rock, pop, 
television, radio, and all the variations on these forms, the cross-over forms and the multi-
dimensional multi-disciplinary events, happenings, installations, social, political and 
environmental activist arts and cyber-culture.  All of these arenas have theoretical expertise, 
knowledge, agreed rankings, re-valuations and each of these arenas has many forms 
recognisable under the familiar tags of traditional and avant-garde. Each of these arenas has sets 
of audiences for different sectors within the arena. All of these art-form theorisations could be 
simply called aesthetics as a very wide general name. But, in such an expanded field 
philosophical aesthetics would be as difficult to identify as it is now. The historical marker that 
philosophy bears would be an indentifier. As I pointed out in chapter one, modern European 
philosophy is an ancient study that constantly refers back to theorisations that are hundreds, and 
often thousands of years old. This distinguishes philosophy from sociology, psychology and 
anthropology for example. It distinguishes philosophy from virtually every other discipline. 
Philosophers still make use of theories from the Bronze Age in their reference to ideas from the 
era of the pre-Socratic philosophers. This continual referencing back is an important 
distinguishing factor and is the marker for philosophical aesthetics as well. Philosophical 
aesthetics can most easily be recognised by its relationship to earlier texts that lie within the 
same field. This has the obvious danger of making philosophical aesthetics simply an 
historically orientated study, a self-contained discourse that comments on itself. That Aesthetic 
Theory is now a part of that historically orientated discourse is both ironic and inevitable. It is 
ironic because one of the central themes of the book is Adorno‟s insistence on the particularity 
of the artwork. Artworks, for Adorno, are not judged by external norms but make their own 
norms visible to interpretation. Inevitable, because the central antinomy that runs through 
Aesthetic Theory is between the particularity of any interpretative response to an artwork and 
the fact that such a response cannot but help make use of the heritage of concepts and language 
of traditional philosophical aesthetics. Adorno famously accused Kant and Hegel of writing 
major philosophical aesthetics „without knowing anything about art‟ but the reverse is also 
 176 
ironically true that knowing a great deal of detail and having experience of any particular 
artwork form means nowadays that the resulting text will be art-form theory as opposed to 
philosophical aesthetics. This again raises the question that seems to be implicit in Aesthetic 
Theory as to whether traditional philosophical aesthetics is redundant as anything other than a 
historical study. One dead end would be to try and argue that philosophical aesthetics should be 
understood as a higher level set of theorisations on art and art theory. This would be as 
unreasonable as philosophy trying to claim intellectual hegemony over sociology and 
psychology for example. Even though such disciplines can be shown to have emerged 
historically from philosophy, they are no longer a part of philosophy. Such disciplines have 
developed their own theoretical reflections on their multiple activities and are now independent 
of philosophy.  
Aesthetic Theory does seem to imply that a large scale philosophical treatment of art – 
an „aesthetics‟ – of a 1960s now would be impossible to write, if indeed it was ever possible. 
This is surely Adorno‟s central message in Aesthetic Theory. That a discursive generic 
aesthetics is an impossible project. This is largely because of the increase in the numbers of 
disciplines forced on theoreticians by the continual growth of new media in the arts. In this 
sense then, philosophical aesthetics as a discipline dealing with contemporary art in all its forms 
has come to an end. This study of Aesthetic Theory leads me to suggest two judgements on 
Aesthetic Theory. First, that a large scale comprehensive treatment of philosophical aesthetics 
for the present day is an impossible task. The second judgement is that philosophical aesthetics 
has no expectations as a discourse that can or should theorise about the multi-forms of art that 
now exist. Philosophical aesthetics continues as an historical study. 
As far as the first judgement is concerned it is clear that Adorno understood aesthetics 
to be inherently dialectical and radically temporal. There is a sense in which the entire history of 
aesthetics is encapsulated within Aesthetic Theory from Plato to Lukács and Benjamin and on to 
Adorno himself. This history is inevitably contradictory. Competing theories are set in 
dialectical opposition to each other not so that some grand synthesis can emerge from the 
conflict but that so the nature of the conflict itself can be examined. This conflict being 
inherently dialectical and antinomical is for Adorno not resolvable. There can be no one overall 
aesthetic „theory‟ other than Adorno‟s own theory of the artwork. This central idea as we have 
seen is a development of the Jena romantic idea that artworks are in a sense completed by 
reflective theory, by interpretation. It is the radically incomprehensible works of 1960s art that 
bring this central assumption to a crisis point for Adorno.  
The second judgement on philosophical aesthetics implies that the expectation of 
philosophical aesthetics is now limited to its memory, limited to looking back. A great deal of 
philosophical aesthetics as practised today in academic circles is precisely an examination of 
aspects of the memory of philosophical aesthetics, it is a looking back, an industry of re-
evaluations of theories from the short history of philosophical aesthetics. This is an archaeology 
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of philosophical aesthetics. As long as there is a memory of philosophical aesthetics that is 
found interesting enough to re-examine then the expectation of philosophical aesthetics is of a 
growing field of historical studies. The present of Aesthetic Theory is to be a part of its own 
interpretative history as a portion of the wider texts that go to make up the academic industry 
known as Adorno studies. In 1969, the original present of Aesthetic Theory, the unfinished text 
existed only as a private project of its author. Forty years later it is a public project with a rich 
history of interpretations. In this sense the present of Aesthetic Theory is then defined as a 
temporary end point in this growing phenomenon.  
As far as art theory is concerned there is an enormous corpus of texts spanning a range 
of disciplines, musicology, philosophy, cultural studies, art theory, psychology, sociology and 
literary studies. Many texts in these interrelated theoretical forms claim Aesthetic Theory as 
relevant, in the same way as they might claim Kant or Hegel or Croce are relevant. This claim 
of relevance often consists of a theoretical mimesis of Aesthetic Theory. Many texts in art 
theory make reference to Adorno‟s ideas and theoretical positions. This is precisely because the 
field is the same. There is a sense in which Aesthetic Theory stages an antinomical relationship 
between philosophical aesthetics and art theory. There is a mimetic relationship between 
philosophical aesthetics and art form theory. Both imitate and have borrowed from each other 
and both in turn have a mimetic relationship to art. And yet Aesthetic Theory carries off the 
trick, the illusion of being both a major text in the field of aesthetics and the harbinger of the 
possible end of aesthetics. On the one hand, Aesthetic Theory signals the end of philosophical 
aesthetics as anything other than an historical study, and on the other hand it is still an attempt 
to theorise about contemporary art. Art-form theory cannot be synthesised into a whole 
aesthetics. But, and this is perhaps the central antinomy of Aesthetic Theory, in creating this text 
Adorno has left us an  aesthetics. It gives an account of art, shows its relation to society, its 
structure, shows how its mimetic non-conceptual intuitive critique becomes conceptual critique 
in pursuit of truth. In other words Adorno has done what I suggested he implicitly claimed was 
no longer possible.    
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